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  ABSTRACT  
 
Hyde, Jason (Ph.D., Philosophy) 
CARING SATISFACTIONISM: A New Theory of Personal Welfare 
Thesis directed by Assistant Professor Christopher Heathwood 
   
 Some lives go better than others.  On this fact there is virtually no 
disagreement.  If that is true, then what makes it so?  Answers to this question 
are theories of personal welfare.  This dissertation provides such a theory that 
claims, roughly, that a life goes better for the person who lives it to the extent 
he gets what he cares about getting and he believes he is getting those things. 
 This dissertation is structured as follows.  The Prologue properly frames 
and details the importance of the issue of personal welfare.  Chapter One 
examines two of the main types of personal welfare theories.  Objections to 
those theories are raised, and some general principles of welfare are formulated 
in response to those concerns, including that desires play at least some role in 
the correct theory of welfare.  Chapter Two takes a preliminary look at desire 
theory⎯the third and final main type of personal welfare theory.  It considers 
and rejects the possibility that something in addition to desires affects welfare 
before taking stock of the challenges that face any desire theory.  Chapter 
Three begins by considering whether a unified theory of welfare for all beings 
exists before rejecting this idea.  The main focus of the chapter, however, is 
putting in place the foundations of the proposed theory as found in the works 
of Harry Frankfurt.  Frankfurt’s works on a variety of topics are covered in 
great detail because part of the problem in the debate over desire theory stems 
from the failure to view desires in their proper and broader context as an 
integral part of the human psyche.  Chapter Four considers some popular 
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forms of and objections to desire theory in order to collect the remaining 
conceptual tools required to build the correct theory of personal welfare.  
Chapter Five explains this theory in full, extols its virtues, demonstrates how it 
resolves the two most difficult objections facing any desire theory, and shows 
how it resolves a deep conceptual confusion within desire theory.  Finally, the 
Epilogue details the meaning of life and shows how Caring Satisfactionism is 
perfectly consistent with it. 
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What gives this mess some grace unless it's fictions 
Unless it's licks, man 
Unless it's lies or it's love? 
     —Okkervil River
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PROLOGUE: WHO CARES? 
One sticks a finger into the ground to smell what country one is in; 
I stick my finger into existence⎯it has no smell.  Where am I?  
What does it mean to say: the world?  What is the meaning of that 
word?  Who tricked me into this whole thing and leaves me 
standing here?  Who am I?  How did I get into the world?  Why was 
I not asked about it, and why was I not informed of the rules and 
regulations but just thrust into the ranks as if I had been bought 
from a peddling shanghaier of human beings?  How did I get 
involved in this big enterprise called reality?  Why should I be 
involved?  Isn't it a matter of choice?  And if I am compelled to be 
involved, where is the manager⎯I have something to say about 
this.  Is there no manager?  To whom shall I make my complaint?  
After all, life is a debate⎯may I ask that my observations be 
considered?  If one has to take life as it is, would it not be best to 
find out how things go? . . . Will no one answer me?  Is it not, then, 
of the utmost importance to all the gentlemen involved?  
(Kierkegaard 2000: 112) 
 
Kierkegaard is not right about much, but his first instinct after he finds 
himself in existence⎯to register a complaint or two⎯is certainly justified (see, 
e.g., genocide, cancer, tsunamis, pedophilia, Alabama, etc.).  After all, no one 
has ever asked to be brought into existence, and one might hope that a 
situation in which one is compelled to be involved would be better, on the 
whole, than what has so far transpired on this planet.1 
However, to complain is to do something.  If you are going to complain, is 
that the first thing you should do?  Should you complain at all?  This train of 
thought should inevitably lead to the more general question: What should I do?  
After a bit of reflection on this question, a slightly more specific question that 
Kierkegaard hints at should come to mind: What should I do in order to have 
                                       
1 Friedrich Nietzsche (1966: 344) refers to it as “that gruesome dominion of 
nonsense and accident that has so far been called ‘history.’” 
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my life go well for me?  Or, in more general terms: What makes a life go well for 
the person who lives it?  I think this is the most important question.  That is a 
bold claim.  Why, you might ask, do I think this is the most important 
question?  I will get to that answer in due course, but first let us get a better 
understanding of the question. 
Some lives go better for the people who lives them than other lives.  This 
is an idea that is accepted by everyone, or quite nearly everyone, until it is 
brought up in a philosophical context.  A simple thought experiment should 
help to make this clear.  Suppose I had come to you before you began to read 
this and asked you the following question: Would you please tell me how your 
life could go such that it would be as good as possible of a life for you, or, 
alternatively, such that it would be as bad as possible for you?  You might have 
little to say at first, but this would be due to your being caught off guard and 
wanting more time to think about your answer (much like you would be if a 
genie popped up and asked what your three wishes were), but it would not be 
because you thought there was no answer to this question. 
 One mistake you may make in answering this question, at least from the 
philosopher’s point of view, is that you may mention something that will make 
your life go better, but only contingently so.  For example, you may identify 
having more money as something that will make your life go better.  If this is 
true for you, it is merely contingently true.  In other words, having more money 
might make your life go better, but only in light of your particular 
circumstances at the time.  For instance, if, at the same time I deliver your 
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additional funds, all minds other than yours go out of existence, then the 
money will not make your life go better, as you will have no use for money qua 
money.  Another way of saying this is that money is only instrumentally 
valuable (i.e., it is valuable only for what it will lead to).  What the philosopher 
wants to know about this question⎯commonly referred to as the question of 
personal welfare, well-being, or prudential value⎯is what is intrinsically 
valuable for a person to have (i.e., what is valuable in and of itself for a person 
independently of any consequences or effects it may have). 
 One might object to this way of conceptualizing the problem at the outset 
by claiming that a list of instrumentally good things, like money, would answer 
the relevant question just as well since these things do lead to the intrinsically 
good things (otherwise, obviously, they would not be instrumentally good).  The 
first problem with this approach is that these instrumental goods will be very 
different for different people.  For example, giving $10,000 to almost any 
graduate student I know will be instrumentally good for them, but it will almost 
certainly not be instrumentally good for Bill Gates.  It is hard to tell a story 
about how an additional $10,000 will lead to anything at all of value for him.  
This indicates a more basic problem with this approach.  Money, to the extent 
it is instrumentally valuable, may be classified as such only because it can lead 
to the attainment of things that are intrinsically valuable.  In other words, 
instrumental value can be explained as such only in relation to intrinsic value.  
Intrinsic value does not need instrumental value to be explained and, 
accordingly, intrinsic value is the more basic concept. 
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 Therefore, my project will be to locate the thing or things that are 
intrinsically valuable for a person such that having it or them makes a person’s 
life go better for that person.  This is, of course, the task for any theory of 
personal welfare if it is to be a theory of welfare at all.  But why do we want a 
theory of personal welfare at all?  After all, we could agree that some lives go 
better than others, but still maintain that the theory that accounts for this fact 
is unimportant.  There are at least three related reasons why I think this 
question⎯what makes a life go best for the one who lives it⎯is the most 
important question one can ask and, accordingly, why everyone should care 
about what the correct theory of personal welfare is.2 
First, suppose someone were to stop you on the street and ask, “Do you 
want to have a good life?”  Your first inclination would probably be to think 
that someone was attempting to have a laugh at your expense.  After all, why 
would anyone stop you and ask you a question with such an absurdly obvious 
one-word answer?  However, the next question, after you give the almost 
obligatory answer of “yes” to the first, should make the practical importance of 
this line of questioning clear: “What, then, makes a good life for the one who 
lives it?”  Here, it seems to me, everyone should grasp the critical significance 
of this question as it relates to his or her own life.  Indeed, how is one 
supposed to go about having a good life if one has no idea what having a good 
                                       
2 Later I will claim that there cannot be valid claims concerning what you 
should care about unless something is known about what you do care about.  
Since you are reading this, I will assume that you care about, at a minimum, a 
life⎯either your own or someone else’s. 
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life consists of?  Hitting a target without knowing where the target is or what it 
looks like is purely a matter of luck.  And while luck may (or may not) play a 
role in living a good life, it should not be the star in a one-man show. 
 Another reason to be concerned with personal welfare involves the lives 
of the people closest to you, the lives of people whom you will never know, and 
everyone in between; for you will probably find yourself in a position from time 
to time of wanting to do something that will make the lives of these people go 
better for them.  You may even, at times, want to do something that will make 
their lives go worse (e.g., you may want to punish a child or someone who has 
wronged you).3  Also, the people in your life will probably ask you for advice on 
occasion regarding what they consider to be very important issues in their 
lives.  How should you go about these tasks?  What is the essence of making a 
life go better or worse?  How will you know if you succeeded or failed in your 
attempt? 
 Finally, personal welfare is an essential element of any plausible moral 
theory.  Supposing one wants to be a morally good person, how is one to go 
about this task?  What makes morally right acts morally right?  Here one might 
want a fully general moral theory to guide one’s actions.  If so, one aspect of 
evaluating a moral theory will probably be how the welfare of persons at least, 
and maybe that of all sentient beings, figures into the theory.  To see why 
                                       
3 It is, of course, very controversial whether it is ever morally permissible to try 
to make someone’s life go worse.  This clearly should not be the goal with 
punishing a child.  The case is less clear and more controversial when it comes 
to punishment of adults guilty of a criminal offense.  (See David Boonin’s The 
Problem of Punishment for a good discussion of whether it is ever morally 
permissible to attempt to make someone’s life go worse.) 
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personal welfare needs to be taken into account in an adequate moral theory, 
consider the following fully general moral justification: WP⎯An act is morally 
right if and only if it produces a wooden pickle.  WP is absurd, and many 
objections could be leveled against it.  However, one of the main objections 
surely must be that it gives no consideration to the welfare of any person.  This 
objection seems fatal to any moral theory against which the objection may be 
leveled.4 
 Now that we have a better idea of what a theory of personal welfare is, we 
should take a brief look at what it is not.  A theory of personal welfare is not a 
theory about morality generally, nor is it a theory about what makes the world 
a better place.  So there is nothing incoherent, on its face, about the statement 
that action X made Xander’s life go better for him, even though it was a morally 
wrong act or it made the world a worse place, or both.  However, it may turn 
out that a theory of personal welfare will be connected with these other 
concepts.  For example, one could make the claim that being good for the world 
is solely a function of personal welfare⎯a theory referred to as “welfarism.”  In 
the same way, one could claim either that personal welfare is a function of 
personal moral goodness⎯a view held by Aristotle, among others⎯or that 
personal moral goodness is a function of personal welfare⎯a view held by Ayn 
Rand, among others.  The point here is that all these ideas require claims in 
addition to those about personal welfare and, accordingly, are distinct from 
                                       
4 Amartya Sen (1985: 185) makes a similar point when he says, “It would, of 
course, be altogether amazing if moral goodness had nothing to do with well-
being.” 
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claims about personal welfare.  A theory of prudential value is a theory about 
what has intrinsic value for the particular person under consideration.  A little 
imagination should be able to produce scenarios in which other good things, if 
there are any, are not good for any particular person. 
Before we proceed down the tracks, there are a couple of objections to 
this project as a whole that should be addressed.  One is the epistemic 
objection (i.e., how do you know if one life goes better than another?), and the 
other is the metaphysical objection (i.e., there is no fact of the matter of 
whether one life goes better than another).  As to the latter objection, I have a 
difficult time believing anyone actually believes this.  In order to maintain this 
objection, you must also maintain that it is not true (or false) that Albert 
Einstein had a better life than a child born in Poland in the 1930s, herded into 
the Warsaw Ghetto, and then gassed in the early 1940s in Auschwitz.  I could 
continue with examples, but if that one leaves you cold then it is not clear you 
can be warmed.  Whatever the source of the anxiety over this question, the 
metaphysical objection is not the most plausible place to exit the train. 
 The epistemic objection, on the other hand, is more promising.  After all, 
it is always an interesting and valid question for all knowledge claims: How do 
you know?  There are a couple of comments to make here.  First, the point of 
the objection cannot be either that questions such as these should not be 
pursued or that pursuing them has no value on the basis of the answers being 
dubitable.  If that were the point of the objection, then that same objection 
would be equally devastating for every interesting question about our lives and 
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the world we inhabit.  After Descartes’s (1996: 15) Evil Demon, even the things 
we take most for granted about ourselves⎯other than, perhaps, our own 
existence⎯are dubitable.  So the fact that all the answers to a question have 
some level of doubt attached to them cannot serve as a reason to reject the 
question itself unless one wants to alternate between pondering the mere fact 
of his own existence and working out math problems.  David Hume (1993: 73) 
provides the right answer on this point: “A wise man . . . proportions his belief 
to the evidence.”  And evidence, mostly in the form of arguments, is what you 
will find in the pages that follow. 
 The other point to make about the epistemic objection is made quite well 
by Bertrand Russell (1988: 156-61): 
 The value in philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its 
very uncertainty.  The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes 
through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common 
sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from 
convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-
operation or consent of his deliberate reason.  
 . . . . 
Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite 
answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, 
be known5 to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions 
themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of 
what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish 
the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against 
speculation. 
 
                                       
5 Russell should have claimed that we cannot be certain about the answers, 
rather than claiming that we cannot know the answers.  Although there is a big 
difference between these claims, his point is still well taken. 
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I suppose the bottom line for me is that, regardless of the inherent difficulties, 
the issue of personal welfare is one that everyone should be interested in, 
particularly once a person understands how intimately it touches her life.6 
                                       
6 And to those people who are not interested, I propose starting a new era of 
name-calling (philosophy is woefully deficient in the fun that is ad hominem 
attacks).  Aristotle (Metaphysics: 4.1006a) called people who accept 
contradictions “vegetables”; I propose calling the people who are not interested 
in the question at hand “fruits.”  Having these kinds of fruits and vegetables in 
your life⎯while perhaps intermittently entertaining⎯will probably make your 
life go worse. 
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CHAPTER ONE: OBJECTIVE-LIST THEORY & HEDONISM 
 So what does make a life go better for the person who lives it?  Hopefully, 
both the import of the question and the question itself are now clear.  And so 
the search begins.  Of course, how one goes about looking for something will 
usually have some effect on how successful one is in finding it.  The 
methodology I intend to follow will be to first set out and evaluate some of the 
established theories of personal welfare.  In so doing, I will consider various 
objections to the theories, but will focus on those that give the most insight 
into and advance us toward an adequate theory.  During this process, I hope to 
propose and then refine some basic and essential personal welfare principles 
that any adequate theory will have to properly countenance.  Finally, I will put 
forward my own theory, extol some of its virtues, and defend it from various 
objections.  
I. OBJECTIVE-LIST THEORIES 
 When discussing the lives of others and assessing how well those lives 
may be going, we often make assumptions about what things are good for a 
person to get.  One of the most common examples in twenty-first century 
America is going to college.  So we will often hear that a parent worries about 
her child going to college, hopes her child will go to college, expects her child to 
go to college, etc.  The same sorts of sentiments can be heard expressed about, 
to varying degrees, getting married, having children, accepting a certain 
religion, getting a certain type of job, buying a house, having a certain sexual 
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orientation, etc.  Now of course, the justifications for such ideas will vary from 
person to person, but I want to focus on just one of these justifications for the 
time being; specifically, the idea that these things⎯college, kids, marriage⎯are 
intrinsically good for a person to have.  In other words, take a person, add 
these things to her life, and⎯Shazam!⎯her life goes better.   
 This idea has a long intellectual heritage.  Philosophers have been 
putting together such lists for thousand of years, although, interestingly, these 
lists usually fail to include college, kids, or marriage.  In order to give this type 
of theory, called an objective-list theory, its due and to see where it might have 
difficulties, several examples of these theories are set out below:1 
In a late Socratic dialogue, Plato (Philebus: 66a-66c) set out five classes 
of intrinsic goods in descending order of goodness: 
1) “Measure, and the mean, and the suitable, and the like”; 
2) “The symmetrical and beautiful and perfect or sufficient, and all 
which are of that family”; 
3) “Mind and wisdom”; 
4) “Sciences and arts and true opinions”; and 
5) “Pleasures which were defined by us as painless, being the pure 
pleasures of the soul herself, as we termed them, which accompany, 
some the sciences, and some the senses.” 
 
G.E. Moore, in Principia Ethica (1903: § 113) had this to say about intrinsic 
value: 
 
By far the most valuable things, which we know or can imagine, 
are certain states of consciousness, which may be roughly 
described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the 
enjoyment of beautiful objects. No one, probably, who has asked 
himself the question, has ever doubted that personal affection and 
the appreciation of what is beautiful in Art or Nature, are good in 
                                       
1 For an example of a defense of objective-list theories generally where no list is 
actually specified, see Richard Arneson (1999: 113-42). 
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themselves; nor, if we consider strictly what things are worth 
having purely for their own sakes, does it appear probable that any 
one will think that anything else has nearly so great a value as the 
things which are included under these two heads. . . . That they 
are truths—that personal affections and aesthetic enjoyments 
include all the greatest, and by far the greatest, goods we can 
imagine, will, I hope, appear more plainly in the course of that 
analysis of them, to which I shall now proceed. 
 
In The Right and the Good, W.D. Ross (1930: 102) writes: 
 
Four things, then, seem to be intrinsically good – virtue, pleasure, 
the allocation of pleasure to the virtuous, and knowledge (and in a 
less degree right opinion). And I am unable to discover anything 
that is intrinsically good, which is not either one of these or a 
combination of two or more of them. 
 
Martha Nussbaum, in Sex & Social Justice (1999: 41-42), “claims that a life 
that lacks any one of these capabilities, no matter what else it has, will fall 
short of being a good human life”: 
1) Life; 
2) Bodily health and integrity; 
3) Bodily integrity; 
4) Senses, imagination, thought; 
5) Emotions; 
6) Practical reason; 
7) Affiliation; 
8) Other species; 
9) Play; and 
10) Control over one’s political and material environment. 
 
Finally, Derek Parfit (1984: 499) sets out, but does not endorse, an example list 
and describes the theory this way in Reasons and Persons: 
Turn now to the third kind of theory that I mentioned: the 
Objective List Theory.  According to this theory, certain things are 
good or bad for people, whether or not these people would want to 
have the good things, or to avoid the bad things.  The good things 
might include moral goodness, rational activity, the development of 
one’s abilities, having children and being a good parent, 
knowledge, and the awareness of true beauty.  The bad things 
might include being betrayed, manipulated, slandered, deceived, 
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being deprived of liberty or dignity, and enjoying either sadistic 
pleasure, or aesthetic pleasure in what is in fact ugly. 
 
 There are several objections that could be made against these particular 
lists, or against the notion of a list in general, that I do not intend to pursue at 
length here for the reason that these objections will not advance our search to 
any significant degree.  I will call these objections the objections of authority, 
commensurability, and completeness.  The authority objection will likely be the 
first one almost any class of undergraduate ethics students will come up with: 
Who gets to decide what goes on the list and what does not?  To bring this area 
into line with other fields of study, the question is probably more properly 
framed as why are these items on the list?  Is it just a brute fact, a fact not 
explicable in terms of anything else, that these items are on the list or is there 
some common theme that links some or all of the items together?  The 
commensurability objection involves the apparent difficulty in comparing the 
lives of the people that have these goods, and in comparing the value of the 
various goods within a single life.  Consider Nussbaum’s list above.  Let us 
suppose that Willie gets five of the things from the list on a consistent basis for 
60 years and that Marcus gets all ten of the things on the list for 45 years.  
Whose life went better for him?  Are some things on the list better than others 
(e.g., bodily integrity vs. play) such that a small amount of one outweighs a 
large amount of the other?  Do we need to know which five Willie got in order to 
know whose life went better?  There are other questions of this sort that I will 
not pursue here.  Finally, there is the objection of completeness.  For an 
objective-list theory—or any other theory—to be a complete theory of personal 
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welfare (i.e., a theory that tells us how well any life will go, is going, or has gone 
for the person who will live, is living, or has lived it), the list of intrinsic goods 
for a person must be complete.  So if Nussbaum is right and other species 
partly determine human welfare, then if there are two identical lives with the 
only difference being that one had a puppy for a day, then the person-with-the-
puppy life will have gone better.  This will be a fatal objection to the 
completeness of any of the other theories listed above. 
 Leaving these objections to one side along with the questions about how 
devastating any or all of them are, the objection I intend to pursue at length is 
one hinted at by Parfit’s quote above: “According to [objective-list] theory, 
certain things are good or bad for people, whether or not these people would 
want to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things” (Parfit 1984: 499) 
(emphasis added).  Now, to be sure, there will be a very large number of people 
who will want most or all of the items on these lists.  If people did not want 
these things, these theories would probably need to be accompanied by a fairly 
robust error theory that would explain why so few people wanted the things 
that were intrinsically good for them to have.  The important thing to notice 
about objective-list theories, as Parfit rightly points out, is that people’s 
attitudes toward the things on the list are entirely irrelevant.  This is a 
necessary consequence of all of these theories, as they have not left themselves 
any conceptual space or framework to handle actual attitudes.  An objective-
list theorist might respond to this by saying, “Actual attitudes do not matter.  
The things on the list just are intrinsically good for a person to have.  
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Therefore, a person who has properly functioning faculties2 will want the items 
on the list.” 
 Putting aside the question of whether a person who does not care about 
the things on the list is malfunctioning in some way, this argument still fails.  
As Harry Frankfurt (1999: 158) points out: 
A person who acknowledges that something has considerable 
intrinsic value does not thereby commit himself to caring about it.  
Perhaps he commits himself to recognize that it qualifies to be 
desired for its own value and to be pursued as a final end.  But this 
is far from meaning that he does actually desire it or seek it, or 
that he ought to do either.  Despite his recognition of its value, it 
may just not appeal to him; and even if it does appeal to him, he 
may have good reason for neither wanting it nor pursuing it.  Each 
of us can surely identify a considerable number of things that we 
think would be worth doing or worth having for their own sakes, 
but to which we ourselves are not especially drawn and at which 
we quite reasonably prefer not to aim. 
 
 Whether we are inclined to agree with Frankfurt or not, there are 
certainly going to be people who lack any sort of positive mental attitude 
toward the items on the objective list in question.  The objective-list theorist 
has a dilemma with regard to people in this class.  The first option is to claim 
that these people’s lives go better when they get the things on the list no matter 
how they may feel about it.  If an objective-list approach is to be retained, then 
this will have to be the option chosen.  The second option is to admit that a 
person’s life does not go better by getting something regardless of what attitude 
she takes toward it.  This, I think, has to be the right answer, for a reason 
already discussed.  Recall that we are looking for value for a subject.  It seems 
                                       
2 Some caveat of this sort will be required.  This may not be what an actual 
objective-list theorist would want to claim, but this will not matter, as all 
caveats of this type will suffer from the same infirmity. 
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the objective-list theorists lose sight of this point.  Perhaps what they really 
have in mind is a theory about what makes the world a better place.  Maybe 
the world is a better place if people get the things on the objective list and an 
even better place if they take the appropriate amount of pleasure in getting just 
those things.3  While this revision of the theory may be plausible for the value 
of possible worlds, the actual objective-list theory of personal welfare fails 
because it does not properly account for the fact that we are looking for how 
well a life went for the person who lived it.  The problem here is not simply that 
a person might have no discernible attitude toward getting the items on the 
list, although this in itself could not be counted as a virtue for a theory of 
prudential value.  The problem is that a person may positively detest any or all 
of the things on the list.  If so, is it really plausible to claim that such a 
person’s life is going better for him if he gets those things?  No.  And the 
intuition behind this answer will provide us with the most essential 
foundational principle that any adequate theory will have to heed.4 
 A great deal of care should be taken in formulating any principles that 
will serve as an essential requirement for an adequate theory.  Another way of 
thinking about this is that these principles are a way of defining the concept of 
                                       
3 Parfit (1984: 502) theorizes that this is what makes a life go best, but his 
comments could be easily altered to reflect this idea. 
 
4 Robert Merrihew Adams (1999: 95) sums up the guiding intuition here nicely: 
Another truth about human well-being that is intuitively evident is 
that a person’s good is not very fully realized unless she likes or 
enjoys her life in the long run.  You may be very virtuous; you may 
be brilliant, beautiful, successful, rich, and famous; but if you do 
not enjoy your life, it cannot plausibly be called a good life for you. 
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personal welfare.  So, yes, a theory of personal welfare is a theory about what 
makes a life go best for the person who lives it⎯but what does that mean?  
Here I should like to steal David Boonin’s requirements for a definition 
wholesale (Boonin 2008: 4-5).  First, and almost too obviously, we want a 
definition to be accurate.  The definition should supply the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for cases of personal welfare, should be reasonably in line 
with ordinary uses of these words, and should help us solve the borderline 
cases where it is unclear if someone’s life is going better or not.  Second, a 
definition should be illuminating.  In other words, we want a definition to point 
us in the right direction in terms of getting a better understanding of the 
concept and any necessary implications of the concept as defined.  Finally, we 
want a definition to be neutral.  In other words, we do not want to unfairly5 beg 
                                       
5 Michael Huemer (2005: 69-70) nicely illustrates when “begging the question” 
is not actually begging the question—and thus is fair—in the following excerpt: 
It is not the case that whenever an argument deploys a premise 
that directly and obviously contradicts an opponent’s position, the 
argument begs the question.  Still less is it true that whenever a 
consistent opponent would reject at least one of an argument’s 
premises, the argument begs the question.  (The latter condition 
applies to every valid argument.)  Consider another famous 
philosophical argument: Philosopher A claims that ‘knowledge’ 
means ‘justified, true belief’.  Philosopher G points out the 
following sort of example: 
Suppose that Smith justifiably believes that Jones owns a 
Ford (he has often seen Jones driving a Ford, has seen the 
title to the car, and so forth).  Smith correctly infers from 
this that the following statement is also true: ‘Jones owns a 
Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona’.  (Barcelona was selected 
randomly; Smith has no idea where Brown is.)  But suppose 
that, improbably enough, Jones actually does not own a 
Ford; it was sold just a few minutes ago.  But by pure 
coincidence, Brown happens to be in Barcelona.  In this 
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the question when coming up with our definition, or in this case, with our 
principles.  This is particularly critical with regard to the first principle of 
personal welfare contained in the next paragraph.  To illustrate the critical 
nature of this requirement, suppose we claimed that any acceptable theory of 
personal welfare had to be objective.  Should we then be surprised to find that 
our search ended with an objective-list theory being the right one?  No, but this 
would be a case of unfairly begging the question, as the objective requirement 
seems to lack any independent motivation.   
 So what is the most accurate, illuminating, and neutral principle of 
personal welfare?  As we saw with our analysis of objective-list theories, the 
right account of personal welfare must adequately countenance the actual 
                                                                                                                           
case, Smith believes [Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in 
Barcelona].  But intuitively, Smith does not know [Jones 
owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona].  Thus, justified, true 
belief is not the same as knowledge. 
The above argument is widely, and rightly, taken to conclusively 
refute the ‘justified, true belief’ account of knowledge; indeed, it is 
one of the few, and one of the most celebrated, examples of a 
conclusive refutation of a previously widely-held view in modern 
philosophy.  How weak it would be for A to reply: 
G has merely begged the question.  I say that knowledge is 
justified, true belief.  From this, it directly and obviously 
follows that Smith does know [Jones owns a Ford or Brown 
is in Barcelona] in G’s example.  For G to assert that Smith 
lacks such knowledge just assumes that my definition is 
wrong.  So G has proven nothing. 
A is correct to note that G’s premise directly and obviously 
contradicts A’s theory.  But this does not mean that G begged the 
question; it means only that G’s refutation of A was direct and 
obvious.  G succeeds while A fails because G’s premise, once 
stated, is intuitively obvious, while A’s theory is not intuitively 
obvious but needs to be tested by considering examples.  A thus is 
not in a position to simply appeal to his theory as a justification for 
denying the premise that would be used to refute the theory. 
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mental states of the person under consideration.  But what kind or kinds of 
mental states should be taken into account?  Although “want,” “pleasure,” and 
“desire” were the most commonly used terms in previous paragraphs, the 
continued use of these terms seems unduly restrictive, such that we may be 
unfairly begging the question by continuing to use them.  Accordingly, I 
propose that we begin with a stance that is completely neutral regarding which 
mental state or states may ultimately be included in any adequate theory: 
INTERNALIST PRINCIPLE (IP) – The intrinsic value of a life (or part of a 
life) for the one who lives it is at least partly determined by the actual 
mental states of the person living that life (or life-part). 
 
 IP is meant to be ambiguous, as I have only attempted to take the most 
tenuous step in the right direction in formulating this principle.  IP merely 
makes the claim that the mental states of X are relevant, at least to some 
degree, to the question of how well life goes for X.  This will allow two distinct 
and competing camps of welfare theories that rely on mental states to stay in 
the running.6  The first is the hedonist camp, which will include states like 
pleasure, enjoyment, satisfaction, and the like.  The other camp I would only 
characterize as, borrowing a term from Donald Davidson (2001: 4), the pro-
attitude camp. The mental states in this camp will include desires, urges, 
values, goals, moral views, and the like.  The intent with IP is to be as inclusive 
                                       
6 IP, in its current form, does not even necessarily rule out some of the 
objective-list theories above.  For example, Ross’s (1930: 102) theory might 
satisfy IP’s mental state requirement quite well.  However, all objective-list 
theories will be eliminated in the coming pages as we scrutinize, and ultimately 
revise, IP.  
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as possible with respect to any mental state that could be, or that could be part 
of, a state of affairs that is intrinsically valuable for a person. 
II. HEDONISM 
 Before explicitly setting out the theory of hedonism, it is worth noting one 
caveat concerning what hedonism is not.  Any connotations associated with the 
common usage of the term should be set aside.  To be sure, the concept of 
hedonism as defined by common usage and as defined by philosophers had a 
common origin, but the conceptual space that these two terms now occupy has 
little to no overlap.  Hedonism, at least in this context, has nothing to do with 
occasionally clothed, mind-altered funsters on a beach in some exotic, libertine 
paradise.  With that in mind, let us turn to an examination of what hedonism 
is. 
The seeds for modern hedonism can be found in the works of the great 
utilitarians Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.  Part of the argument for 
their ethical theory⎯and the largest part of the foundation⎯consists of claims 
about the value of pleasure and pain.  According to Mill (2006: 335): “The 
utilitarian doctrine is that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, 
as an end; all other things being only desirable as a means to that end.”  Mill 
(2006: 320) then goes on to explain what he means by happiness: “By 
happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain 
and the privation of pleasure.”  Mill (2006: 320) also combines these ideas into 
this claim: “pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as 
ends; and that all desirable things . . . are desirable either for the pleasure 
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inherent in themselves or as a means to the promotion of pleasure and the 
prevention of pain.” 
However, these claims do not get us all the way to the form of hedonism 
we are interested in here.  Recall that in axiology we are looking for what thing 
or things are intrinsically good for a subject.  Mill has only made claims about 
what is intrinsically desired by a subject.  Accordingly, in order to get from the 
claim that only pleasure is intrinsically desired by a subject to the conclusion 
that only pleasure is intrinsically good for a subject, Mill needs an additional 
premise equating being intrinsically desired with being intrinsically good.  And 
this is clearly what Mill has in mind, as he often implicitly equates well-being 
and happiness.  In other words, the good life is the happy life and the happy 
life is the more pleasurable life. 
 In the modern era, this idea is best illustrated by what Fred Feldman, a 
hedonist, calls Default Hedonism (DH).  Feldman puts forward DH in his book 
Pleasure and the Good Life as a starting point because he thinks most 
formulations of hedonism in the professional literature are defective in one way 
or another.7  An adequate formulation of hedonism, DH is set out as follows: 
i. Every episode of pleasure is intrinsically good; every episode of 
pain is intrinsically bad. 
 
ii. The intrinsic value of an episode of pleasure is equal to the 
number of hedons of pleasure contained in that episode; the 
intrinsic value of an episode of pain is equal to – (the number of 
dolors of pain contained in that episode). 
                                       
7 As an example of a defective formulation of hedonism, Feldman (2004: 22-25) 
quotes the version in William Frankena’s Ethics (1973: 84) and then recites six 
ways that it fails to be an adequate characterization. 
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iii. The intrinsic value of a life is entirely determined by the 
intrinsic values of the episodes of pleasure and pain contained 
in that life, in such a way that one life is intrinsically better 
than another if and only if the net amount of pleasure in the 
one is greater than the net amount of pleasure in another.  
(Feldman 2004: 27) 
 
 Hedonism, at least at first blush, seems to have several points in its 
favor.  First and foremost, there is a great deal of intuitive plausibility to the 
idea that pleasure makes a life go better and pain makes a life go worse.  
Illustrations and calm reflection should not be required to see this point.  
Second, the theory is simple and, therefore, easy to understand.  As shown 
above, the theory can be set out in a few sentences, which makes it easy for a 
beginner to be up and running with the basic ideas of hedonism in a very short 
time.  Third, there are no glaring8 commensurability problems with hedonism 
as there are with, using an earlier example, objective-list theories.  Finally, DH 
makes it very easy, at least in theory, to calculate how well a life (or any part 
thereof) is going for the one who lives it.  A list of a person’s hedons and dolors 
and a calculator is all you need. 
The simplicity of hedonism, while one of its greatest virtues, is also cited 
as leading to the theory’s greatest defects.  The challenge, roughly stated, is to 
                                       
8 In order to avoid problems of commensurability, hedonists will often describe 
pleasure and pain as being “opposites” (see, e.g., Feldman 2004: 26).  This is 
supposed to make it acceptable to directly compare units of pleasure to units of 
pain to come up with a net balance of pleasure vs. pain.  However, it is not 
clear that, say, some pains can be compared to other pains in this way, much 
less that pleasures can be compared to pain in this manner.  So, for example, 
can the pain of breaking an arm be compared to the pain of losing a loved one?  
Or can the pleasure of an ice cream cone be compared to the pain of stubbing a 
toe?  These are questions that I will have to leave unexplored here. 
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question whether prudential value is really so simple after all.  This can be 
summed up in two related questions that I intend to pursue next.  First, does a 
person’s well-being depend, at least to some degree, on something other than 
that person’s mental states?  Second, does a person’s well-being depend, at 
least to some degree, on mental states other than pleasure and pain? 
 DH claims the only things that are relevant to determining personal 
welfare are certain mental states.  One way to evaluate the plausibility of this 
aspect of hedonism is to create a scenario where, in essence, mental states are 
the only things a person has.  Robert Nozick (1974: 42) did just that with his 
“experience machine”: 
Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you 
any experience you desired.  Super duper neuropsychologists 
could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you 
were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an 
interesting book.  All the time you would be floating in a tank with 
electrodes attached to your brain. 
 
The rest of the story rounds out the thought experiment quite nicely from a 
phenomenological perspective⎯you can pick your experiences from a huge 
library of desirable experiences, you will not know you are plugged into the 
machine while you are plugged in, your loved ones can plug in as well so there 
is no reason to stay unplugged in order to serve them, etc.  Nozick then asks, 
“Would you plug into the machine?” 
 If you accept hedonism as the correct theory of personal welfare and you 
want your life to go better than it otherwise might, then you should plug in.  Or 
is this conclusion a bit too hasty?  After all, the only things that matter from a 
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hedonistic standpoint are certain mental states, and an experience machine is 
not necessary for mental states.  At this point there is no reason to plug in, just 
as there is no reason not to plug in.  But it is not just the existence of mental 
states that matters.  According to hedonism, it is the type, duration, and 
intensity of the mental states that make your life go better.  And this is just 
exactly what, presumably, you can be guaranteed a better mix of in the 
experience machine.  If pleasure and the avoidance of pain are what determine 
the intrinsic value of your life, it seems almost assured that you will be better 
at picking experiences off a list that will produce these outcomes than at 
orchestrating your life⎯and all of the things that affect your life over which you 
have little to no control⎯to produce a more favorable ratio of pleasure to pain. 
 Nozick (1974: 43), for one, would not plug in for the following reasons: 
What does matter to us in addition to our own experience?  First, 
we want to do certain things, and not just have the experience of 
doing them. . . .  A second reason for not plugging in is that we 
want to be a certain way, to be a certain sort of person.  Someone 
floating in a tank is an indeterminate blob.  There is no answer to 
the question of what a person is like who has long been in the 
tank.  Is he courageous, kind, intelligent, worthy, loving?  It’s not 
merely that it’s difficult to tell; there’s no way he is.  Plugging into 
the machine is a kind of suicide. 
 
 So Nozick’s reasons for not plugging in are that you cannot do certain 
things and that you cannot be a certain way.  Yet consider the following 
scenario from Shelly Kagan (1998: 34-35): 
Imagine a man who dies contented, thinking he has achieved 
everything he wanted in life: his wife and family love him, he is a 
respected member of the community, and he has founded a 
successful business.  Or so he thinks.  In reality, however, he has 
been completely deceived: his wife cheated on him, his daughter 
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and son were only nice to him so that they would be able to borrow 
the car, the other members of the community only pretended to 
respect him for the sake of the charitable contributions he 
sometimes made, and his business partner has been embezzling 
funds from the company, which will soon go bankrupt. 
 
Here again we have, presumably, a very good life if the only things that matter 
for well-being are mental states.  Notice that, in terms of how it feels from the 
inside, this man’s life is exactly the same as that of a man who actually has the 
things that our subject merely believes he has.  If the only thing that matters is 
how a life feels from the inside (i.e., mental states), then there would be no 
reason to prefer the life of the man who actually has these things to the life of 
the man who just believes he does.  Furthermore, we have resolved Nozick’s 
issues concerning actively doing certain things and actively being a certain 
way.  Is it in fact the case that the lives of these two men go equally well?  If we 
were one of these two men, should we be indifferent as to which one of them we 
were?  A hedonist might prefer the life of the man who actually has the things 
that he thinks he does simply as a result of having to choose one, even though 
there is no reason to prefer one to the other; however, he will have to prefer the 
“false” life if we change the “true” life to include just one feature that seems 
worse from the inside (e.g., one more stubbed toe or mild headache).  From 
these hypotheticals one could reasonably conclude that features beyond our 
conscious experience can have an impact on how well our lives go.9 
 But hedonism’s failure to give any weight at all to the outside world may 
not be the only, or even the best, reason to call it into question.  Recall that, 
                                       
9 I will have much more to say on this topic in Chapter Four. 
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according to hedonism, not all mental states count for personal welfare.  It is 
only one range of mental states, the continuum of pleasure to pain, that makes 
one’s life go better or worse.  To evaluate this aspect of hedonism, consider the 
following: 
Maxwell Edison, who majored in medicine in the late 1960s, has 
always had a very strong affinity for Paul McCartney.  Maxwell, a 
committed (and very misunderstood) hedonist, has devoted his 
medical career to finding a way to make people’s lives, and Paul’s 
in particular, go better.  After a few failed attempts involving Joan, 
his teacher, and a judge, Maxwell has perfected his technique.  He 
sneaks up behind Paul and strikes him with a silver hammer just 
so.  While this blow reduces Paul’s cognitive abilities to that of an 
infant, it simultaneously extends his life span by 10 years and 
causes him to experience the most intense pleasure he has ever 
experienced over and over for the rest of his days.  Paul, a 
billionaire, will be cared for extraordinarily well for the remainder 
of his life. 
 
If hedonism is the correct theory, then Maxwell has very clearly succeeded in 
making Paul’s life go better.  Assuming your needs would be met in a way 
similar to Paul’s, would you choose to be subjected to Mawell’s now perfected 
Silver Hammer Therapy™?  I suspect that no one reading this thinks Maxwell 
has improved Paul’s life and, therefore, no one would choose to be so struck 
about the head.  The most likely reason for the reticence to undergo this 
treatment is that you value things, even if they are only other mental states, in 
addition to and perhaps more than unending and unwavering pleasure. 
 What the experience machine, the businessman, and Mawell’s Silver 
Hammer Therapy™ suggest is that perhaps something other than, or at least in 
addition to, pleasure and pain affects how well a life goes for the one who lives 
it.  Here we have three options for how to integrate these ideas into our theory 
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of personal welfare.  The first option is to ignore or explain away these ideas, 
ultimately concluding that, in fact, pleasure and pain are the only things that 
determine prudential value.  A hedonist will have to give this response if he is 
to remain a hedonist.  For those people who found one or more of our 
experience machine line of cases compelling, this response will be deeply 
unsatisfying.  This is because the hedonist is saying, in essence, “You who 
think something other than pleasure and pain is relevant to your personal 
welfare are wrong.  I, the hedonist, know better than you what will make your 
life go better.”  In this way, hedonism is like an objective-list theory.  The main 
differences are that hedonism’s list is much shorter than that of the typical 
objective-list theory, and the problem just described is much more obvious 
when it comes to objective-list theories.  Recall that our Internalist Principle 
(IP) requires an adequate theory of personal welfare to take into account the 
actual mental states of the person living that life.  IP was designed to be broad 
enough to allow the pleasures and pains of the hedonism camp to count.  What 
our experience machine line of cases suggests, then, is that IP is too broad 
since it is still subject to the same sort of objection that prompted the adoption 
of IP in the first place. 
 To see how IP should be narrowed to accommodate these ideas, it is 
important to be clear about the differences, if any, between the objection to 
objective-list theories and the objection to hedonism.  So suppose there were 
an objective-list theory that included just three items: sex, drugs, and rock & 
roll.  We then find a person whose life was filled with sex, drugs, and rock & 
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roll who states that he hated just about every moment of his life.  Based on this 
report, it seems wrong to conclude that his life did in fact go well for him.  It 
would be odd to say to him, “You are wrong about your life.  It did go well for 
you.  We here at the Sex, Drugs, and Rock & Roll Institute—after many nights 
of research—are sure of it.”  The odd tenor of this remark stems from its very 
strong paternalistic character.  If IP is the most basic principle that an 
adequate theory of personal welfare must meet, the paternalism objection is 
the most basic objection that an adequate theory must avoid.  This should not 
be surprising since they are flip sides of the same coin.  A theory of personal 
welfare, in order to be a theory of personal welfare, must identify some thing or 
things that make a life go better for the one who lives it.  An adequate theory 
should always be mindful of trying to reduce the size of the conceptual gap 
between what the theory identifies as making a life go better and what the 
person who is living the life cares about.  For a gap too large, the paternalistic 
response sounds tone deaf, if not completely bizarre. 
For example, suppose there were an objective-list theory that included 
just one thing: Merchant Ivory films.  Insisting that someone who watched The 
Remains of the Day every day of her life and despised it more with each viewing 
had a great life probably makes one a good candidate for a room with padded 
walls.  However, the paternalistic response is much more plausible when it 
comes to smaller gaps.  This is the case with hedonism and is why the 
paternalism problem is much less obvious.  Whereas objective-list theories 
typically completely disregard how anyone feels about the items on the list, 
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hedonism’s list⎯pleasure and the absence of pain⎯ensures that at least the 
good life for the one who lives it will be the pleasurable life.  And while the 
conceptual gap is smaller here, there is a gap nonetheless.  So suppose there is 
a woman who finds sex to be a very pleasurable activity, but does not care at 
all about having sex and would always prefer a good nap instead.  Here again it 
sounds odd, albeit less so, to insist to her that her life is going better for her if 
she has sex instead of taking a nap, even though this is contrary to her wishes.  
We can further suppose that her preferences are similar with regard to all other 
sensory pleasures; she prefers work to a good meal, study to a massage, etc.  Is 
it plausible to claim that all of her preferences make it the case that her life is 
going worse when she gets what she wants? 
 The paternalism objection also lurks for the second of these potential 
responses to the experience machine line of cases.  This response is to claim 
that just this list of things, other than pleasure and pain, necessarily impacts 
how well a life is going for the one who lives it.  Depending on what is on this 
list of other things that are supposed to affect prudential value, a conceptual 
gap may open between what the person cares about and what is supposed to 
determine that person’s welfare.  The paternalistic response will be plausible, 
perhaps, for some of these things and less so for others. 
 It is the third response to the experience machine line of cases that holds 
the most promise for directing us how to appropriately narrow IP.  The third 
response is to claim that things other than pleasure and pain can matter for 
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purposes of personal welfare.  Given our paternalism concerns,10 the most 
obvious answer for when they can matter is when the person cares about the 
thing in question.  Notice that the claim here is merely that these things can 
matter if the person cares about them.  There will, I think, still be occasions 
that merit a paternalistic response.  However, this does not undermine the fact 
that a paternalistic answer in axiology is an inherently suspect classification.  
Given this fact, a general principle concerning paternalism is in order: 
PRINCIPLE CONCERNING PATERNALISM (PCP): Paternalistic claims in 
axiology must be justified by a compelling theoretical interest and must 
be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 
 
A couple of features of PCP are worth noting.  First, a compelling theoretical 
interest is required.  This does not require universal agreement among the 
public at large, much less universal agreement among philosophers.  
Philosophers cannot even agree that there is an external, mind-independent 
world, which generally suffices to eliminate any consensus about anything that 
may happen in the world.  Nonetheless, there will have to be a reasonable 
amount of overlap regarding intuition and a great deal of independent 
                                       
10 Shelly Kagan (1998: 40) nicely sums up the concern over paternalism as it 
relates to objective-list theories, stating that such theories provide that 
possession of the objective goods makes one better off⎯regardless 
of whether or not one realizes this.  This seems to have the 
implication that your life could be made better off by the 
possession of some ‘good’ even though you yourself dislike it and 
would greatly prefer to be without it: since the good possesses 
objective value, your own opinion on the subject is quite irrelevant.  
Your life could be going well even though you are unhappy with 
almost all its central features! 
For additional statements of paternalistic concerns about theories of welfare, 
see, e.g., Feldman (2004: 17), Sumner (1996: 45), and Railton (2003: 47). 
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motivation to count as a compelling theoretical interest.  Second, the definition 
of the paternalistic item or items to be included in any personal welfare 
calculation must be narrowly tailored to include all and only the items that are 
the subject of the compelling theoretical interest.  Any definition found to be 
either over- or under-inclusive must be refined appropriately or discarded 
altogether. 
 With these ideas in mind, we can turn to the task of properly narrowing 
IP.  Recall that IP was intentionally drafted to be broad enough to include 
mental states that are usually claimed to be the basis for hedonistic theories of 
welfare along with what Davidson calls “pro-attitude” mental states.  This class 
of mental states, according to Davidson (2001: 4), is composed of the following: 
. . . desires, wantings, urges, promptings, and a great variety of 
moral views, aesthetic principles, economic prejudices, social 
conventions, and public and private goals and values in so far as 
these can be interpreted as attitudes of an agent directed toward 
actions of a certain kind.  The word ‘attitude’ does yeoman service 
here, for it must cover not only permanent character traits that 
show themselves in a lifetime of behaviour, like love of children or 
a taste for loud company, but also the most passing fancy that 
prompts a unique action, like a sudden desire to touch a woman’s 
elbow.  In general, pro attitudes must not be taken for convictions, 
however temporary, that every action of a certain kind ought to be 
performed, is worth performing, or is, all things considered, 
desirable.  On the contrary, a man may all his life have a yen, say, 
to drink a can of paint, without ever, even at the moment he yields, 
believing it would be worth doing. 
 
While Davidson is discussing pro attitudes as they relate to action, this list 
need not be so limited for our purposes.  I doubt that one could come up with 
another pro attitude that could not be subsumed under one of the categories 
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on this list, but nothing of consequence hinges on this claim, as will soon 
become clear. 
 One thing that should be clear by now is that the term “pro attitude” is 
very broad.  This is a good thing at this point, as our mental state or states 
must surely be on this list.  The question now becomes: Do we proceed with 
the entire list of pro attitudes, or is there a way to eliminate some of the items 
on the list based on some idea we have already come across?  Recall that the 
problem with hedonism was the conceptual gap between what the person cares 
about and pleasure and pain.  This will clearly be a problem for many of the 
items on the pro attitude list as well.  Take, for example, public values or 
aesthetic principles.  One can easily imagine a person who does not care about 
these things at all and who claims that every moment spent contemplating 
these things or acting upon them is extraordinarily unpleasant.  Do these 
things merit a paternalistic response?  No.  PCP requires a compelling 
theoretical interest that is lacking here.  In other words, there seems to be little 
to be gained and potentially much to be lost by insisting, in the face of contrary 
reports from the person at issue, that her life goes better for her by getting 
these things.  
 So if the problem is going to be the conceptual gap between what a 
person cares about and whatever item is put forward as necessarily affecting 
her welfare, then the most successful approach will be one in which the theory 
proposed does not deviate from what the agent cares about in calculating 
personal welfare. 
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 There is also powerful independent motivation for this approach.  Recall 
from the prologue that one of the reasons a theory of prudential value is 
important is that it will tell us how to go about the task of making the lives of 
those near and dear to us go better for them.  We may also be interested in 
making the lives of some go worse, as in the case of, for example, people guilty 
of committing a crime.  Now suppose there is a person, Veronica, whom you 
are trying to affect in this way (i.e., you are trying to make her life go better or 
worse).  Without any more information about her, how will you go about 
affecting her welfare?  If you are trying to improve her welfare, the best option 
is to just give her some money, with the idea being that you do not know what 
she cares about and money will give her the greatest flexibility in getting some 
object or experience that she does care about.  However, what if you then learn 
that there is in fact nothing that she cares about now and there will in fact be 
nothing that she cares about at any point in the future?  How would you go 
about the task of helping her or harming her then? 
 The first reaction someone tasked with helping or harming Veronica 
would have is likely disbelief.  This person might think Veronica has had a 
hard life and was saying these things as a defense mechanism to prevent 
further harm to herself.  So if Veronica were given a billion dollars or were 
made Ruler of the Universe, she would later admit to secretly wanting these 
things and caring about them once she received them.  Or, more radically, if 
you soaked her in gasoline and lit her on fire, she would, if she were able, 
admit to caring about not being in this situation.  However, suppose it is 
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actually the case that Veronica cares about nothing, and the person charged 
with helping or hurting her personal welfare comes to believe this.  The next 
reaction would probably be to try to coax her into caring about something 
again.  We could imagine this process as approximating the familiar scene in 
movies where the cop tries to talk the potential jumper off the building or 
bridge.  Accordingly, you might talk to Veronica about her parents, kids, 
siblings, pets, co-workers, neighbors, other relatives, old hobbies, past favorite 
foods, books, movies, music, etc., trying to spark some concern in her about 
one or more of these things.  Supposing this effort is unsuccessful, what then?  
The only reasonable thing to conclude at this point is that it is not possible to 
make Veronica’s life go better or worse.  She is, quite literally, beyond help. 
 The tale of careless Veronica should prove quite useful in restricting IP.  
Let us suppose that the moral of Veronica’s tale produces the following 
principle: 
PRINCIPLE CONCERNING CARING (PCC): If X does not care about 
anything and could not be made to care about anything in the future, 
then it is not possible for X’s personal welfare to be affected going 
forward. 
 
Notice that PCC allows for the fact that X’s life may have gone better or worse 
for X in the past.  PCC simply says that at any time X cares about nothing and 
could not be made to care about anything in the future, there is no way to 
impact the prudential value of X’s life.  Given PCC, we can now narrow IP as 
follows: 
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INTERNALIST PRINCIPLE' (IP'): The value of a life (or part of a life) for the 
one who lives it is determined to a significant degree by what the person 
in question cares about.11 
 
IP' claims that prudential value is determined to a significant degree by what 
the person cares about.  IP' does not claim that prudential value is determined 
solely by what the person cares about in order to leave room for a paternalistic 
response if the conditions for PCP are met.  IP' also does not claim that 
prudential value is determined to some extent by what the person cares about 
because this potentially allows what the person cares about to play too little a 
role in the theory, thus requiring other paternalistic factors to play a greater 
role than PCP will allow.12 
 So which of Davidson’s pro attitudes does IP' pick out as having the 
closest possible relationship to caring?  The most promising candidate is the 
first one that Davidson mentions: desire.13  This is because caring will require 
desires of some sort, as it is not possible for a person to care about something, 
                                       
11 IP' is in line with the internalist notions put forward by a couple of recent 
treatments of this subject.  Connie Rosati (1995: 300 n.10) specifically 
mentions taking into account what the subject cares about for purposes of 
personal welfare.  Similarly, Robert Noggle (1999: 303) claims that welfare 
calculations must take into account the “agent’s own ends and goals.” 
  
12 Of course it is possible, at this point in the proceedings, that paternalistic 
factors could play a large role in the final theory by satisfying PCP’s theoretical 
requirements.  This will turn out not to be the case, as will be shown in the 
coming chapters by returning to the issue of paternalism on multiple 
occasions. 
 
13 The next three items on the list⎯wantings, urges, promptings⎯could all be 
in play here as well, being synonymous with, or very closely related to, desire. 
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yet have no desires at all.  Caring entails desire.  We shall examine the 
question of whether desires entail caring in Chapter Three. 
 This brings us to the third of the three major theories of personal welfare: 
desire-satisfaction theory.  Desire-satisfaction theories of welfare claim, 
roughly, that a person’s life goes better when the person gets what he wants.  
We will thoroughly examine different variations of this theory in the next 
chapter, but for now the preliminary signs seem encouraging.  Desire-
satisfaction theory seems to allow for the possibility of tracking what we care 
about (i.e., it fits nicely with IP' and PCC) and does not seem to raise any 
worrying concerns with paternalism (i.e., it heeds PCP).  Yet, as you rightly 
imagine and as we shall see, desire-satisfaction theories have their own issues.  
 Before turning to desire-based theories, we should evaluate whether 
hedonism can be salvaged given the principles⎯IP’, PCP, and PCC⎯set out in 
this chapter.  Feldman thinks that it can be.  After formulating Default 
Hedonism (DH) as a starting point and noting that “some critics of hedonism 
seem to understand hedonism in something like this way,” Feldman (2004: 27) 
goes on to say that he is not going to defend DH.  Instead, he is going to defend 
what he calls attitudinal hedonism (AH) (Feldman 2004: 55).  The basic 
difference is that where DH claims that some sensory pleasure is what makes a 
life go better, AH claims it is attitudinal pleasure that serves this function.  “A 
person takes attitudinal pleasure in some state of affairs if he enjoys it, is 
pleased about it, is glad that it is happening, is delighted by it” (Feldman 2004: 
56).  Moreover, according to Feldman (2004: 56), attitudinal pleasures are 
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always “directed onto objects.”  It is this last claim, I think, that is supposed to 
be the main advantage of AH.  However, I do not think this feature of AH will 
ultimately be successful in helping to defend against the types of objections 
presented above.  This is because AH, just like DH, is a form of “mental 
statism,” as Feldman (2004: 67) himself notes.  A mental statist theory claims 
that the prudential value of a life is solely determined by facts about the mental 
states of the person who lives that life such that if two lives are identical with 
respect to mental states, then they are necessarily equivalent with respect to 
prudential value. 
 While I do think that the same sorts of objections could be pursued 
against AH as were pursued above against DH, I will not do so here.  This is 
because these objections can be pursued in a more relevant and illuminating 
fashion against an equivalent desire-satisfaction theory.  Chris Heathwood 
(2006: 559) argues that what he calls the “most plausible form of hedonism,” 
Feldman’s Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism,14 is extensionally equivalent to “the 
most plausible form of desire satisfactionism,” Subjective Desire 
Satisfactionism (SDS).  I will accept the claim about the equivalence of IAH and 
SDS for the purposes of this project.  Heathwood’s (2006: 559) central claim is 
that pleasure is the subjective satisfaction of desire.  Whatever the truth of this 
claim, it seem as though Feldman’s IAH is an attempt to incorporate some of 
                                       
14 This version of AH is limited to intrinsic enjoyment.  In other words, 
enjoyment taken in a state of affairs for its own sake, not enjoyment taken in a 
state of affairs that merely relates to some other state of affairs the person 
takes pleasure in. 
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the central intuitions of desire satisfactionism into hedonism.  In so doing, 
Heathwood noticed that Feldman may have been so successful in this that he 
turned his “hedonistic” theory into a form of desire-satisfaction theory.15  And 
whether IAH and SDS are equivalent or not, they are certainly close to being 
so.  If they are not equivalent, then it would seem to be a charitable 
interpretation of IAH that would allow this to be the case (although nothing 
hinges on this claim since the equivalence of the two theories is being 
accepted).  Accordingly, any successful objection against SDS will also be at 
least as successful against IAH.  SDS, along with other versions of desire-
satisfaction theories, will be evaluated in the coming pages. 
                                       
15 As Feldman (2004: 168-69) himself notes, there is some concern from critics 
that IAH is no longer a form of hedonism at all. 
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CHAPTER TWO: DESIRE THEORY 
 Personal welfare is primarily a function of what we care about.  Caring 
about something entails having desires about it.  Accordingly, desire 
satisfactions will at least be part of the right theory of welfare, if not the theory 
in its entirety.  So if you imagine the realm of ideas as an incredibly large 
mansion that we are exploring in order to find the ideas of personal welfare, we 
now know that at least part of the idea we are looking for is in the room labeled 
“desire,” which we are about to enter.  This is the good news from the tenuous 
steps taken in the previous chapter.  Now for the bad news.  The room we are 
entering is the largest room that has ever been made.  It is so large, in fact, 
that you must pull out your telescope to verify that it is a room at all.  After a 
great deal of effort, you are able to see the ceiling, floor, and three of the walls.  
However, there is no fourth wall.  This, needless to say, may complicate our 
search, as we have a lot of conceptual ground to cover.  More on this later.  Let 
us start this chapter with a basic introduction to the fundamental desire-
related concepts. 
I. WHAT ARE DESIRES? 
If desires, or some subset thereof, are supposed to be fundamental in 
determining how well your life goes for you, a solid understanding of what a 
desire is is in order.  A desire is a pro-attitude mental state.1  To desire 
                                       
1 I intend to use “desire,” “want,” and “preference” interchangeably.  Although 
they may not be perfect synonyms, no clarity or specificity should be lost. 
  
40 
something is to be in favor of it, have a positive attitude toward it, give it a 
mental thumbs up, give it a mental “hip hip hooray!”, etc. 
The object of the pro attitude, or the “it” in the preceding descriptions, is 
a state of affairs.  Accordingly, if you have a pro attitude about the state of 
affairs in which you dance a jig, then you desire to dance a jig. 
Desires can be more or less intense.  For example, your desire to dance a 
jig may be less intense than your desire to win the Nobel Prize.  If this is true, 
then it should be possible to rank a person’s desires, from the state of affairs 
that the person desires most all the way down to the state of affairs that the 
person most desires not to happen.  Moreover, assigning numerical values to 
the ranked desires seems unproblematic, at least in theory, as long as there is 
nothing mysterious about claiming, for example, that one desire is twice as 
intense as another.  The specific numbers will not matter as long as the 
numbers adequately represent the relative differences in intensity.  In other 
words, if I desire the Nobel Prize ten times more than I desire to dance a jig, 
then, for our purposes, it will not matter if we say that the desires have 
intensities of 10 and 1, respectively, or intensities of 50 and 5. 
II. DESIRE-SATISFACTION THEORY 
Now that we have an understanding of what a desire is, we should use 
this information to advance the topic at hand⎯personal welfare.  A desire-
satisfaction theory of personal welfare claims, roughly, that a person’s life goes 
better for her when the state of affairs that she desires obtains (i.e., when she 
gets what she wants).  Along the same lines, desire satisfactionism claims that 
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a person’s life goes worse when she does not get what she wants.  The term 
desire satisfaction is used to describe the state of affairs that obtains when a 
person gets what she wants, and the term desire frustration is used to describe 
the result when a person does not get what she wants. 
A couple points should be kept in mind regarding desire satisfactions 
and frustrations and their use going forward.  First, I will usually speak of 
desire satisfactions as they pertain to making a life go better, as opposed to 
desire frustrations as they pertain to making a life go worse.  This is, I think, a 
helpful consistency in framing the various issues and is also in keeping with 
the existing literature on this topic.  However, everything that is written about 
desire satisfactions making a life go better is meant to apply equally to desire 
frustrations making a life go worse.  Second, one should pay attention to the 
somewhat confusing nature of the terms desire satisfaction and desire 
frustration.  While the definitions are clear, the popular use of these terms to 
describe feelings that often accompany desire satisfactions and frustrations 
can be misleading.  So while one can feel satisfied or feel frustrated, there is no 
necessary connection between desire satisfactions and desire frustrations as 
these terms are being used here and the feelings of satisfaction or frustration 
when one does or does not get what one wants.  This distinction can be seen 
most clearly if one takes note of the fact that desire satisfactions and desire 
frustrations do not require that the desirer know that the desired state of 
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affairs does or does not obtain, much less that the desires need to have any 
introspectively discernible feeling.2 
Before setting out and examining a basic version of desire 
satisfactionism, we should be clear about another feature of these theories.  
Recall that objective-list theories claim that certain things are good for a person 
and that it does not matter what mental state, if any, the person has toward 
these items.  Now of course, many, or most, people may want most, or all, of 
the items on the list.  If so, the objective-list theorist will likely describe this 
situation by saying that the people who desire the things on the list desire 
them because they are good.  Desire-satisfaction theory, on the other hand, 
makes a very different claim about what is good for a person.  Objects are good 
for a person, according to this theory, if and because they are desired.3  In 
other words, objective-list theories appeal directly to facts about value, whereas 
                                       
2 Some desire-satisfaction theories do have a knowledge requirement (e.g., 
Heathwood: 25), but this is not the majority view, nor is it a requirement for a 
desire-satisfaction theory.  (All of the page-number-only cites in the rest of this 
project will be to Heathwood’s forthcoming Subjective Desire Satisfactionism 
listed in the bibliography as an unpublished manuscript.) 
 
3 There is a growing debate in the literature about what the fundamental value 
bearer is in desire satisfactionism.  One option is to claim that the desired 
object is the good thing.  Another option is to claim that the desire satisfaction 
itself (i.e., the state of affairs consisting of both the desire for X and X) is the 
good thing.  Although I will often write as if I am endorsing the former position, 
I intend to stay neutral on this issue because it appears that nothing crucial 
hinges on this distinction.  I think both of these options could be incorporated 
into a fully developed theory to yield the same welfare score for all possible 
lives.  To the extent that this is not the case, it seems as though an otherwise 
adequate theory could easily be modified to incorporate whichever option yields 
the most plausible results over a wide range of cases.  For an interesting 
discussion of these two options, see The Two Desire-Satisfaction Views at 
http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2010/01/the-two-desiresatisfaction-
views.html. 
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desire-satisfaction theories appeal only to purely descriptive facts about what 
people actually do (or would) want.4  Accordingly, an objective-list theory and a 
desire-satisfaction theory may give the exact same personal welfare score for a 
particular state of affairs (e.g., a person viewing Munch’s Scream), but the 
reasons for the scores will be very different. 
This feature of desire satisfactionism will strike some as being completely 
backwards.  There are people who report “experiencing value,” which means 
that they report perceiving something as good and then wanting it for this 
reason.  If desire satisfactionism is true, then people who experience value are 
simply mistaken.5  Reports such as these do not refute desire satisfactionism, 
as the theory is consistent with people believing they experience value.  It is 
easy to see why people would want the objects that they want to be good 
independent of their wanting them.  This would place their desires on a solid 
foundation and would seem to bring all questions and doubts about what they 
want to an end.6  While wanting and believing the world to be a certain way do 
                                       
4 See Parfit (1984: 499) for a discussion of these ideas.  Also, it may be possible 
(although it is not clear how) for an objective-list theory to avoid appealing 
directly to facts about value. 
 
5 Here I am assuming that there is no such thing as impersonal value (i.e., 
value for the world).  The existence of impersonal value would mean that 
goodness would exist as a mind-independent property of objects.  The existence 
of such value would require magical metaphysics, and the experience of it 
would require tortured epistemology⎯two things I intend to avoid in this 
project. 
 
6 Adams (1999: 98) makes a similar point: “Could we sustain our valuing and 
enjoying if we regarded the valuing as purely subjective, merely a matter of our 
individual likes and dislikes?  Perhaps, but it may be doubted.  I suspect the 
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not make it any more likely that this is the case, it does raise an issue: If desire 
satisfactionism is true, then our desires appear to be arbitrary.  I will have 
more to say about this issue in Chapter Three, but the short answer to this 
concern is that it does not matter, and even if it did, it is not true that our 
desires must be arbitrary.  For example, it does not seem to matter that I prefer 
chocolate to vanilla.  Make this preference as arbitrary as you like, it is simply 
a brute fact about me, and the fact that this is an arbitrary preference appears 
to have no impact on my personal welfare at all.  Moreover, this is just a 
feature of beings who, like us, do not create themselves.  I was created in such 
a way so as to prefer chocolate to vanilla; thus, my preference is not arbitrary 
after all.  Finally, it is much easier to provide a plausible error theory for people 
who report experiencing the goodness of some objects when there is no such 
property than for people who do not want the good objects when there is such 
a property.  So suppose goodness is a property of objects, and Stifler is 
presented with an object that has this property and is given all the information 
about it.  However, Stifler, who wants his life to go as well as possible, does not 
want the object in question.  What we will be forced to conclude about Stifler 
                                                                                                                           
interest in such activities as art or sport would be hard to sustain if we thought 
(or better, if we really felt) there was nothing more to the value of the activities 
and the ends we pursue in them than our liking them.  It would also be hard to 
find meaning and interest in our own lives, more broadly if we thought that 
about all our activities and ends.”  These considerations, at most, establish 
that it is better for us, in terms of personal welfare, to believe that some of the 
objects we desire have objective value (i.e., value independent of our desire for 
them).  Nothing Adams says here makes it even slightly more likely that this is 
actually the case.  Moreover, the metaphysical and epistemological implications 
of Adams’s objective-value world are highly suspect. 
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is, I think, that he is defective in some way.7  And the greater the number of 
things that are supposed to have the property of goodness, the greater the 
number of “defective” people will become.  So on the one hand, we have people 
incorrectly believing they experience value (which is consistent with desire 
satisfactionism and independently motivated), and on the other we have a 
potentially large number of defective people.  The more plausible, and less 
paternalistic, conclusion is that things are good if and because they are desired 
and not desired because they are good.8 
In order to properly appreciate the range and scope of the problems 
facing desire satisfactionism, a topic we will turn to next, it will be useful to set 
out a very basic version of the theory.  Keeping in mind the definitions of desire 
satisfaction and desire frustration set out above, Unconstrained Desire-
Satisfaction Theory (UDS) contains the following theses: 
(i) Every desire satisfaction is intrinsically good for its subject; every 
desire frustration is intrinsically bad for its subject. 
                                       
7 If goodness is supposed to be a property of some of the objects around us, 
then it looks as though we will need a sixth sense in order to experience that 
property.  If that is true, then people like Stifler could either be missing the 
sixth sense entirely or just have a defective sixth sense.  Being forced to claim 
either of these does not appear to be an attractive feature of a theory. 
 
8 This conclusion is also more metaphysically plausible.  If something like the 
Big Bang is the right cosmological account, then the origin of “goodness” as a 
property of objects looks quite difficult to explain. Of course, for a theory of 
personal welfare to be a theory of personal welfare, it must identify something 
as being intrinsically good for a subject.  And this I will do, but the goodness is 
for a subject⎯not mysteriously slathered on objects out in the world⎯and the 
goodness will ultimately be reducible to certain facts about desires.  For a good 
discussion of a naturalistic reduction of the normative, see Heathwood (2011b: 
84-86). 
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(ii) The intrinsic value for its subject of a desire satisfaction = the 
intensity of the desire satisfied; the intrinsic value for a subject of a 
desire frustration = –(the intensity of the desire frustrated). 
(iii) The intrinsic value of a life (or segment of a life) for the one who 
lives it = the sum of the intrinsic values of all the desire 
satisfactions and desire frustrations contained therein.9 
 
UDS is just a formal way of expressing the idea that your life goes better for 
you when you get what you want and goes worse for you when you do not get 
what you want.  UDS will serve as the starting point for most, if not all, of the 
versions of desire-satisfaction theory we will be evaluating in the pages that 
follow.  One final note about UDS: No one has, to my knowledge, ever defended 
UDS as being the correct theory of personal welfare for reasons that will soon 
become clear. 
III. WELFARE & DESIRES 
Now that we are clear about what desire satisfactionism and its related 
concepts are, we are in a better position to examine the relationship, if any, 
between welfare and desires.  This examination will illuminate the general 
types of objections that are leveled against the theory as well as the logical 
space that a desire-satisfaction theorist must defend.  The graphic below, 
designed to aid in this examination, depicts the five logically possible 
relationships between welfare and desire.10 
                                       
9 This is a modified version of a desire-satisfaction theory that appears in 
Heathwood (2005: 489). 
 
10 The graphic does not contain Venn diagrams in the technical sense.  For 
example, Diagram E is only meant to depict an intimate connection between 
desires and welfare rather than an identity relationship. 
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Diagram A depicts a scenario in which desires and welfare are completely 
distinct concepts, and neither impacts, or is impacted by, the other.  For those 
interested in establishing the truth of Diagram A, the typical strategy is to 
provide an alternative theory of welfare rather than to formulate objections to 
desire satisfactionism.  After all, formulating an objection to desire 
satisfactionism that purports to show all desires are not relevant to a person’s 
welfare is a tall order, and an objection that 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
establishes only a certain subset of desires does not affect personal welfare gets 
you only a small part of the way, at best, to establishing the truth of Diagram 
A.  The alternative theories, as we saw in the last chapter, usually come in the 
form of some version of a hedonistic or objective-list theory.  However, these 
theories, to the extent they exclude all desires, are false.  As was demonstrated 
in the last chapter, personal welfare entails caring and caring entails desire.  
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Therefore, personal welfare entails desire.  Diagram A does not accurately 
portray the relationship between welfare and desires. 
Diagram B depicts a scenario in which some desires affect welfare, and 
some things other than desires also affect welfare.  This possibility merits 
serious consideration for a couple reasons.  First, this option has a great deal 
of intuitive plausibility.  In fact, I suspect this is the diagram most people 
would choose as being the correct depiction of the relationship between welfare 
and desire.  This fact (if it is a fact), of course, does not carry a great deal of 
philosophical weight in and of itself, but I think ideas that might not otherwise 
merit a great deal of scrutiny should be looked at more closely the more they 
are believed by intelligent, but philosophically uninitiated, people.  Second, and 
much more importantly for our purposes, Diagram B is not ruled out by the 
latest version of our Internalist Principle, IP'.  Recall that IP' states that the 
value of a life (or part of a life) for the one who lives it is determined to a 
significant degree by what the person in question cares about.  Accordingly, all 
we have established so far is that welfare is determined to a significant degree 
by desires (since caring entails desire).  This obviously leaves open the 
possibility that there are determinants of welfare other than desires, which is 
exactly what Diagram B depicts.  
Since the target concept is personal welfare, objections to Diagram B will 
come in the form of a claim that something other than desires completely 
determines how well a life goes for the person who lives it.  Not having 
addressed this sort of objection in the last chapter, it is time to do so here.  In 
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addressing this objection, I intend to cover all of the logical space in the non-
desire area of the welfare circle in Diagram B.  This will be accomplished in two 
steps, first by addressing the possibility of pleasure as a non-desire-related 
determinant of welfare, and then by addressing the possibility of items 
normally included in objective-list theories (or any other item for that matter) 
that might fill this role. 
IV. A DESIRE/PLEASURE HYBRID THEORY? 
One might plausibly claim that certain pleasures do not make a life go 
better for the person who lives it and that certain pains do not make a life go 
worse.  For example, it may be argued that a refreshing sip of iced tea or a 
mildly stubbed toe fits this description.  However, whether these claims are 
plausible or not, there is a stronger claim about pleasure and pain that lacks 
any plausibility at all.  This is the claim that all pleasures and all pains do not, 
and in principle cannot, affect personal welfare to any degree.  That pleasure 
and pain have an effect on personal welfare is a data point that a welfare 
theorist ignores at his professional peril.  To claim that pleasure and pain are 
irrelevant to prudential value is to embark on what seems to be one of the 
longest uphill climbs a philosopher could undertake. 
The question, then, as it relates to Diagram B, is where does this data 
point belong?  It clearly belongs in the welfare circle, but does it belong in the 
part that overlaps with the desire circle or in the non-desire part of the welfare 
circle?  The somewhat surprising answer is that the pleasure data point 
belongs in the desire circle.  This view, called the Motivational Theory of 
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Pleasure (MTP), might require an entire book to thoroughly defend.11  
Consequently, all I will have space to do here is to present and motivate the 
view.  Needless to say, if MTP turns out to be false, then that fact would prove 
to be a fairly serious issue for the theory that I ultimately present and defend in 
Chapter Five (just as it would be for any other desire-satisfaction theory). 
In order to appreciate the attractiveness of MTP, a cursory examination 
of its main competitor, Felt-Quality Theory (FQT), should prove useful.  Carson 
(2000: 13) describes FQT as holding “that the pleasantness or unpleasantness 
of an experience is determined solely by its felt introspectable or 
phenomenological qualities.”  FQT is easy to understand, probably has the 
most initial plausibility of any theory of pleasure and pain, and has been 
endorsed by a number of philosophers.12  Two problems for FQT will help to 
highlight the advantage of MTP as an alternative.  First, there is the 
heterogeneity problem, which is nicely illustrated by the following: 
There are bodily pleasures, like those had from relaxing in a 
Jacuzzi tub, from sunbathing on a warm beach, or from sexual 
activities. There are gustatory and olfactory pleasures (maybe they, 
too, qualify as “bodily”). There are what we might call “emotional 
pleasures,” such as the elation of receiving an ovation or the 
prideful satisfaction of completing a difficult and worthwhile 
project. There are more “cognitive” pleasures, such as the pleasure 
derived from working on a crossword puzzle, from reading an 
insightful philosophy paper, or from listening to an amusing 
anecdote. There are aesthetic pleasures, like those derived from 
listening to beautiful music or from taking in a powerful sculpture. 
(Heathwood 2007: 25) 
 
                                       
11 Heathwood (2007) devotes a paper to defending MTP only as it relates to 
sensory pleasure. 
 
12 See, e.g., G. E. Moore (1903: § 12), and C. D. Broad (1930: 225-31). 
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If the proponent of FQT admits that these all count as pleasures, which it looks 
like he must, then he has a problem.  According to FQT, something is a 
pleasure in virtue of a felt quality.  If all the things on this list are pleasures 
and FQT is the right theory of pleasure, then there must be some felt quality 
that each of these pleasures shares, in virtue of which they are actually all 
pleasures.  However, a little reflection on the phenomenology of these 
experiences should reveal that there is no felt quality that they all share.13  
Therefore, FQT is false.   
 The oppositeness problem is the second way in which FQT fails.  Pleasure 
and pain are often described as being opposites.14  If this is true, then FQT 
should be able to explain this fact.  It is unclear whether FQT cannot, in 
principle, explain this fact or whether it merely does not do so.  Getting to the 
bottom of this issue may require a long foray into philosophy of mind that 
would be an unnecessary digression here.  After all, FQT needs to be false only 
once.  At any rate, it is conceptually difficult, if not impossible, to see how one 
felt quality could be the opposite of another felt quality, no matter how much 
one tried to finesse this result by choosing the easiest possible case. 
 The Motivational Theory of Pleasure, on the other hand, does not suffer 
from these problems.  It nicely accounts for the common element in pleasures 
                                       
13 This point has been made by several philosophers.  See, e.g., Sidgwick (1907: 
127), Feldman (1997: 87), and Sobel (2002: 241). 
 
14 This is also of great concern to hedonistic theorists in order to prevent 
commensurability problems whereby if pleasure and pain are not opposites, 
they cannot be weighed against each other on the same scale. 
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and pains and how pleasure can be the opposite of pain.  After noting the 
heterogeneity problem, Parfit (1984: 493) writes: 
What pains and pleasures have in common are their relation to our 
desires.  On the use of ‘pain’ which has rational and moral 
significance, all pains are when experienced unwanted, and a pain 
is worse or greater the more it is unwanted.  Similarly, all 
pleasures are when experienced wanted, and they are better or 
greater the more they are wanted. 
 
In addition to Parfit, similar versions of MTP have been endorsed by Alston 
(1967: 345), Brandt (1979: 38), Carson (2000: 13), and Heathwood (2007: 24).  
While the differences in the various formulations of MTP are interesting and 
worthy of examination in their own right, they need not detain us here.  The 
only thing required for our purposes is that a version of MTP is the correct 
theory of pleasure such that pleasure is reducible to the more basic concept of 
desire (i.e., pleasure is reducible to desire if facts about pleasure just are facts 
about desire).  If a version of MTP is true, then, as noted by Parfit above, we 
have an answer to the heterogeneity problem: The common element in all 
pleasures, and what in fact makes something a pleasure, is that it is desired.15  
Also, the oppositeness problem now has an answer: Pleasure is desired, pain is 
desired not, and desire and desire not are opposites (Heathwood 2007: 27).  
Finally, and most importantly, the truth of MTP means that the pleasure/pain 
data point belongs in the area on Diagram B where the desire and welfare 
circles overlap. 
                                       
15 For all claims about pleasure as it relates to MTP, a corresponding claim 
could be made about pain and is meant to be implicit. 
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V. A DESIRE/OBJECTIVE-LIST HYBRID THEORY? 
There remains the possibility, as depicted by Diagram B, that something 
that is not desire, nor reducible to desire (as we just showed pleasure to be), 
can affect welfare.  I will call theories of this type Desire/Objective-List Hybrid 
Theories, although in this category I will evaluate the prospect of any non-
desire-based object affecting welfare regardless of whether it has, or ever will 
be, included in an objective list.16  In order to properly evaluate these theories, 
an examination of various formulations will be beneficial.  Parfit (1984: 501-02) 
ends his discussion of personal welfare in Reasons and Persons by saying that, 
although he will not attempt to answer the question of which theory of 
prudential value is correct, he will “mention” another theory, “which might be 
claimed to combine what is most plausible in these conflicting theories.”   
We might claim, for example, that what is good or bad for someone 
is to have knowledge, to be engaged in rational activity, to 
experience mutual love, and to be aware of beauty, while strongly 
wanting just these things.  On this view, each side in this 
disagreement saw only half of the truth.  Each put forward as 
sufficient something that was only necessary.  Pleasure with many 
other kinds of object has no value.  And, if they are entirely devoid 
of pleasure, there is no value in knowledge, rational activity, love, 
or the awareness of beauty.  What is of value, or is good for 
someone, is to have both; to be engaged in these activities, and to 
be strongly wanting to be so engaged. 
 
 
                                       
16 A Desire/Objective-List Pluralist Theory (two kinds of things are good for 
us⎯desire satisfactions and things on an objective list) would not make 
Diagram B true, as this would essentially be just a form of an objective-list 
theory since these theories claim that at least some of the things that are good 
for us are objective.  Moreover, a theory of this type would be plagued with all 
of the problems associated with objective-list theories and all of the problems 
associated with desire-satisfaction theories⎯a tough row to hoe. 
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Adams (1999: 93-94), in Finite and Infinite Goods, writes: 
Without pretending to offer here a complete theory of the nature of 
a person’s good, I wish to explore the idea that what is good for a 
person is a life characterized by enjoyment of the excellent.  More 
precisely, I shall argue that the principal thing that can be 
noninstrumentally good for a person is a life that is hers, and that 
two criteria (perhaps not the only criteria) for a life being a good 
one for a person are that she should enjoy it, and that what she 
enjoys should be, in some objective sense, excellent.  Its being 
more excellent, and her enjoying it more, will both be reasons for 
thinking it better for her, other things being equal . . . . 
 
Darwall (2002: 80) writes in Welfare and Rational Care: 
The specific version of the Aristotelian Thesis I shall defend, then, 
is that the most beneficial human life consists of activities 
involving the appreciation of worth and merit.  I do not claim that 
appreciating these values is the only source of human good.  I only 
claim, somewhat vaguely, that is the most important source.17 
 
Finally, Feldman (2004: 120), in Pleasure and the Good Life, formulates 
“Desert-Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism” (DAIAH), which he describes 
as follows: 
The idea is to say that the intrinsic value of an attitudinal pleasure 
is determined not simply by the intensity and duration of that 
pleasure, but by these in combination with the extent to which the 
object of that pleasure deserves to have pleasure taken in it.  More 
exactly, the value of a pleasure is enhanced when it is pleasure 
taken in a pleasure-worthy object, such as something good, or 
beautiful.  The value of a pleasure is mitigated when it is pleasure 
taken in a pleasure-unworthy object, such as something evil, or 
ugly.  The disvalue of pain is mitigated (the pain is made less bad) 
when it is pain taken in an object worthy of pain, such as 
                                       
17 To clarify his claim both in general and with respect to ensuring that it is 
about personal welfare, Darwall (2002: 76) writes: “My claim will be that a 
person’s welfare is enhanced, her life is made better for her, through active 
engagement with and appreciation of values whose worth transcends their 
capacity to benefit (extrinsically or intrinsically).  The benefit or contribution to 
welfare comes through the appreciative rapport with the values and the things 
that have them.” 
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something evil, or ugly.  The value of a pain is enhanced (the pain 
is made yet worse) when it is pain taken in an object unworthy of 
this attitude, such as something good or beautiful. 
 
 The first thing to notice about these theories is that they will all be 
subject to the same objections that were briefly mentioned in the last chapter 
as they applied to straight objective-list theories.18  This is because, as is the 
case with objective-list theories, some things are claimed to have “value[] whose 
worth transcends their capacity to benefit” (Darwall 2002: 76).  This means 
that the authority objection still applies: Who decides what goes on the list and 
what, if anything, do these items have in common with one another?  Also, the 
commensurability objection is still a problem: How does the value of each item 
on the list compare to that of the other things on the list?  Is this even possible 
according to the theory?  Finally, the completeness objection still must be 
answered: Is this list of items complete? 
 The other noteworthy feature of these four theories is their inchoate 
nature, which is the reason that an extended quote from each of them appears 
above.19  Parfit (1984: 501-02) “mentions” what such a theory “might claim,” 
                                       
18 Or, perhaps, the first thing to notice about these four theories is that they all 
seem to be pleasure/objective-list hybrid theories rather than instances of 
desire/objective-list hybrid theories that I claimed to be addressing.  Two 
points should be made here.  First, as I just argued, pleasure is reducible to 
desire.  Therefore, each of these theories can easily be interpreted as 
desire/objective-list theories.  Second, recall that the main objection leveled 
against objective-list theories dealt with the problem of people not caring about 
the items on the list.  Interpreting these theories as desire/objective-list hybrid 
theories is the most charitable reading that will perhaps allow them to survive 
this objection, which will be evaluated below. 
 
19 Kraut (1994: 44) offers yet another incomplete theory of this type:  
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but does not flesh out the theory in the single paragraph he devotes to it.  
Adams (1999: 93), in setting out his theory, does not even “pretend[] to offer 
here a complete theory of the nature of a person’s good.”  Darwall (2002: 80) 
also admits to offering an incomplete theory and claims “somewhat vaguely, 
that [appreciation of worth and merit] is the most important source [of human 
good].”  Finally, Feldman (2004: 121) offers a complete theory only in the sense 
that it purports to include everything that determines prudential value.20  
While he does briefly defend the use of the concept desert in modifying his base 
hedonistic theory to meet a specific objection, he does not flesh the concept 
out.21  It is barely worth mentioning that it is hard to properly evaluate a theory 
with an unexplained central concept. 
                                                                                                                           
So, there are at least three conditions that make a life a good one: 
one must love something, what one loves must be worth loving, 
and one must be related in the right way to what one loves.  
Perhaps other conditions must be specified, but I will not explore 
that possibility here. 
It might be objected that the thesis I am proposing is empty 
unless it is backed by a systematic theory that enables us to 
decide which among alternative ways of life is most worth living 
and which objects are most worth loving.  It would of course be 
nice to have such a theory, but it is possible to do without one and 
still make defensible judgments about what is worth wanting and 
what is not. 
 
20 Feldman’s (2004: 121) exact quote: “The intrinsic value of a life is entirely 
determined by the intrinsic values of the episodes of intrinsic attitudinal 
pleasure and pain contained in that life, in such a way that one life is 
intrinsically better than another if and only if the net desert-adjusted amount 
of intrinsic attitudinal pleasure in the one is greater than the net amount of 
that sort of pleasure in the other.” 
 
21 Feldman (2004: 122) notes that “it would be good to have a fully developed 
theory of desert,” but “that’s a project for another book.” 
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 What, then, can we safely surmise here?  One possibility is that a 
desire/objective-list hybrid theory is much more plausible than it seems as 
presented here because I have simply cherry-picked underdeveloped theories 
from minor philosophers.  This is not the case.  While this list is probably not 
exhaustive, I have searched for a complete desire/objective-list hybrid theory to 
no avail.  Also, each of these philosophers is quite well known in philosophy 
circles generally and in axiology specifically.  In fact, a book on personal 
welfare that did not mention each of these theorists would be suspect.  The 
other main possibility, then, is that this type of theory is just not very 
plausible.  These theories sound noble and seem plausible at a sufficiently 
abstract level, which probably explains why none of them appear to get beyond 
this stage.  However, this type of theory is not plausible as a theory about what 
makes a life go best for the person living it.  This point always bears repeating 
as, I think, many theorists lose sight of the target along the way and end up 
giving, unwittingly, a theory of something else entirely.22  A concrete example, 
of the sort I did not find in any of the four sample theories, should help 
illuminate this weakness in theories of this type. 
 I love movies and have watched thousands of them.  It is a very widely 
held belief that Citizen Kane is the greatest film ever made.  In fact, this might 
be the most widely held belief there is regarding the greatest example of a work 
of art in any artistic genre.  I do not enjoy watching Citizen Kane very much, 
although I will watch it as an academic exercise.  On the other hand, Night of 
                                       
22 I tend to think of desire/objective-list hybrid theories as a theory of what sort 
of friends the theorist would most like to have. 
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the Comet, a 1984 valley girl/zombie B-movie, is a movie that I watch often and 
thoroughly enjoy every time.  Assuming that each desire/objective-list hybrid 
theory will claim that Citizen Kane is (much?) more worthy of pleasure/desire 
than Night of the Comet, then some variations of this sort of theory will claim 
that my life goes better for me by watching Citizen Kane.  This is the wrong 
result because it seems to clearly violate PCP (i.e., there does not appear to be 
any theoretical interest, compelling or otherwise, to make a paternalistic claim 
here) and it threatens to violate IP' (i.e., if this sort of claim is allowed to stand, 
then there seems to be nothing stopping similar claims, which could easily lead 
to the value of a life being determined to a significant degree by things that the 
person cares nothing about). 
 This example obviously does not entirely refute this type of theory.  We 
could weaken the objective element to such an extent as to provide the right 
result in my movie case.  While I suspect that most of the desire/objective-list 
hybrid theorists will think that weakening the objective element to achieve the 
right result in a wide range of these sorts of cases will weaken the theory too 
much for it to achieve their desired results in other cases, this is a viable 
strategy.  However, problems remain.  Consider a variation of the movie case 
presented above.  Spike enjoys Citizen Kane just as much as I enjoy Night of the 
Comet.  If we sit across the table from each other, he watching his movie and I 
watching mine, what would be the basis for claiming that Spike’s life is going 
better for him than my life is going for me for that stretch of time?  I 
understand the argument in favor of this conclusion, but here I mean to call 
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into question the basis, or, more accurately, the metaphysical foundations, of 
the theory. 
 In order to be a complete theory of personal welfare, a theory must be 
able, in principle, to give a definitive answer to how well a life went for the 
person who lived it, thus making a ranking of possible and actual lives 
possible.  For desire/objective-list hybrid theories, this means that the theory 
will have to account for how every possible object of desire comes to have its 
value, or lack thereof.  There are several issues confronting the metaphysics of 
these theories.  First, the property of “good for a person to get” is just an odd 
sort of property for an object out in the world to possess.  A second related 
issue deals with the timing of the acquisition of value; at what point does the 
object acquire the value that it has?  Third, these theories must work out the 
relative weight they give to desires versus the weight they give to the objects.  
For example, can a relatively strong desire for a nearly worthless object 
outweigh a weak desire for an excellent object?  Fourth, the theory must be 
able to work out the relative weights between objects.  So is Citizen Kane twice 
as worthy of desire as Night of the Comet?  Ten times?  One hundred?  And how 
does Citizen Kane stack up against Picasso’s Guernica, Beethoven’s Ninth 
Symphony, and Michelangelo’s David?  Although there are also metaphysical 
issues, it would be beating a dead horse to pursue them here.  And even if the 
metaphysical issues were thoroughly explained, there would still be all of the 
related epistemological issues.  These all count as reasons, in addition to the 
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general implausibility of these theories, why, I think, none of these theories are 
complete.23 
 The last objection to desire/objective-list hybrid theories involves a final 
range of implausible consequences from different scenarios in which a person 
gets everything he desires.  Other things being equal, one would probably 
suppose that such a person had at least a good life and perhaps one of the best 
possible lives.  However, desire/objective-list hybrid theories will probably have 
to claim (remember, none of them are complete) that some lives in which the 
person gets everything he desires are either equivalent to having no life at all 
or, in some cases, worse than having no life at all.  This consequence stems 
from the fact that these theories have, as an essential element, ideas of objects 
that are “excellent,” “worthy of being enjoyed,” or “pleasure-worthy.”  
Accordingly, for such a theory to be plausible, it must claim that some objects 
possess none of this property.  If so, then a life filled with these objects and the 
desire for them is equivalent to, in terms of intrinsic value, never having lived 
at all.  Perhaps my desire for Night of the Comet is like this.  Or perhaps it is 
even worse than this, such that the enjoyment of this movie makes my life go 
worse for me.  This would be the case if Night of the Comet has a negative 
“excellence” value.  Even if it does not, it seems quite plausible that a 
potentially great number of things could have a negative value.  Taking into 
                                       
23 I think one of the reasons there does not appear to be even one complete 
version of this type of theory in the over two-millennia history of philosophy is 
that a complete theory (i.e., one that had answers to all of the questions I have 
raised) would make the general implausibility of this approach self-evident.  In 
other words, these theories retain any semblance of plausibility precisely 
because they are incomplete. 
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account the vast range of objects in the world, it would seem odd, after all, if 
the continuum of excellence values was limited on the low end by zero.24  If the 
values can go negative, then according to these theories a life filled with desire 
satisfactions could be worse than no life at all.  This is not plausible.  
Desire/objective-list hybrid theories should be rejected for all of these 
reasons.25 
VI. TAKING STOCK & CHALLENGES ON THE ROAD AHEAD 
By evaluating objective-list and hedonistic theories of welfare, we 
determined that a person’s welfare is determined to a significant degree by 
what the person cares about (as stated in IP').  After determining that welfare 
entails caring and that caring entails desire, we evaluated the possibility of 
something in addition to desires being a determinant of welfare.  This turned 
out not to be the case.  Accordingly, a person’s desires (or some subset thereof) 
are the sole determinants of a person’s welfare. 
In terms of where this leaves us on our graphic depicting the logical 
possibilities, we can now cross off Diagrams B and C.  Stated another way, by 
                                       
24 Such a claim could only be made by a theorist who had never visited 
Rotten.com or been subjected to Two Girls One Cup. 
 
25 There is, of course, one final reason to reject these theories⎯the fact that 
there do not appear to be any complete versions of such a theory.  In this era of 
prolific academic philosophy, this fact alone should cast doubt upon the 
plausibility of these theories.  It is fairly easy to make any number of false 
theories look good at a sufficiently high level, but the devil is always in the 
details.  A defender of such views may claim that all of the above objections do 
not apply to her preferred version of the theory.  But no such theory exists 
today.  And I think the future prospects for a version of this theory that is both 
plausible and that avoids these objections are very, very dim. 
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eliminating the possibility of a non-desire welfare determinant, we can shade 
out those areas in Diagrams B and C.  After shading out these areas in each 
diagram, both of them become slightly different graphic depictions of our two 
remaining options.  Shading out the non-desire area of the welfare circle in 
Diagram B is just another way of depicting Diagram D, which is one of our 
remaining possibilities.  Similarly, shading out the non-desire area of the 
welfare circle in Diagram C is just another way of depicting the other remaining 
option, Diagram E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Narrowing the possibilities for a theory of personal welfare to the two 
depicted above is an achievement in itself and should give us reason to think 
that we are getting close to the correct theory.  Knowing where to look, after all, 
usually makes the finding easier.  However, this is not as great of an 
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accomplishment as it might appear at first blush for a couple of reasons.  First, 
desire-satisfaction theories of welfare are the dominant view, and their pedigree 
stretches a long way back into the history of ideas.26  We stand at the same 
spot where many have stood before.  Second, for reasons that will soon become 
abundantly clear, the most difficult stretch of the journey starts here.  To 
understand why this is the case, a preview of the road ahead will be helpful.  
Not surprisingly, the diagram that depicts the correct relationship between 
desires and welfare is Diagram D.  What makes this the case is that we will 
easily find at least one type of desire that will not affect welfare, and as it turns 
out, we will find several types of desires that do not affect welfare.  The real 
accomplishment, then, will be delineating the ambit of desires that do affect 
welfare.  Depicted graphically, this will be the project of shading out the non-
                                       
26 Hobbes (2002: 42), in 1651, makes a remark that is at least consistent with 
desire satisfactionism, if not an outright endorsement:  
But whatsoever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire, that is 
it which he for his part calleth good; and the object of his hate and 
aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable.  For 
these words of “good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with 
relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing simply 
and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be 
taken from the nature of the objects themselves . . . .   
Spinoza, in 1677, makes several remarks that could be characterized in the 
same way.  For example: “It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no 
case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it 
to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we 
strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it”  (Spinoza 1981: 118), and: “For I 
have shown that we in no case desire a thing because we deem it good, but, 
contrariwise, we deem a thing good because we desire it . . .” (Spinoza 1981: 
136).  The earliest modern discussion of desire satisfactionism in academic 
philosophy came in 1874 from Sidgwick (1907: 111-12): “[A] man’s future good 
on the whole is what he would now desire and seek on the whole if all the 
consequences of all the different lines of conduct open to him were accurately 
foreseen and adequately realised in imagination at the present point of time.” 
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welfare area of the desire circle in Diagram D.  Successfully accomplishing this 
goal will mean that we have accurately defined the subset of classes that affect 
welfare, which will move us from Diagram D to a slightly modified version of 
Diagram E that now reads “Restricted Desires” to reflect the fact that we are 
now dealing only with a subset of desires after the move from the successfully 
shaded Diagram D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once we have accomplished that task, we will be in a position to fill in the 
details of the theory in order to show how, exactly, our restricted desires affect 
personal welfare.  Finally, the advantages of our new desire-satisfaction theory 
over competing theories will be demonstrated, as well as how the theory 
handles a variety of objections made to desire-satisfaction theories.  Before 
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tackling these topics, however, the rest of this chapter will be devoted to 
chronicling the problems that desire-satisfaction theories face. 
VII. SOME GENERAL CONCERNS ABOUT DESIRES AS THE BASIS FOR A THEORY OF 
WELFARE 
Suppose, again, you are told that a person had gotten everything she 
desired during her life, and then you are asked to venture a guess as to how 
well her life went for her.  If you are not told anything more about her life, you 
would probably guess that her life went somewhere between well and very well 
for her.  This seems to be in accordance with how we generally view desire 
satisfactions; when we learn that someone got what she wanted, we assume 
that, other things being equal, her life is now going better than it was before.  
In other words, we are using desire satisfactions as a proxy for personal 
welfare. 
Desire-satisfaction theories of welfare, however, make a much stronger 
claim.  These theories do not claim that certain desire satisfactions are simply 
a proxy for welfare.  Rather, they claim that the satisfaction of the desires 
included in the theory is what contributes to welfare and that nothing other 
than these desires affect welfare at all.  This strong of a claim is almost always 
accompanied by a host of objections that it must overcome before it will be 
generally accepted.  The first set of three objections⎯considered in the next few 
paragraphs⎯applies to all classes of desires. 
While the next two objections deal with the objects of our desires, the 
first one, fittingly, deals with the origin of our desires.  Nietzsche claimed that 
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philosophers do not like to talk about the beginnings of things.27  I suspect 
there are many reasons for this, but I think the main reason pertains to the 
long shadow cast by the single most impenetrable, inscrutable question ever 
asked: Why is there something rather than nothing?28  Anyone who pretends to 
offer an answer to this question is a fool of unparalleled stature.29  So if the 
origins of things is a generally underexplored and difficult topic, it should come 
as no surprise that the origins of our desires have been neglected as well.  
Given what follows, it is clear why proponents of desire satisfactionism should 
want to avoid this topic, but it is not clear at all why opponents of such 
                                       
27 Nietzsche makes this point, like most of the points he makes, repeatedly.  
For example: “You want to know what the philosophers’ idiosyncrasies are? . . . 
Their lack of historical sense for one thing, their hatred of the very idea of 
becoming, their Egypticity.  They think that they are showing respect for 
something when they dehistoricize it, sub specie aeterni, – when they turn it 
into a mummy” (Nietzsche 2005: 166-67).  See also Nietzsche (1996: § 2). 
 
28 Neither god nor the Singularity of the Big Bang is an answer to this question, 
as both of these things are things that would require an explanation in order to 
answer the question. 
 
29 David Hume (1989: 32-33) summed this up best: “A very small part of this 
great system, during a very short time, is very imperfectly discovered to us; and 
do we thence pronounce decisively concerning the origin of the whole?  
Admirable conclusion!”  Bede Rundle (2004: ix), apparently undeterred, wrote 
an entire book, Why There is Something Rather than Nothing, on this topic and 
came up with, among other things, the “central thesis that there has to be 
something.”  Rundle (2004: ix) admits he cannot claim that the arguments on 
key points are “compelling,” but rather claims that “good reasons can be given 
in support of the position advocated.”  It is not at all clear what that means, 
but what is clear is that Rundle does not understand the essence of the 
question, as he appears to offer a linguistic analysis as an argument for 
nothingness being impossible (i.e., there has to be something).  It is precisely 
this sort of thing that gives philosophy a bad name. 
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theories would do so.30  This is because the origins of a great many of our 
desires come from a place that is both difficult in its own right to analyze and 
seems very unreliable as a source of things designed to make our lives go 
better.  The place that I am referring to is, of course, the parts of our psychic 
makeup that trace back to our animal origins.  Humans are the product of 
billions of years of evolution, and, for better or worse, we carry that baggage 
with us to this day.  And while that baggage has made the human race quite 
good at survival, that is not what concerns us here.  Our topic, is, roughly, 
what makes us thrive as a species, rather than what makes us merely survive.  
                                       
30 One critic, Adams (1999: 90), does touch upon this problem: “And [desire 
satisfactionism] still is not plausible if we also demand full realization of the 
causal history of one’s motives.  A fuller understanding of our histories, 
capacities, and tendencies does not always make us like ourselves better.”  
Rawls (1999: 368-69) also discusses some concerns regarding the origin of 
desires: 
We may also investigate the circumstances under which we 
have acquired our desires and conclude that some of our aims are 
in various respects out of line.  Thus a desire may spring from 
excessive generalization, or arise from more or less accidental 
associations.  This is especially likely to be so in the case of 
aversions developed when we are younger and do not possess 
enough experience and maturity to make the necessary 
corrections.  Other wants may be inordinate, having acquired their 
peculiar urgency as an overreaction to a prior period of severe 
deprivation or anxiety.  The study of these processes and their 
disturbing influence on the normal development of our system of 
desires is not our concern here.  They do however suggest certain 
critical reflections that are important devices of deliberation.  
Awareness of the genesis of our wants can often make it perfectly 
clear to us that we really do desire certain things more than 
others.  As some aims seem less important in the face of critical 
scrutiny, or even lose their appeal entirely, others may assume an 
assured prominence that provides sufficient grounds for choice.  Of 
course, it is conceivable that despite the unfortunate conditions 
under which some of our desires and aversions have developed, 
they may still fit into and even greatly enhance the fulfillment of 
rational plans.  If so, they turn out to be perfectly rational after all. 
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A cursory glance at the human condition, both current and historical, should 
sharpen one’s appreciation for this critical distinction.  Accordingly, the fact 
that a great number of our desires simply bubble up, for lack of a better term, 
to our conscious minds seems to be a significant issue for desire-satisfaction 
theories to address. 
The questionable origin of many of our desires contributes to the second 
major issue for desire satisfactionism⎯the fact that we can be mistaken about 
our desires.  If some of our desires do just bubble up to our conscious minds, 
then it seems plausible to suppose that some of our desires stay down in the 
primordial muck.  And if Freud was right, this is precisely what happens.  This 
opens the door to several problematic possibilities.  For example, we could 
want X and be unaware of it, we could want X and think we do not want X, we 
could not want X and think that we do want X, etc.  I think it is both more 
tempting and more plausible for a desire-satisfaction theory to sidestep these 
issues than the origin issue, but avoiding this issue does leave the theory open 
to a line of objections seeking to exploit this fact. 
The final general issue with desires “is that one’s desires spread 
themselves so widely over the world that their objects extend far outside the 
bound of what, with any plausibility, one could take as touching one’s own 
well-being” (Griffin 1986: 17).  While that sounds daunting enough from the 
perspective of desire satisfactionism, Griffin actually understates the problem 
or, at least, does not emphasize the proper scope of the issue.  This is because 
it is possible to desire anything, where “anything” has a meaning that extends 
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far beyond the boundaries of its meaning in any other context.  This issue is 
what I was alluding to in the beginning of the chapter when I claimed we had 
found the room in the mansion that contains welfare, but that the room was 
not only massive but also lacking a fourth wall.  Starting with the easiest to 
imagine and working our way up, here are some examples that illustrate the 
scope of the problem.  First, there are no ethical limits on what we can desire.  
As Hume (2003: 296) says, I could “prefer the destruction of the whole world to 
the scratching of my finger.”  Second, there are no epistemic constraints on 
what we can desire.  In other words, it need not be possible for us to know 
about some state of affairs in order for us to want it.  I could, for example, 
desire that the creature in the universe that is most similar to me have a good 
life provided that this creature does not live on Earth or on any planet that I 
could possibly ever visit or communicate with.  I could desire to experience the 
infinite.  I could also desire to experience, literally, everything at once.  Third, 
there are no metaphysical constraints on what we can desire.31  “For example, I 
may want it to be true that, in my drunkenness last night, I did not disgrace 
myself” (Parfit 1984: 171).  Suppose that I did disgrace myself last night.  I now 
want something that is metaphysically impossible to achieve.  Finally, there are 
no logical constraints on what we can desire.  “The Pythagoreans wanted the 
square root of two to be a rational number.  It is logically impossible that this 
desire be fulfilled” (Parfit 1984: 172). 
                                       
31 Nagel’s (1970: 76) “man who wastes his life in the cheerful pursuit of a 
method of communicating with asparagus plants” is another amusing example 
of an impossible desire. 
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There are a potentially infinite number of variations of the types of 
desires described in the last paragraph, and this does not even include all the 
variations of the more mundane desires that are a part of everyone’s daily lives.  
The issue that some may have with the majority of the infinite list of possible 
desires is a nagging doubt about whether someone could actually want these 
things.  There are, of course, states of affairs that no one has ever wanted, but 
the point is that someone could want them.  And he could want these states of 
affairs even if an omnipotent god could not make them obtain (Parfit 1984: 
172).  In short, it is a logical truth that we want what we want, ethics, 
epistemology, metaphysics, and logic notwithstanding.  Although this leaves a 
lot of conceptual ground for a desire-satisfaction theory to cover, there is 
reason to be optimistic about the chances of a solution.  Narrowing the list of 
potential desires to those that affect welfare is much less theoretically daunting 
than either expanding a hedonistic theory or creating an objective-list theory 
out of whole cloth. 
VIII. DEFECTIVE DESIRES 
As mentioned above, Diagram D will be the correct depiction of the 
relationship between desires and welfare if we can find just one desire, or 
perhaps even an entire class of desires, that does not affect welfare.  It is also 
possible that there are desires that do affect welfare, but do not fall within the 
welfare circle in Diagram D.  In other words, there may be desires the 
satisfaction of which makes a life go worse for the person who lives it.  The 
correct desire-satisfaction theory of welfare will have to address each of these 
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possibilities.  The basic form of the argument made against desire theories of 
welfare is usually as follows: 
Premise 1: Desire-satisfaction theories include in the calculation of 
personal welfare the satisfaction of desires of type X. 
Premise 2: The satisfaction of desires of type X do not make a life 
go better. 
Conclusion: Therefore, desire-satisfaction theories of personal 
welfare are false. 
 
The goal, then, for the rest of this project is to develop a new desire-satisfaction 
theory, motivate it, and defend it against this type of objection. 
The rest of this section will be devoted to cataloguing the types of desires 
that have been advanced in the literature on personal welfare as posing a 
threat to the success of desire satisfactionism.  In fact, the existence of one or 
more of the types of desires listed in this section has been thought to be a 
decisive objection against desire satisfactionism by Brandt (1979: 115-26), 
Schwartz (1982: 195-97), Griffin (1986: 10), Kraut (1994: 40), Kagan (1998: 38-
39), Adams (1999: 87), Carson (2000: 80), and Feldman (2004: 16). 
Parfit (1984: 494) discusses the scenario of meeting an ill stranger and 
desiring that the stranger be cured.  Although Parfit never knows about it, the 
stranger is subsequently cured.  Parfit asserts that it is not plausible to claim 
that the satisfaction of this desire makes his life go better.  The rationale for 
this claim is that this desire, and many other possible desires, is too remote 
from Parfit in some way to impact his welfare.  The possibility of remote desires 
is a direct consequence of the unbounded nature of our desires. 
Kraut (1994: 41) asks us to imagine a boy who desires, on impulse, to 
throw a rock at a nearby duck.  Kraut suggests that the satisfaction of this 
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desire does not increase the boy’s welfare and that it may even decrease it.  
Impulsive desires or, as I have described them previously, those desires that 
just bubble up to our conscious mind, are a consequence of the questionable 
origin of our desires. 
Overvold (1980: 108) describes a situation involving a man of modest 
means and his four sons.  The man kills himself so that each of his sons will be 
able to attend expensive private colleges by using the proceeds from his large 
life insurance policy.  Overvold argues that satisfying this apparently self-
sacrificial desire does not make the man’s life go better for him. 
Heathwood (11) devises the case of Ellie and the music to be played at 
her 50th birthday party.32  From her teens until a month before her party, she 
had a desire to have rock ’n roll played at her party.  With a month to go and 
for the rest of the time up to and through her party, Ellie will prefer easy 
listening and will not be pleased if rock ’n roll is played at her party.  A desire-
satisfaction theory that counts past desires and how long the person had the 
desire will probably claim that we make Ellie’s life go better by playing rock ’n 
roll at her party.  Heathwood claims, rightly, that this is an implausible claim 
given the fact that Ellie’s changing desire has now ensured that she will hate 
the rock and the roll. 
Carson (2000: 72) describes a case in which he is thirsty and has a 
desire to drink from a nearby stream.  There is a leak from a chemical factory 
upstream that he does not know about.  Thus, satisfying this ill-informed desire 
                                       
32 Brandt (1979: 249-50) describes a similar case. 
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will kill Carson.  This type of desire also seems problematic for a desire-
satisfaction theory. 
Schwartz (1982: 196) discusses the possibility of conditioning creating 
desires within us that may be contrary to our “true needs.”  Commercial 
advertising, religious training, political propaganda, and peer pressure are all 
mentioned by Schwartz as potential causes of malconditioned desires.  Once 
again, the origin of some of our desires seems as though it may cause problems 
for a desire-centric theory. 
Sumner (1996: 126) asks us to consider your possible desire to be 
remembered by your lover after you die.  This desire, if it is satisfied at all, will 
necessarily be satisfied after your death.  However, is it plausible to claim that 
this posthumous desire satisfaction actually makes your life go better for you?  
This is another potential problem created by our ability to desire anything at 
all. 
Kraut (1994: 40-1) creates a scenario in which a man decides to punish 
himself for a crime he committed earlier in his life by taking a boring, arduous, 
insignificant job for several years after quitting his job that he loves.  He 
considers it a moral necessity to satisfy this desire not to be well off.  Satisfying 
this desire, by its own terms, seems to make one worse off, thereby creating 
another problem for desire satisfactionism.   
After reading the letters of Keats and Van Gogh, Parfit (1984: 171) 
reports wanting it to be true that they knew how great their achievements were.  
This desire about the past⎯a now-for-then desire as Hare (1981: 101) calls 
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it⎯complicates matters as well.  Could my welfare be affected by things that 
either did or did not obtain long before I was born? 
Schwartz’s (1982: 196) Bertha seeks above all else to minimize pain, and 
she is fully aware of the fact that going to the dentist in the near future would 
minimize her pain in the long run.  Nevertheless, Bertha desires not to go to 
the dentist.  Bertha’s irrational desire provides another concern for the 
prospective desire-satisfaction theorist to sort out. 
Heathwood (23) describes a case in which Father wants Son to get good 
grades, but only as a means to the end of what Father really wants for Son⎯“to 
be respected, to do worthwhile things, and to have a good life.”  Father’s desire 
for Son to get good grades is an extrinsic desire (i.e., a desire that a state of 
affairs obtain only because of what it will lead to and not because the state of 
affairs is desired in itself).  Is it plausible to claim that the satisfaction of 
desires that merely lead to things that are intrinsically desired makes one’s life 
go better? 
Finally, there is a group of various types of desires the satisfaction of 
which has been claimed not to make one’s life go better, and perhaps make it 
go worse in some cases, due to the objects of the desires being unworthy of 
desire in some respect.  First, one can have malicious desires.  Charles 
Manson’s desire to incite an all-out race war is a prime example.  Second, one 
can have tasteless, base, or poorly cultivated desires.  Preferring Justin Bieber, 
bestiality, or Birmingham, Alabama over available alternatives might be 
considered examples of these types of desires.  Lastly, one could have pointless 
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desires.  Rawls’s (1999: 379-80) man who devotes himself to counting blades of 
grass or Kraut’s (1994: 42) man who devotes himself to knocking down icicles 
are both examples of this type of desire. 
This list of potentially problematic desires is meant to be exhaustive in 
order for us to completely demarcate the boundaries of the minefield we are 
about to traverse.  On our journey we will step on some of these mines only to 
learn that they are duds.  The rest we will avoid with the theory we will develop 
in the next three chapters. 
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CHAPTER THREE: UNIFIED THEORIES & FRANKFURTIAN FOUNDATIONS 
 Having chronicled all the potential pitfalls that await a desire-satisfaction 
theory of welfare, it is time to turn to an evaluation of the tools available to a 
desire satisfaction theorist that might be employed to fashion an adequate 
theory.  This chapter will be devoted primarily to the tools provided by the work 
of Harry G. Frankfurt (b. 1929).  Although Frankfurt has never addressed the 
question of personal welfare in print, the seeds for the theory I will construct 
and present over the course of the next few chapters can be found throughout 
his work.  Frankfurt’s works on free will, moral responsibility, rationality, and 
moral psychology formulated over the last 40 years are particularly helpful in 
this regard. 
I. A UNIFIED THEORY OF WELFARE? 
 Before we turn to Frankfurt’s ideas, a preliminary question about 
theories of welfare generally should be addressed.  The question is a meta-
axiological question concerning whether the right theory must include all 
sentient beings.  The notion that this is what the right axiological theory should 
encompass is occasionally mentioned in passing in the literature,1 but there 
does not appear to be any extended discussion of this issue. 
 The motivation for wanting a theory of welfare for all sentient beings is 
obvious.  At least since the time John Stuart Mill (2006: 322) made the 
                                       
1 See, e.g., Kraut (1994: 47), Sumner (1996: 14), and Griffin (1986: 315 n.19). 
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following remark, a unified theory has been on the wish list of many an ethical 
theorist: 
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; 
better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.  And if the 
fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only 
know this side of the question.  The other party to the comparison 
knows both sides. 
 
This is a controversial statement.  Each time I teach Mill’s Utilitarianism, there 
is always a subset of students who disagree with this claim.  In fact, many 
utilitarians (e.g., Bentham) present a version of utilitarianism that would 
commit them to rejecting this claim.  A unified theory would give us an answer 
to the question Mill raises. 
 Before we proceed further, the concept of a “unified theory” should be 
clarified.  This concept could be defined in two ways.  The first of these I will 
call a strong unified theory.  A strong unified theory of personal welfare would 
measure welfare for all beings that have a welfare and would base welfare on 
the same attribute across every type of being.  Hedonism might be an example 
of a strong unified theory if the version in question purported to cover all 
relevant beings and the measure of welfare across all of them was a function of 
the balance between pleasure and pain.  If such a strong unified theory were 
the right theory, then, obviously, the theory of welfare (covering only persons) 
that I will put forward later would be false.  Accordingly, I will offer some 
reasons in the rest of this section⎯in addition to the reasons I have already 
produced to doubt the truth of hedonism⎯to doubt the truth of such a theory. 
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 The other possible kind of unified theory I will call a weak unified theory.  
A weak unified theory could allow for the welfare of each type (or even, 
perhaps, each instance) of being to be determined by different or unique 
attributes and would then specify a way to compare the welfare of any two 
beings⎯even beings of different kinds⎯in order to determine which life went 
better for the being that lived it.  While the truth of a weak unified theory would 
be consistent with the truth of my theory, in this section I will give some 
reasons to doubt the commensurability of the welfare of different 
beings⎯which would mean no weak unified theory exists⎯and reasons to 
suppose that even a weak unified theory is radically epistemically inaccessible 
to us.  And, at any rate, this discussion helps to frame and motivate the 
material from Frankfurt that follows it. 
 Returning to Mills’s porcine idea, not only is there reason to want a 
theory that covers all sentient beings, there seems to be good reason to think 
that this is a good-making feature of a theory.  If there were two competing 
theories, and one covered all sentient beings while the other covered some 
subset of sentient beings, it does seem reasonable to suppose the larger ambit 
of the former is a mark in its favor.  However, to focus too much on this good-
making feature of a theory may be to lose sight of the best good-making 
feature⎯that it be the right theory.  If the right theory for, say, persons were 
only to include persons, then the problem is with our expectations of the theory 
and not the theory itself.  Moreover, the idea that the right theory of welfare 
must include all sentient beings is a substantive claim that would need 
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supporting arguments.  The claim that we have reason to want a unified theory 
is just that⎯a claim that we want such a theory and not a claim either that 
there is such a theory or that this is a requirement of the right theory.  In fact, 
it seems that the best, and perhaps the only, way to argue that the right theory 
is a unified theory would be to put forward a theory, support the theory with 
arguments, and then take note of the fact that, as it turns out, this theory 
covers all sentient beings.  Any attempt to argue that the right theory must be 
a unified theory using some sort of conceptual or analytic argument, without 
more, seems doomed from the start. 
 There is an additional reason to think that there is no strong unified 
theory that covers all sentient beings or that requiring one is really an attempt 
to stack the deck in favor of a particular theory.  Which of these is the case 
turns on how one defines the term “sentient.”  In common usage, the term 
sentient means “having the power of perception by the senses; conscious” 
(Webster’s Dictionary 1996: 1745).  Without getting bogged down too deeply in 
complicated issues of philosophy of mind,2 this definition of “sentient” opens 
the door to a potentially broad range of beings, which would seem to 
significantly reduce the prospect of finding a strong unified theory for all of 
them.  Robots and other machines might fall into this definition.  What makes 
a robot’s life go better for it?  Does this question make sense?  Is this question 
                                       
2 “It is no accident that so many thinkers, both philosophers and scientists, 
have spoken of the ‘mystery’ of consciousness.  It is not an exaggeration to say 
that the mystery of mind is, in essence, the mystery of consciousness” (Kim 
2006: 224). 
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more like what makes a person’s life go best for her, or more like what makes 
the life of Xerox copier go best for it?  Is it like both questions?  Is it in some 
third category such that it is like neither question?  God and the Flying 
Spaghetti Monster would also presumably qualify as sentient beings under this 
definition.  What makes their lives go better for them?  Does this question make 
sense?  If it does, how would one even begin to go about answering it?  These 
issues point to the fundamental problem with defining “sentient” in this way.  
The problem is that by defining “sentient” as having the power of perception by 
the senses, this is the only attribute that all sentient beings can be assured of 
having, and almost all of these beings will have many of the additional 
attributes that it is possible for a being to have.  If the power of perception by 
the senses is the only attribute that the beings at issue are assured of having, 
then a theory of welfare that encompasses all of these sentient beings will have 
to take one of two approaches.  The first approach, a version of a strong unified 
theory, would be to make welfare a function of the only thing you can be sure 
every sentient being has⎯the power of perception by the senses.  This option 
does not appear to hold much promise.  In this option, it seems that welfare 
would increase by having more perceptions, specific perceptions, or good 
perceptions.  Each of these options is so imperfect that explicit refutations are 
unnecessary.  The second option, a version of a weak unified theory, would 
require an additional assumption in order to be possible⎯namely, that every 
sentient being does possess an attribute in addition to being sentient.  If so, 
then each sentient being’s welfare could be a function of this additional 
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attribute or this additional attribute and the power of perception by the senses.  
A detailed treatment of this very imperfect solution will be discussed below. 
 The other possible definition of “sentient” raises concerns of a different 
sort.  Peter Singer (1989), in his famous article “All Animals Are Equal,” 
described sentience as “the only defensible boundary of concern for the 
interests of others.”  In so doing, it seems as though he could not have had in 
mind the definition discussed above.  Indeed, Singer acknowledges as much in 
a parenthetical that appears directly before the quote in the last sentence: 
“sentience (using the term as a convenient, if not strictly accurate, shorthand 
for the capacity to suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness).”  For better or 
worse, Singer’s “not strictly accurate” definition of “sentient” seems to have 
changed the definition, at least as the term is used in ethics, for the foreseeable 
future.3  When the term “sentient” is defined in this manner, the concern for 
theories of welfare is obvious.  For if a theorist, in developing a theory of 
welfare, is given the constraints that (1) the right theory must include all 
sentient beings and (2) sentient means the capacity to experience pleasure and 
pain, then it will be no surprise when the theorist produces a hedonistic theory 
of welfare.  This is the concern noted earlier about stacking the deck in favor of 
a particular theory, in this case hedonism.  And hedonism is almost surely the 
theory that would be produced given the two constraints above, as it is one of 
the two possible outcomes and is by far the more plausible of the two.  This is 
because the only attribute we can be sure every sentient being, so defined, has 
                                       
3 See, e.g., Regan (2001: 71): “sentience (that is, the capacity to experience 
pleasure and pain).” 
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is the capacity to experience pleasure and pain (although, as I have argued in 
Chapter One, it is not a plausible theory for persons).  The other possibility is 
only a possibility if we add in the additional assumption that was discussed at 
the end of the last paragraph, namely that every sentient being possesses some 
attribute in addition to being sentient.  We could then have a weak unified 
theory that claimed the welfare of sentient beings was a function of this 
additional attribute alone or some combination of this additional attribute 
along with the capacity to experience pleasure and pain.  As promised at the 
end of the last paragraph, the implausibility of this type of theory is what we 
will turn to next. 
 I have been arguing that the idea that there should be a strong unified 
theory for all sentient beings is a substantive claim that needs support and 
that there are reasons to think no such theory would be plausible.4  This 
should not be confused with the claim that the lives of sentient beings, 
properly defined, do not go better or worse for the beings that live them.  If this 
is correct, and if even a weak unified theory of welfare is neither possible nor 
plausible, then we may not be able to evaluate Mills’s claim regarding humans 
and pigs that provided a great deal of the motivation for a unified theory in the 
first place.  An illustration will be useful here in demonstrating the issue facing 
a weak unified theory.  Let us suppose that the welfare of a pig is a function of 
                                       
4 Such a theory is implausible because, as I argued in Chapter One, hedonism 
is implausible (at least as applied to persons) and a theory of welfare for all 
sentient beings⎯when sentience is defined as pertaining to sensory 
perception⎯is even less plausible. 
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some attribute F that all pigs have.  Although nothing important hinges on 
this, we can even suppose, perhaps plausibly, that attribute F is the capacity to 
feel pleasure and pain, which would then make a hedonistic theory of welfare 
the correct theory of welfare for pigs.  We then find a happy pig, Babe, and 
calculate a welfare score of 100 for Babe, which, as it turns out, is quite a good 
score for a pig.5  Next, let us suppose that the welfare of a person is a function 
of some attribute G that all persons have but that pigs do not have (which is 
what I will argue for in the coming pages).  We then find a dissatisfied person, 
Arthur, and calculate a welfare score for him of 5, which is quite a low score for 
a person.  We now want to know who had the better life⎯and thus, which life it 
would be better to have⎯Babe with a pig score of 100 or Arthur with a person 
score of 5.  The proponent of a weak unified theory has a tall order on her 
hands if she is to answer this question.  And notice that she must answer this 
question if she is truly offering a unified theory.6  The task the unified theorist 
is faced with is devising a pig-person welfare exchange rate.  In other words, 
she must specify an equation that allows the pig welfare score to be directly 
                                       
5 That’ll do, pig.  That’ll do. 
 
6 Of course a theorist could maintain that there is a weak unified theory of 
welfare without actually specifying the theory.  Such an attempt might rely on 
a hypothetical like the following.  Imagine a super-duper great pig life and a 
terrible, horrible human life.  Which one would you prefer?  Most people, 
including me, would probably choose to live the pig life.  However, this does not 
establish that there is a fact of the matter as to which life is better.  As I have 
been explaining, I doubt that there is a fact of the matter.  The reason, then, 
that I would choose the pig life over the human life is that I have some idea 
how a horrific human life would go and I would choose the good life of anything 
(or no life at all, for that matter) over the bad human life.  This preference does 
not entail that it is true that the pig life is better than the human life. 
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compared to the person welfare score.  For example, suppose the theorist 
claims that person welfare is multiplied by 2.5 in order to yield the equivalent 
pig welfare units.  We would then know that Babe had a better life than Arthur 
by a score of 100 to 5 times 2.5 or 12.5.  Such a theory would be wildly 
speculative at best.  If there is a fact of the matter regarding which of these two 
lives is better, our lines cannot plumb these metaphysical and epistemological 
depths. 
 There is yet another consideration that makes the possibility of a 
successful weak unified theory unlikely.  I have previously claimed that it 
makes sense to ask what life is like for the being that lives it and that it does 
not make sense to ask this question for other things (e.g., a Xerox machine).  
The problem with limiting the ambit of the former group to sentience, where 
sentience is defined as the capacity to experience pleasure and pain, is that, as 
explained previously, it will have a tendency to beg the welfare question in 
favor of hedonistic theories.  Properly defining the boundary for a group whose 
welfare it makes sense to inquire about will illuminate another reason for us to 
be skeptical about the prospects for a unified theory.  The proper boundary for 
welfare is all and only those beings for which there is something it is like to be 
that being (i.e., something it is like for that being or how it is for the being 
itself).7  Following Thomas Nagel (1974: 436), we can call this the “subjective 
                                       
7 I am assuming that it does not make sense to inquire about the welfare of 
plants or inanimate objects.  Things do not go better or worse for them.  We 
may like one plant better than another, but that does not mean things are 
going better for that plant than they are for the other plant.  And to the extent 
that such talk makes sense, I would argue that this is not talk about welfare, 
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character of experience.”  This presents a serious problem for even a weak 
unified theory of welfare if we add in an additional premise: In order to develop 
and adequately support a theory of welfare for a particular being (i.e., how well 
the life goes for the being who lives that life), the theorist must know the 
subjective character of that being’s experience.  For if the theorist does not 
have this information, then is she not just throwing darts in the dark?  She 
may hit the bull’s-eye, but she would never have reason to believe this without 
turning on the lights (supplying her with the required subjective character of 
experience), nor would we as spectators (the evaluators of her theory) have 
reason to believe this.  This is because, as Nagel so persuasively argues, the 
subjective character of experience for some (or all?) creatures is radically 
inaccessible to us.  Supposing that there is something that it is like to be a bat, 
Nagel asks what it is like for a bat to be a bat.  In other words, what is the 
phenomenal character of a bat’s experience for a bat from navigating the world 
primarily through the use of the bat’s incredibly discriminating sonar system?  
One could know all the physical facts about a bat for any period of time and 
still not have the faintest idea what it is like for a bat to be a bat.  As Nagel 
(1974: 439) says, if he tries to imagine this, “I am restricted to the resources of 
my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task.  I cannot 
perform it either by imagining additions to my present experience, or by 
imagining segments gradually subtracted from it, or by imagining some 
combination of additions, subtractions, and modifications.”  So while there is 
                                                                                                                           
but about some other concept.  I will have to leave these claims undefended 
here. 
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something that it is like for a bat to be a bat, Nagel (1974: 441) claims that our 
lines cannot plumb these depths either: 
Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, 
to the conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the 
truth of propositions expressible in human language.  We can be 
compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without being 
able to state or comprehend them. 
 
This may be the best reason to think that even a weak unified theory of welfare 
is beyond our reach at best and perhaps does not exist at all. 
 There is one final consideration that may cast doubt upon the 
accessibility or even existence of a unified theory and will also serve as a 
smooth transition to our next topic.  This issue presents itself if we take a 
closer look at the relationship, if any, between the welfare of nonhuman 
animals⎯let us just use pigs for simplicity’s sake⎯and the welfare of persons.  
Now as I have stated previously, every theory of welfare⎯in order to be a theory 
of welfare at all⎯must specify something that makes a life go better for the 
being who lives that life.  Although I have argued against the existence of a 
unified theory for all sentient beings, perhaps there is a unified theory for 
nonhuman animals and persons.  While I do not think this is the case either, a 
cursory examination of this possibility should prove useful.  If there were a 
unified theory for pigs and persons, the three most plausible options are an 
objective-list theory, a hedonistic theory, or a desire-satisfaction theory.  An 
objective-list theory is a nonstarter.  First, bearing in mind the lengthy 
argument in Chapter One against the possibility that an objective-list theory is 
the right theory for persons, it follows that an objective-list theory cannot be 
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the correct theory for persons and pigs.  Second, a weak unified objective-list 
theory would be faced with the daunting pig-person welfare exchange rate 
problem described above, and a strong unified objective-list theory would have 
to specify the same list for both pigs and persons; neither of these approaches 
seems promising.  A hedonistic theory for both pigs and persons, while more 
plausible than objective-list theory, also appears to be false.  Although a 
hedonistic theory for pigs is a good guess (what is it like to be a pig?), I argued 
against this being the correct theory for persons in Chapter One as well.  
Again, if it is not correct with respect to persons, it cannot be correct for 
persons and pigs. 
 This brings us to the possibility that a desire-satisfaction theory is the 
correct theory for both pigs and persons.  Could desire satisfactionism be the 
correct theory for pigs?  Although I do not want to commit myself to any 
definitive answer here because nothing hinges on this in terms of my larger 
project, I suspect there is at least one good reason to reject this possibility.  It 
seems reasonable to suppose that any adequate theory for animals must 
countenance the fact that pleasure makes an animal’s life go better and pain 
makes it go worse.  We were able to accommodate this data point with respect 
to persons by appealing to the Motivational Theory of Pleasure (MTP).  It is not 
clear to me that this strategy will be successful when it comes to nonhuman 
animals.  With respect to identical sensations, could a pig desire it over time, 
thus making it pleasurable, and not desire it at another time, thus making it 
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painful?8  Whether MTP works for nonhuman animal welfare, or could be 
modified to do so, is a question I cannot answer here. 
If an unrestricted desire-satisfaction theory will not work for pigs, what 
about a restricted theory?  This is where this exercise gets interesting, as this 
is what I will claim is the correct theory for persons.  What I would like to 
examine here is not the answer to the following question, but the implications 
of the answer to the question: Are the welfare-producing desires restricted in 
the same way for pigs as they are for people?  In other words, will the restricted 
desire-satisfaction theory that I intend to claim is the correct theory of welfare 
for persons also work for pigs?  The answer is no.  If any restricted desire-
satisfaction theory could work for pig welfare, it is not the one I will offer in the 
coming pages.  However, let us suppose the answer was yes; there is a 
restricted desire-satisfaction theory that could be used to determine the welfare 
of any animal⎯human or nonhuman, person or pig.  Leaving aside any 
speculation of what this theory might look like, there is an interesting 
implication.  If this were right, then the correct theory of welfare for persons 
not only would not, but could not, include any feature that makes humans 
distinct from other animals.  This outcome would be a rather large surprise 
and is yet another reason to suppose that a strong unified theory of welfare is 
not possible.  This is because the difference between human animals and 
                                       
8 The thought that I cannot adequately explore here is that perhaps some type 
of reflective attitude might be required in order to want a sensation at one time 
and not want the exact same sensation at another time.  If something like this 
were true, it would make MTP inapplicable to most nonhuman animals and, in 
turn, would make a desire-satisfaction theory incorrect for them. 
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nonhuman animals is not a trivial characteristic that would be surprising to 
find was related to human welfare⎯like, say, if we were the only animals that 
laid eggs or had horns.  What does set persons apart is our capacity for self-
consciousness, which seems to give rise to most, if not all, of the aspects of our 
mental lives that we value the most: free will, rationality, highly refined 
language skills, etc.  A strong unified theory of welfare for all animals would 
mean that none of these things could impact our welfare.  While this may 
ultimately be true, it would be at odds with most people’s intuitions about 
welfare and may be a sign that the theory claiming this needed to be 
reexamined. 
II. WHAT IS A “PERSON”? 
 If one does not intend to offer a unified theory of welfare, then it is a good 
idea to be very clear about the sort of being for which one does intend to offer a 
theory of welfare.  As I will be offering a theory of personal welfare, I will 
attempt to clarify what the term “person” means in this context and why clarity 
on this issue is so important. 
 What does it mean to be a person?  It seems clear that a person must be 
a being of some sort, but what sort?  To answer this will be to specify the 
property or properties that a being must have in order to be a person.  In other 
words, persons are all and only those beings who possess property F.9  What 
property, then, should property F be?  In common parlance, property F is 
                                       
9 For a detailed discussion of various ways “person” has been defined, see 
Loren E. Lonsky’s (2001: 1293) “person, concept of” in the Encyclopedia of 
Ethics. 
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assumed to be equivalent to human being so that persons are all and only 
human beings.  This assumption is even made by some philosophers (see, e.g., 
Wertheimer 1971: 69).  Although defining personhood in this way is a natural 
tendency and quite harmless on many occasions, it may be problematic in 
many philosophical contexts. 
 Often when philosophers use the word “person”, it connotes a sense of 
elevated moral standing such that persons are often claimed to have rights of 
some sort (e.g., the right to life, the right to bodily integrity, etc.).  One problem 
with defining persons as human beings is that it will not include many possible 
or actual beings that would seem to possess the same rights.  This problem 
stems from the fact that to be a human being is just to be a being with a 
specific sequence of DNA.  Is a specific sequence of DNA a morally relevant 
difference such that those with it have rights and those without it do not?  The 
answer would seem to be no.  If a race of beings were discovered that were 
identical to humans in every way except that they had XYZ instead of DNA, 
would it be morally justifiable to rape, torture, and kill them as we pleased?  
Intelligent life forms on other planets, if they exist, might be interested in our 
answer to this, given the thought that what is good for the goose is good for the 
gander. 
 The other problem with equating persons and human beings pertains 
specifically to the question of welfare and also relates back to the point made at 
the end of the last section.  This problem concerns the fact that the 
development of a human being is a process involving continuous and gradual 
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change.  This ground has been covered thoroughly in the abortion debate (see, 
e.g., Thomson 1971: 47-48).  The problems caused by this fact in the abortion 
debate raise analogous issues in the welfare debate.  This is because the thing 
formed is biologically human very soon after, or perhaps at, conception.  (This 
makes sense; what else, biologically, could it be?)  However, we do not have a 
problem yet from an axiological perspective.  This is because, at least up until 
about the 25th week of development, there is nothing it is like to be one of these 
things (i.e., there is no subjective character of experience), as the central 
nervous system is not yet functioning.  From the standpoint of welfare prior to 
this point and excluding any potential future welfare, this biologically human 
entity is nothing more than a glorified tumor until, at the very least, the start of 
brain function.  Once there is something that it is like to be this thing, though, 
it makes sense to ask about its current welfare.  Leaving aside the 
underinclusiveness issue discussed in the last paragraph, shall we say that 
persons are humans who can be said to have the subjective character of 
experience?  This definition would also be an unfortunate one.  If our theory of 
welfare for persons must include you, me, and fetuses, what shall we specify 
that makes our lives go better and that also makes a fetus’s life go better?  
Perhaps the only option, and at least the most plausible of the very few options, 
will be our previously discredited hedonistic theory of welfare.  The options do 
not get much better, either, until well after birth because we do not develop the 
mental features that separate us from other animals until long after birth.10  If 
                                       
10 This can be seen quite nicely if one observes the similarities in how adults 
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a theory of welfare is to include both adults and fetuses/babies anywhere in 
this stage of development (leaving aside questions of potential future welfare), 
then we must choose from features that we share with other animals and we 
must exclude any features that arise from our capacity for self-consciousness. 
 Michael Tooley notes this same fact, at least as it relates to fetuses and 
babies, in pointing out the difficulty in developing a position on abortion that 
allows for abortions but does not allow infanticide (Tooley 1972: 37-38).  In 
formulating his own position on abortion and infanticide, Tooley (1972: 40) 
treats the concept of a person as a purely moral concept that is synonymous 
with a being that “has a serious right to life.”  Tooley (1972: 44) goes on to 
argue that the necessary (and possibly also sufficient) properties a being must 
have to be a person (i.e., a being with a serious right to life) are that “it 
possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other 
mental states, and believes that it is itself such a continuing entity.”  Tooley 
(1972: 44) calls this the “self-consciousness requirement.”  Here, finally, we are 
getting much closer to something robust enough to work with from an 
axiological perspective if one is to formulate a theory of welfare that can give at 
least some weight to the feature that separates us from the rest of the animal 
kingdom.  Although the definition of personhood I intend to use is slightly 
different from Tooley’s definition, for reasons that should become clear in the 
next section, there is a great deal of overlap between his project and this one.  
For one, the properties he requires for personhood are necessary preconditions 
                                                                                                                           
relate to and teach both puppies and babies.  There is little difference in either 
the actions of the adults or the actions of the puppies and babies. 
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for the properties that I will claim constitute personhood.  Moreover, although 
Tooley never says as much, the rationale for his self-consciousness 
requirement seems to be one that is deeply aligned with many of the arguments 
in the previous chapters.  The rationale seems to be that you do not have a 
serious right to life (i.e., you are not a person) if you are incapable of caring that 
you are being deprived of that right. 
III. WHY USE FRANKFURT’S DEFINITION OF PERSONHOOD? 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, I intend to adapt many of 
Frankfurt’s concepts and arguments for use in a new theory of personal 
welfare.  While it is certainly the goal to clarify why Frankfurt’s work is being 
used during the course of explaining it and laying out the new theory, there is 
good cause to touch briefly upon some of those reasons at the outset in order 
to evaluate them in relation to the bigger picture when they are presented later 
in this chapter and the next. 
The central concept of Frankfurt’s that I intend to make use of is his 
definition of personhood.  According to Frankfurt, persons are all and only 
those beings who possess property F where property F is to be found in the 
structure of the will.  As will be explained in great detail in the next section, a 
person must have a certain type of desire about her desires, which Frankfurt 
calls second-order volitions.  The basic idea is that persons must have an 
evaluative attitude toward themselves as agents.  This attribute that gives rise 
to personhood is made possible by the reflective component contained in 
Tooley’s self-consciousness requirement, but it goes beyond Tooley’s definition 
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to capture the attributes that are most important to ourselves.  By locating 
personhood within the structure of the will, being a person becomes essentially 
tied to several salient features of beings like us. 
First, being a person brings in the capacity for free will.  If, as is 
commonly supposed, persons are capable of enjoying free will and most, if not 
all, other animals are incapable of free will, then this is a fact that needs to be 
explained and not just asserted.  Frankfurt’s account explains free will in a 
very straightforward manner by making use of the essential feature of 
persons⎯second-order volitions.  Freedom of the will, according to Frankfurt, 
is achieved when a person secures the conformity of his will to his second-
order volitions.  Frankfurt also manages to explain free will coherently without 
resorting to any miraculous (by definition) absence-of-causal-determination 
claims⎯no small feat.  Moreover, in the context of axiology, it should not be 
surprising to find that the value of a life is tied to notions of free will.  Indeed, it 
seems as though the capacity for free will is not only an essential feature of 
persons, but a valuable feature as well.  Frankfurt’s account of persons and 
free will can explain this fact in a way that none of the other major personal 
welfare theories can.11 
Second, relating personal welfare to Frankfurt’s conception of 
personhood allows personal welfare to be linked with personal identity.  To the 
extent that a person is defined by his will, then the theory of personal welfare I 
                                       
11 In Chapter Five, I will discuss how other theories will most likely make free 
will appear to be an ad hoc addition to the theory, or will have to assign free 
will an arbitrary value, or both. 
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am developing will be bound up with a person’s essential nature or, if you like, 
his identity as an agent.  This relationship also seems correct, at least from a 
common-sense standpoint, as it would be strange to find that a person’s 
welfare was completely unrelated to his essential nature. 
Third, Frankfurt’s conception of personhood yields an excellent account 
of what it is to care about something.  This is obviously critical to a theory of 
personal welfare, as the earlier discussion of the Principle Concerning Caring 
(PCC) demonstrated.  According to Frankfurt, caring is essentially a volitional 
activity that consists in having, and identifying with, second- (or higher-) order 
volitions.  In fact, the formation of the will is primarily an exercise in coming to 
care about certain things because the person wants the desires pertaining to 
these things sustained.  Accordingly, what it means for something to be 
important to a person is just that the person cares about that thing.  And it is 
through the act of caring that a person is provided with stable motivational 
structures that guide and limit his conduct.  In other words, caring is the 
characteristic of persons that allows us to be involved in our own lives (i.e., not 
to care about anything is to be uninvolved in one’s own life).12  Should we be 
surprised, then, to learn that a person who does not care about anything has a 
life that does not go better or worse for him than no life at all? 
Finally, Frankfurt’s conception of personhood as being comprised of a 
certain volitional structure allows for a compelling account of the active-passive 
distinction.  This is important from an axiological perspective if, as is 
                                       
12 As will be explained in the paradox of welfare section at the end of Chapter 
Five, caring about something makes it about our lives. 
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commonly supposed, there is some value in being active.  Frankfurt (1988: viii-
ix) frames this issue beautifully in the preface of his book, The Importance of 
What We Care About: 
 In the seventeenth century, mechanism became established 
as the dominant worldview of our culture.  It has since that time 
come to seem obvious that either references to final causes are 
entirely illicit or they are no more than convenient ways of 
speaking designed to avoid clumsier (albeit more strictly accurate) 
formulations in terms of efficient causation.  In the eighteenth 
century, the notion of an efficient cause was itself eviscerated by a 
devastating critique of the idea of inherent power.  These 
compelling philosophical developments have made it difficult to 
give a good account of the difference between being active and 
being passive.  For if things are understood as having neither 
purposes nor powers, in what way is it possible to comprehend 
them as being active at all?  Nonetheless, the role of the active-
passive distinction in human life is pervasive and deep.  The 
difference between passivity and activity is at the heart of the fact 
that we exist as selves and agents and not merely as locales in 
which certain events happen to occur. 
 
Precisely how this works will be explained in detail later in this chapter along 
with the three topics that preceded it. 
 However, before turning to the detailed discussion of Frankfurt’s ideas 
that I intend to adapt for this project, one final note regarding the use of 
Frankfurt’s conception of personhood bears mentioning.  With regard to the 
possibility of a unified theory of welfare for all sentient beings discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, one of the recurring problems was that none of the 
plausible definitions of “sentient” yielded anything robust enough on which to 
base a theory of welfare.  That is obviously not the case here.  In Frankfurt’s 
conception of personhood, we can be assured not only of the presence of 
desires, but also of a special class of desires resulting from our self-conscious, 
  
97 
reflexive capacity.  This will prove to be an excellent foundation for our theory 
of personal welfare. 
IV. FRANKFURTIAN PERSONS 
Frankfurt first presented his definition of personhood in his seminal 
1971 article Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.  His account 
begins with desires that humans share with nonhuman animals and then 
builds to include the elements that are essential to personhood. 
Before we proceed to Frankfurt’s discussion, a note about his definitions 
of “person” and “care” are in order.  In common usage, “person” often simply 
means “human being” or “Homo sapien” and “care” often means “desire.”  
Frankfurt’s definitions of each of these terms are more restrictive, and in that 
sense, are stipulative.  However, in another sense, I do not think Frankfurt 
thinks of these definitions as being stipulative.  So Frankfurt might claim that 
in formulating these definitions, he is trying to capture what, upon reflection, 
we are really trying to convey when we use these terms carefully.13  In any 
event, both of these terms are central to the rest of the project, and paying 
close attention to what Frankfurt means by each will aid in understanding the 
coming chapters. 
                                       
13 This can be seen in a comment Frankfurt (1988: 12) makes about his 
interest in the term “person”: 
In those senses of the word which are of greater philosophical 
interest, however, the criteria for being a person do not serve 
primarily to distinguish the members of our own species from the 
members of other species.  Rather, they are designed to capture 
those attributes which are the subject of our most humane 
concern with ourselves and the source of what we regard as most 
important and most problematical in our lives. 
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At least in terms of those desires that we share with most nonhuman 
animals, Frankfurt (1988: 12) defines first-order desires as “simply desires to 
do or not to do one thing or another.”  First-order desires are expressed in the 
form “A wants to X” where “to X” refers to a possible action or inaction 
(Frankfurt 1988: 13).  Frankfurt then makes the distinction between effective 
first-order desires and non-effective first-order desires (or simply first-order 
desires).  He does this because, as he rightly notes, there are a multitude of 
reasons why a first-order desire may not result in an action or may have 
nothing to do with motivating the action that is taken.  For example, the person 
may be unaware of the desire, the person may want to do something else more, 
the person may also want to refrain from taking the action in question, the 
person may take the action in question but be motivated to do so by an entirely 
different desire, etc.  Effective desires, then, are a subset of first-order desires 
that move “(or will or would move) a person all the way to action” (Frankfurt 
1988: 14).  According to Frankfurt, an agent’s will is identical to effective first-
order desires. 
 However, this is not the end of the story for the agent’s will.  Second-
order desires also pay a critical part.  If first-order desires are desires expressed 
in the form of “A wants to X” where “to X” is an action or inaction, then second-
order desires are desires expressed in the form “A wants to X” where “to X” 
refers to a first-order desire.  In other words, a second-order desire takes the 
form of “A wants to want to X” (Frankfurt 1988: 15).  Frankfurt discusses two 
varieties of second-order desires.  While perhaps empirically scarce, the first 
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type of second-order desire discussed is important in that it demonstrates that 
having a second-order desire for a first-order desire does not entail actually 
having that first-order desire. 
 Frankfurt’s example involves a psychotherapist treating drug addicts.  
The therapist believes that he would be better able to help his patients if he 
fully understood what it is like for his patients to desire the drug they are 
addicted to.  Because of this, he is led to want to have a desire for the drug.  In 
other words, he has a second-order desire for the desire to take the drug.  
However, he has no desire to actually take the drug and may, in fact, have a 
strong desire not to take the drug.  “And insofar as he now wants only to want 
to take it, and not to take it, there is nothing in what he now wants that would 
be satisfied by the drug itself” (Frankfurt 1988: 15).  Accordingly, having a 
second-order desire for a first-order desire does not entail actually having that 
first-order desire.  Frankfurt says that someone who only wants to want a 
certain desire “stands at the margin of preciosity, and the fact that he wants to 
want to X is not pertinent to the identification of his will” (Frankfurt 1988: 15). 
 The second variety of second-order desire described by Frankfurt is 
critical for determining the structure of the will.  This variety of desire 
described by “A wants to want to X” indicates what A wants his will, or his 
effective first-order desire, to be.  In these cases, “A wants to want to X” “means 
that A wants the desire to X to be the desire that moves him effectively to act” 
(Frankfurt 1988: 15).  If A wants this first-order desire to be effective (i.e., to 
provide the motive in what he actually does), then it does entail that A already 
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has the first-order desire to X.  To claim otherwise, one would have to claim 
that it is true both that A wants the desire to X to be his will and that he does 
not want to X.  Frankfurt’s assessment that this is incoherent seems 
undeniable.  And for purposes of a desire-satisfaction theory of welfare, it 
should also be made explicit that when A has a desire that a certain first-order 
desire be effective (i.e., his will), then it entails not only that A wants the desire 
in question to be the desire that moves him effectively to act, but also that A 
wants the desire in question to be satisfied.  For just as it would be incoherent 
to claim that A wants the desire to X to be his will and that he does not want to 
X, it would be equally incoherent to claim that A wants the desire to X to move 
him to effectively act and that A wants the desire to X to be frustrated. 
 This second variety of second-order desires, desires about those desires 
that the agent wants to become her will, Frankfurt (1988: 16) calls second-
order volitions and are essential to being a person.  Frankfurt (1988: 16) 
contrasts this with the term wanton, which he defines as agents that have first-
order desires⎯and perhaps second-order desires⎯but who do not have 
second-order volitions.  Another way of stating the essential feature of a person 
is that he cares about his will; the essential feature, then, of a wanton will be 
that he does not care about his will.  The class of wantons includes most, if not 
all, nonhuman animals, children,14 and some adult human beings. 
                                       
14 The existence of second-order volitions in a particular agent is, of course, an 
empirical question.  Children will all be in the class of wantons up until they 
develop the capacity for reflection.  At that point they can become critically 
  
101 
 A wanton has first-order desires, but no second-order volitions, and 
thus, he can be said not to care about his will.  So a wanton’s desires “move 
him to do certain things, without it being true of him either that he wants to be 
moved by those desires or that he prefers to be moved by other desires” 
(Frankfurt 1988: 16).  In the case of conflicting first-order desires, it is not the 
case that the wanton is neutral in the conflict because he finds both desires 
equally acceptable.  In failing to care about his will through the formation of 
second-order volitions, “it is true neither that he prefers one [desire] to the 
other nor that he prefers not to take sides” (Frankfurt 1988: 18).  Furthermore, 
his failure to care about his will in cases of conflicting first-order desires is not 
due to his inability to find a compelling reason to prefer one over the other.  
Simply put, the wanton’s failure to care about his will is due to one of two 
reasons.  The first possibility is that the wanton lacks the capacity for 
reflection, such as might be the case with a young child or would be the case 
with a squirrel.  The second possibility would be that the wanton possesses a 
“mindless indifference to the enterprise of evaluating his own desires and 
motives” (Frankfurt 1988: 19).15  Accordingly, the wanton, or the person acting 
in a wantonly fashion in a particular situation, by definition, will “pursue 
                                                                                                                           
aware of their own will, and some of them will form second-order volitions and 
become persons, at least with respect to their actual second-order volitions.  
 
15 Although Frankfurt does not specifically address the question, I do not think 
occurrent higher-order volitions are necessary to avoid being a wanton with 
respect to any particular act or desire.  As always having occurrent higher-
order volitions could be exhausting, dispositional volitions should suffice.  As 
long as the course of action has been properly reflected upon at some point, the 
resulting dispositional desires should be sufficient to address Frankfurt’s 
theoretical concerns. 
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whatever course of action he is most strongly inclined to pursue, but he does 
not care which of his inclinations is the strongest” (Frankfurt 1988: 17).  
However, while a wanton either cannot or does not deliberate (i.e., perform a 
reflexive action that the mind does to itself), this does not mean that a wanton 
cannot act intelligently.  This can be clearly seen by examining the case of some 
nonhuman animals.  Although they lack any reflexive capacity, they do act 
intelligently quite frequently.  There is no reason to believe that a wanton 
would not act with similar intelligence to satisfy his desires (Frankfurt 2006: 
14).  
 This distinction between wantons and persons can be illustrated by a 
case that is hard to make sense of without utilizing these concepts relating to 
the will.  Consider the cases of Dexter and Dahmer.  Both have first-order 
desires to kill other human beings.  Both also have first-order desires not to kill 
other human beings.  Furthermore, both Dexter and Dahmer succumb to their 
desires to kill from time to time, such that an observer could not tell the 
difference between the actions of these two men.  But here the similarities stop, 
for Dexter is a person and Dahmer is a wanton.  What makes Dexter a person, 
if only in this situation, is that he has a second-order volition with regard to 
these competing first-order desires.  Dexter wants the first-order desire not to 
kill to be his will, to be effective, to provide the motivation for what he does 
when he does act.  However, Dexter is overtaken by his desire to kill from time 
to time⎯his dark passenger⎯despite his constant struggle against it.  When 
this happens he is violated, against his will, by his own desire to kill.  This is 
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because Dexter cares which of his conflicting first-order desires wins out in the 
end.  This caring comes about through his second-order volition whereby 
Dexter identifies himself with his first-order desire not to kill and withdraws 
himself from the competing desire.  It is through this process that we can make 
sense of the idea of Dexter’s being moved by a force that is not his own.  When 
he kills, which is directly contradictory to his second-order volition, he is 
moved by a force that is not his own and against his own will. 
 The wanton, Dahmer, on the other hand, does not care about his will.  
When he acts, it merely reflects the economy of his first-order desires.  The 
strongest desire will win out, and it makes no difference to Dahmer which 
desire does so.  He cannot win this battle, just as he cannot lose it.  When 
Dexter acts he is moved by the will he wants or by the will he does not want.  
When Dahmer acts, it is neither. 
V. WHAT IS WRONG WITH MERE FIRST-ORDER DESIRES? 
 Many concepts were introduced in the last section that will require a full 
explanation as well as a justification for their being used in the context of 
personal welfare.  Most of them will be discussed in the remainder of this 
chapter, while a few will be left for the next chapter.  The topic for this section, 
however, is first-order desires.  As the last section made clear, desires are 
essential for personhood.  Nevertheless, first-order desires alone are not 
sufficient.  So what is the problem with first-order desires for purposes of both 
personhood and welfare? 
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 The problems with first-order desires16 can be broken down into two 
major categories.  The first problem stems from the origin of first-order desires.  
While humans may be the only beings capable of higher-order desires,17 
humans share the capacity for having first-order desires with a large segment 
of the animal kingdom.  And this shared capacity for first-order desires seems 
to operate in much the same way for both human and nonhuman animals.  
Desires just occur within us after being caused by a variety of hereditary and 
environmental factors.  In most nonhuman animals, this means that their 
actions simply reflect the economy of their first-order desires, with, other 
things being equal, the most intense desire at the time winning out over the 
others. 
 In persons, however, this plays out differently and, as a result, helps to 
highlight the second problem with first-order desires⎯the role these desires 
play in our mental lives.  Instead of the unfettered sovereign reign of first-order 
desires found in most nonhuman animals, persons simply find these desires 
within themselves.  First-order desires merely bubble up to the surface⎯in 
response to environmental factors⎯out of the murky, evolutionary stew that is 
                                       
16 “First-order desires,” as used in the rest of this section, means neither first-
order desires prior to any related higher-order desires occurring nor first-order 
desires that were generated by any higher-order desires. 
 
17 It should be noted that nothing of consequence hinges on this claim.  If, say, 
dolphins and great apes have higher-order desires as a result of developing 
self-consciousness, then they too would be persons.  Moreover, there are no 
obvious evolutionary obstacles preventing other species from coming to have 
the capacity for self-consciousness and higher-order desires in the future. 
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our minds.18  Accordingly, they are just “psychic raw material,” and the person 
must decide if, and how, he is to incorporate them into the structure of his will 
(Frankfurt 1999: 137).  From this we can see that first-order desires are not 
volitional, but rather are “impulsive or sentimental,” as both their origin and 
role would suggest (Frankfurt 1999: 99). 
 Equipped with this description, it is much easier to make sense of the 
possibility that these are desires that belong to no one.  In other words, these 
are not desires that are attributable to the person since they are ones that the 
person merely finds occurring within her body.  This does sound odd, and it is 
opposed by a simple and straightforward argument from Terence Penelhum 
(1971: 674): 
Premise 1: Every desire must belong to someone. 
Premise 2: A desire that occurs within a person cannot belong to 
anyone else. 
Conclusion: Therefore, every desire belongs to the person whose 
body it occurs within. 
 
There is a literal sense in which this is quite obviously true.  In much the same 
way as Descartes (1996: 17) claimed that the fact that there was thinking led 
him to the conclusion that there had to be something doing that thinking, 
Penelhum concludes that desires require a desirer, and the desirer is the 
person whose body the desires occur within.  However, this argument glosses 
over an important distinction between persons and nonhuman animals.  
Penelhum’s argument works quite well with most nonhuman animals, as for 
                                       
18 There is also the possibility of desires that do not bubble up to the surface 
and, accordingly, are subconscious desires.  Also, as is evident from the claim 
in the text, I am assuming that innatism is false, although nothing of 
importance hinges on this claim. 
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them there is no interesting or relevant distinction to be made concerning their 
desires.  The strongest desire, other things being equal, will be translated into 
action at any given moment.  Persons, on the other hand, can reflect upon 
desires they find occurring within their bodies and decide whether a given 
desire is one they want to act upon or one they want to distance themselves 
from so that the desire will not be acted upon.  In this way, it is much less 
jarring to say that, while a desire occurs within a person’s body, it is not a 
desire that belongs to the person.  In fact, this type of claim seems trivial and 
commonplace in an analogous context pertaining to persons.  In one sense, all 
bodily movements must be movements occurring within a body.  This 
statement, however, overlooks an important distinction in that not every 
movement of a body is a movement performed by the person.  There are, after 
all, a large class of movements that are not performed due to any conscious 
interest on the part of the person.  For example, my body may perform a reflex 
movement such as when a doctor taps my knee with a hammer or when I blink 
as the result of a loud noise.  My body also performs a large number of 
involuntary movements such as my heart beating.  It is also possible to have 
seizures or spasms, such that there are definitely actions being performed that 
are not the person’s doing.  Frankfurt (1988: 61) sums up this idea nicely: “A 
person is no more to be identified with everything that goes on in his mind, in 
other words, than he is to be identified with everything that goes on in his 
body.” 
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 If persons are not to be identified with all of the desires that occur within 
their bodies, then this fact obviously has further implications concerning the 
role these first-order desires play in our psychic makeup.  While there will be 
much more on caring later in the chapter, it is worth pointing out here that the 
fact that a person is not to be identified with all of the desires occurring within 
her body seems to entail that some desires are ones the person does not care 
about.  An example may help make this point clear.  Suppose I find myself 
wanting a new gadget, and I have narrowed it down to the iPhone or the iPad, 
of which I can only afford one.  After examining the relative strength of my 
desire for the iPhone and my desire for the iPad, I discover that my desire for 
the iPhone is stronger and, thus, I would prefer the iPhone.  Does this fact 
entail that I care about my desire for the iPhone?  No.  “The fact that a person 
wants one thing more than he wants another does not entail that he cares 
about it more, therefore, because it does not entail that he cares about it at all” 
(Frankfurt 1999: 157).  This is the proper conclusion to draw given that a 
person’s stance on desires he finds within himself may be anything from caring 
very deeply about them to being completely appalled that they are occurring to 
anything in between (including not paying attention to them at all other than, 
perhaps, noting their presence). 
 Finally, having characterized first-order desires as psychic raw material 
that may belong to no one and that the person they occur within may not care 
about, it would be easy to be almost completely dismissive of these desires.  
This would be a mistake, as these desires can be quite powerful and persistent.  
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Take, for instance, the example of teenage boys and the effect that their 
hormones have on their desires.  How can we properly characterize the role 
these types of desires, or passions as Frankfurt sometimes refers to them, play 
in our motivational structures without minimizing the intensity that they can 
have?  Frankfurt  (1999: 137) does a perfect job: 
However imposing or intense the motivational power that the 
passions mobilize may be, the passions have no inherent 
motivational authority.  In fact, the passions do not really make 
any claim upon us at all.  Considered strictly in themselves, apart 
from whatever additional impetus or facilitation we ourselves may 
provide by acceding to them, their effectiveness in moving us is 
entirely a matter of sheer brute force.  There is nothing in them 
other than the magnitude of this force that requires us, or even 
that encourages us, to act as they command.19 
                                       
19 Nietzsche (2005: 171-72) is also helpful on this topic and, in his own way, is 
in apparent agreement with Frankfurt⎯as we will see later⎯on how desires we 
find within ourselves can ultimately be beneficial: 
All passions go through a phase where they are just a disaster, 
where they drag their victim down with the weight of their stupidity 
– and a later, much later phase where they marry themselves to 
spirit, where they ‘spiritualize’ themselves.  People used to fight 
against the passions because the passions were so stupid: people 
conspired to destroy them, – all the old moral monsters are 
unanimous on that score: ‘il faut tuer les passions’.  The most 
famous formula for this is in the New Testament, in that Sermon 
on the Mount, where, incidentally, things are certainly not viewed 
from a higher perspective.  When it comes to sexuality, for instance, 
it says: ‘if your eye offends you, pluck it out’: fortunately, 
Christians do not follow this rule.  Nowadays, to destroy the 
passions and desires just to guard against their stupidity and its 
unpleasant consequences strikes us as itself a particularly acute 
form of stupidity.  We have stopped admiring dentists who pluck 
out people's teeth just to rid of the pain . . . But it is reasonable to 
admit that the idea of ‘spiritualizing the passions’ could never have 
arisen on the soil where Christianity grew.  It is well known that 
the first church even fought against the ‘intelligent’ for the sake of 
the ‘poor in spirit’: how could we expect it to have waged an 
intelligent war on the passions? – The church combats the 
passions by cutting them off in every sense: its technique, its 
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 From this discussion of the origin of our first-order desires and their role 
in our motivational structures, it becomes clear that it would be dogmatic to 
claim that the satisfaction or frustration of every first-order desire a person has 
must be relevant to assessing his well-being.  However, this is the claim that 
William James (1948: 73) seems to be making when he writes, “Take any 
demand, however slight, which any creature, however weak, may make.  Ought 
it not, for its own sole sake, to be satisfied? . . .  Any desire is imperative to the 
extent of its amount; it makes itself valid by the fact that it exists at all.”  This 
claim, as we have repeatedly seen, is far too indiscriminate.  Not only does it 
overlook important distinctions in both the type of creature that has the desire 
and the type of the desire itself, it also ignores the obvious fact that not all 
unsatisfied desires are frustrated.  A person may simply decide to give up a 
desire by no longer wanting the object in question.  All of this should not be 
construed, of course, to endorse the idea that desires are not relevant to 
personal welfare.  The claim that not every desire impacts personal welfare 
does not entail the claim that no desire impacts personal welfare.  As has been 
said before, the trick, and the point of this project, is to properly discriminate 
between desires that impact welfare and those that do not. 
                                                                                                                           
‘cure’, is castration.  It never asks: ‘how can a desire be 
spiritualized, beautified, deified?’ – It has always laid the weight of 
its discipline on eradication (of sensuality, of pride, of greed, of the 
thirst to dominate and exact revenge). – But attacking the roots of 
the passions means attacking the root of life: the practices of the 
church are hostile to life . . . 
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VI. REFLECTIVE CAPACITY & THE WILL 
 In previous chapters, I have attempted to make the case that some form 
of desire satisfactionism must be the correct theory of personal welfare because 
(1) some lives do go better than others, and (2) none of the competing theories 
are plausible.  In the previous section, I have attempted to demonstrate that 
first-order desires (having characterized them as psychic raw material that may 
not even belong to the person in question), without more, cannot be what 
makes the life of a person better or worse.  By process of elimination, then, 
higher-order desires, or some subset thereof, must be what drive personal 
welfare.  Nevertheless, in the remainder of this chapter I intend to make the 
positive case for this outcome rather than simply relying on a relatively 
unsatisfying process of elimination. 
It happens that the stage sets collapse.  Rising, streetcar, four 
hours in the office or the factory, meal, streetcar, four hours of 
work, meal, sleep, and Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday 
Friday and Saturday according to the same rhythm⎯this path is 
easily followed most of the time.  But one day the “why” arises and 
everything begins in that weariness tinged with amazement.  
“Begins”⎯this is important.  Weariness comes at the end of the 
acts of a mechanical life, but at the same time it inaugurates the 
impulse of consciousness.  It awakens consciousness and provokes 
what follows.  What follows is the gradual return into the chain or 
it is the definitive awakening. . . .  For everything begins with 
consciousness and nothing is worth anything except through it.  
(Camus 1996: 358-59) 
 
 For better or worse, rational human beings seem to be the only sort of 
creature for whom this type of occurrence is possible.  Other creatures are only 
capable of a purely mechanical life, meaning, roughly, their instincts combined 
with their environment strictly determine what they will do at any given time.  
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For them, there can be no “awakening” of the type Camus discusses.  And 
while Camus’s discussion of the awakening is a bit overly dramatic, it does 
serve to nicely highlight the point I wish to make here.  The “awakening” and 
the “consciousness” of which Camus speaks are, of course, both referring to a 
person’s coming to use his capacity for self-consciousness.  Self-consciousness, 
Camus appears to claim, is at least necessary for anything to have value.  This 
is obviously a very bold claim, but not an altogether implausible one.  It seems 
relatively straightforward that there could be no meaningful discussion about 
value in a system that contained no instances of self-consciousness.  If that is 
true, then there does not appear to be any non-arbitrary way to assess, 
determine, or assign value in such a system.  Nothing of significance, however, 
rests on those claims here.  I intend to support the much more modest claim 
that self-consciousness is a necessary condition for personal welfare. 
 So why should we care about self-consciousness?  The answer to this 
question is best answered by examining how self-consciousness impacts our 
lives.  To do this, a particularly difficult thought experiment should prove 
useful.  Stop reading for a moment and try to imagine what your experience of 
yourself would be like without the capacity for self-consciousness. 
Welcome back. 
Let me begin with an apology for asking you to do the impossible.  
Without the capacity for self-consciousness, you would not, because you could 
not, have any experience of yourself.  In this way, you would be no different 
from the nonhuman animals Frankfurt (2004: 18) describes: 
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They are moved into action by impulse or by inclination, simply as 
it comes, without the mediation of any reflective consideration or 
criticism of their own motives.  Insofar as they lack the capacity to 
form attitudes toward themselves, there is for them no possibility 
either of self-acceptance or of mobilizing an inner resistance to 
being what they are.  They can neither identify with the forces that 
move them nor distance themselves from those forces.  They are 
structurally incapable of such interventions in their own lives. 
 
This would obviously be a significant and⎯I am assuming⎯unwelcome change 
in our mental lives.  And while I will be discussing some of the features that we 
would lose in the coming pages, it would do to reflect on just how different we 
would be for another moment.  I, for one, find the prospect of being moved to 
and fro by my strongest desire at each point in time quite distressing.  I 
suspect some will find this prospect less disturbing, but I think we would all 
have a decent chance of finding ourselves in our own version of The Scorpion 
and the Frog fable, resulting in varying degrees of calamity.20 
 Continuing with our thought experiment, now imagine yourself with a 
slightly different version of the capacity for self-consciousness that you have 
now.  This self-consciousness will allow you to observe all of your mental 
activity, but no more.  You would not be able to intervene in any way.  It would 
be like taking a mental ride on an animal that lacked self-consciousness.  This 
                                       
20 The Scorpion and the Frog fable reads as follows: 
A scorpion and a frog meet on the bank of a stream and the 
scorpion asks the frog to carry him across on its back. The frog 
asks, “How do I know you won’t sting me?”  The scorpion says, 
“Because if I do, I will die, too.”  The frog is satisfied, and they set 
out, but in midstream, the scorpion stings the frog.  The frog feels 
the onset of paralysis and starts to sink, knowing they both will 
drown, but has just enough time to gasp, “Why?”  Replies the 
scorpion: “It’s my nature . . .” 
(www.aesopfables.com/cgi/aesop1.cgi?4&TheScorpionandtheFrog) 
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would provide you with a nice seat for watching yourself sting the frog (or be 
stung by the scorpion), but you could not affect the outcome at any point.  
Would you want this version of self-consciousness?  Although it may be a fun 
and novel experience for a while, it would soon become wholly frustrating, 
giving new appreciation for the analogy of our bodies being cages.21  While I 
think some serious reflection on this version of self-consciousness shows it to 
be worse than no self-consciousness at all, all that really need be true is that 
this version is not preferable to the version we actually enjoy.  It is the ability to 
intervene, and not just observe, that is so central to our understanding of 
ourselves and our mental lives. 
 Frankfurt (2006: 4) claims that this capacity is more fundamental to our 
humanity than our capacity for reason, albeit more inconspicuous, and goes on 
to describe it as follows: 
It is our peculiar knack of separating from the immediate content 
and flow of our own consciousness and introducing a sort of 
division within our minds.  This elementary maneuver establishes 
an inward-directed, monitoring oversight.  It puts in place an 
elementary reflexive structure, which enables us to focus our 
attention directly upon ourselves. 
 When we divide our consciousness in this way, we objectify 
to ourselves the ingredient items of our ongoing mental life.  It is 
this self-objectification that is particularly distinctive of human 
mentality.  We are unique (probably) in being able simultaneously 
to be engaged in whatever is going on in our conscious minds, to 
detach ourselves from it, and to observe it⎯as it were⎯from a 
distance.  We are then in a position to form reflexive or higher-
                                       
21 This point is made nicely in Dalton Trumbo’s book Johnny Got His Gun about 
a WWI soldier who, after being wounded by an exploding artillery shell, 
awakens to find that although he has lost his arms, legs, eyes, ears, teeth, and 
tongue, his mind functions perfectly (or as perfectly as one’s mind could given 
this situation). 
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order responses to it.  For instance, we may approve of what we 
notice ourselves feeling, or we may disapprove; we may want to 
remain the sort of person we observe ourselves to be, or we may 
want to be different.  Our division of ourselves situates us to come 
up with a variety of supervisory desires, intentions, and 
interventions that pertain to the several constituents and aspects 
of our conscious life. 
 
 It is through the lens of our reflective capacity that the presence of first-
order desires in persons comes into focus.  After noting that some philosophers 
claim that a person necessarily has a reason to satisfy any desire he has, 
Frankfurt (2006: 11) states that 
the mere fact that a person has a desire does not give him a 
reason.  What it gives him is a problem.  He has the problem of 
whether to identify with the desire and thus validate it as eligible 
for satisfaction, or whether to dissociate himself from it, treat it as 
categorically unacceptable, and try to suppress it or rid himself of 
it entirely. 
 
It is through this process that we participate in our agency.  Thus a person, 
but not the scorpion, can reflect upon his desire to kill the frog midstream and 
decide what to do about the problem (i.e., desire) he now finds himself 
confronted with.  All of this plays out in the structure of our wills, which is 
where personhood is located, through the formation of second-order 
volitions⎯the essential feature of persons.  Accordingly, being a person entails 
having an evaluative attitude toward oneself.  Persons endorse or repudiate 
their motives and organize their preferences and priorities. 
 This participation in our agency is also what constitutes our being active.  
Recall the passage from Frankfurt (1988: ix) in which he draws our attention to 
the importance of the active-passive distinction: “The difference between 
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passivity and activity is at the heart of the fact that we exist as selves and 
agents and not merely as locales in which certain events happen to occur.”  
Frankfurt notes that we are passive with respect to numerous events within 
our bodies: the dilation of my pupils, the beating of my heart⎯these are not 
actions that I perform.  The same can be said of our intellectual processes.  
Thus we can be active, as with “turning one’s mind in a certain direction, or 
deliberating systematically about a problem,” or we can be passive, as with 
“obsessional thought, whose provenances may be obscure and of which we 
cannot rid ourselves; thoughts that strike us unexpectedly out of the blue; and 
thoughts that run willy-nilly through our heads” (Frankfurt 1988: 59).  We do 
not actively participate in the occurrence of these latter thoughts; we merely 
find them occurring within us.  The key, in the case of both bodily movements 
and intellectual processes, is whether these things occur “under the person’s 
guidance” (Frankfurt 1988: 72).  The person’s guidance is achieved through the 
will and the desires that comprise the will: 
Now a person is active with respect to his own desires when 
he identifies himself with them, and he is active with respect to 
what he does when what he does is the outcome of his 
identification of himself with the desire that moves him in doing it.  
Without such identification the person is a passive bystander to 
his desires and to what he does . . . . (Frankfurt 1988: 54) 
 
Specifically concerning the second-order volitions that are essential to 
personhood, it is impossible for a person to be passive with respect to them, as 
“they constitute his activity” (Frankfurt 1988: 54).  Frankfurt (1999: 79) sums 
up these ideas as follows: 
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[T]he will is absolutely and perfectly active.  In other words, there 
can be no such thing as a passive willing.  All of the movements of 
my will – for instance, my choices and decisions – are movements 
that I make.  None is a mere impersonal occurrence, in which my 
will moves without my moving it.  None of my choices or decisions 
merely happens.  Its occurrence is my activity, and I can no more 
be a passive bystander with respect to my own choices and 
decisions than I can be passive with respect to any of my own 
actions.  It is possible for me to be passive when my arm rises, but 
I cannot be passive when I raise it.  Now every willing is necessarily 
an action; unlike the movements of an arm, it is only as actions 
that volitions can occur.  Thus, activity is of the essence of the will.  
Volition precludes passivity by its very nature. 
 
VII. IDENTIFICATION & WHOLEHEARTEDNESS 
 In setting out Frankfurt’s analysis of personhood, I mentioned a person’s 
“identifying” with one of his first-order desires.  The act of identifying with a 
first-order desire was claimed to be the key to making a desire the person’s 
own desire in a nontrivial way and, accordingly, essential to being a person at 
all.  The fact, then, that this is a central concept in Frankfurt’s account of 
personhood demands that it be explained. 
 The act of identifying with a desire is rooted in the phenomenology of 
human mentality and arises as a consequence of the reflexive nature of our 
minds.  Our reflexive capacity is what allows us to make decisions at all, and 
identification is a kind of decision.  “To make a decision is to make up one’s 
mind.  This is an inherently reflexive act, which the mind performs upon itself.  
Subhuman animals cannot perform it because they cannot divide their 
consciousness.  Because they cannot take themselves apart, they cannot put 
their minds back together” (Frankfurt 2006: 13).  The decision at issue here 
concerns our psychic raw material⎯the desires we find within ourselves that 
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are provided by nature and circumstance.  The decision to identify with certain 
desires and not others depends upon what the person wants himself to be.  
When a person identifies with a desire, he incorporates it into himself and 
makes it his own. 
This willing acceptance of [desires] transforms their status.  
They are no longer merely items that happen to appear in a certain 
psychic history.  We have taken responsibility for them as 
authentic expressions of ourselves.  We do not regard them as 
disconnected from us, or as alien intruders by which we are 
helplessly beset.  The fact that we have adopted and sanctioned 
them makes them intentional and legitimate.  Their force is now 
our force.  When they move us, we are therefore not passive.  We 
are active, because we are being moved just by ourselves. 
(Frankfurt 2006: 8) 
 
 It is just this active process of sorting through the desires we find within 
ourselves that is at the center of volitional capacity. When we identify with 
some desires and not others, we internalize those desires and externalize the 
others.  To internalize a desire is to take it as an authentic expression of 
ourselves and to give it a place in the ordering of our preferences and priorities.  
Externalizing a desire, then, will be just the opposite.  Although we cannot help 
having desires that are antithetical to our conceptions of ourselves, we can 
resolve (i.e., will) ourselves not to let these desires impact our conduct.  When 
we are beset by such desires, we resist them by trying to repress or inhibit 
them, to dissociate ourselves from them. 
This means that we deny them any entitlement to supply us 
with motives or with reasons.  They are outlawed and 
disenfranchised.  We refuse to recognize them as grounds for 
deciding what to think or what to do. . . .  The fact that we 
continue to be powerfully moved by them gives them no rational 
claim.  Even if an externalized desire turns out to be irresistible, its 
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dominion is merely that of a tyrant.  It has, for us, no legitimate 
authority.  (Frankfurt 2006: 10) 
 
 An example may help to clarify this point.  Suppose I have a friend who 
is about to achieve a difficult and worthwhile goal.  While I am happy for my 
friend, I also experience some unwelcome jealousy.  After taking stock of my 
desires upon receiving his news, I find three relevant desires: the desire to buy 
my friend a nice, congratulatory gift; the desire to take my friend out for a nice, 
congratulatory dinner; and the desire to kill my friend.  After a very brief 
reflection on these desires, I instantly externalize the desire to kill my friend.  I 
am horrified by this desire, try to inhibit it, want it to play no role in either my 
motivations or actions, and give it no place in the ordering of my projects and 
priorities.  Conversely, the other two desires are ones I decide to internalize by 
giving them a place in that ordering.  After concluding that attempting to 
satisfy both desires might be a bit much given the occasion and the level of our 
relationship, I decide that the dinner would be more appropriate and give it a 
higher priority.  However, this does not mean that the desire to give a gift is 
externalized or rejected.  If it turns out that I am unable to coordinate a dinner 
with my friend, then I should attempt to satisfy the desire to give the gift, as it 
is a desire within the ordering of my priorities (i.e., a desire that I willingly 
adopted and sanctioned). 
 At this point, it is hopefully clear that the concept of identification 
involves second-order desires that result from the reflexive capacity of our 
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minds.22  But what determines whether we identify with a second-order desire 
in a way that is sufficient to turn it into a second-order volition, which is the 
essential element of personhood?  This hierarchical account of the self seems to 
leave itself open to the objection that the second-order desire in question is just 
another desire with no special authority.  Why claim that it is constitutive of 
what the person really wants?  As we shall soon see, the search for an even 
higher-order desire to confirm the authority of this second-order desire will 
only lead to a fruitless, infinite regress.  Moreover, a second-order desire does 
not become a second-order volition merely because it endorses a first-order 
desire.  In other words, simply having a second-order desire that endorses a 
first-order desire is not enough. 
The endorsing higher-order desire must be, in addition, a desire 
with which the person is satisfied. . . .  Identification is constituted 
neatly by an endorsing higher-order desire with which the person 
is satisfied.  It is possible, of course, for someone to be satisfied 
with his first-order desires without in any way considering whether 
to endorse them.  In that case, he is identified with those first-
order desires.  But insofar as his desires are utterly unreflective, 
he is to that extent not genuinely a person at all.  He is merely a 
wanton.  (Frankfurt 1999: 105-06) 
 
 It would, of course, be a welcome outcome if we always had higher-order 
desires with which we were satisfied.  Unfortunately, this is not the case.  The 
reflexive capacity of our minds virtually assures this outcome.  The ability to 
reflect upon the contents of our minds makes it statistically unlikely that 
everyone would always be satisfied with all the elements he finds there.  This 
                                       
22 There is, of course, the possibility that desires of an even higher order should 
come into play.  I will leave this bit of complexity aside here, but will address it 
below. 
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fact gives rise to the common occurrence of our wanting to be different than we 
are.  Sometimes this inner conflict even goes beyond the level of competing 
first-order desires, as in the case of Dexter and Dahmer.  For just as there can 
be conflicts between first-order desires, so too can there be conflicts between 
higher-order desires. 
 This possibility is one that must be addressed by any hierarchical 
account of the self, particularly one that defines personhood as Frankfurt does.  
Recall that a person must have at least one second-order volition.  However, 
second-order volitions are possible only if the conflict, if any, between his 
second-order desires is resolved in a manner sufficient to produce a preference 
concerning which of his first-order desires is to be his will.  To the extent that 
this conflict is unresolved, 
if it is so severe that it prevents him from identifying himself in a 
sufficiently decisive way with any of his conflicting first-order 
desires, [it] destroys him as a person.  For it either tends to 
paralyze his will and to keep him from acting at all, or it tends to 
remove him from his will so that his will operates without his 
participation.  In both cases he becomes . . . a helpless bystander 
to the forces that move him.  (Frankfurt 1988: 21) 
 
 Conflict of this kind that is wholly within a person’s volitional complex is 
just what it is to be ambivalent.  There are degrees of ambivalence, but what 
concerns us here is an ambivalence to such a degree that the person cannot 
act decisively or finds that fulfilling either of her conflicting desires is 
substantially unsatisfying (Frankfurt 1999: 99).  This level of ambivalence is 
the result of conflicting volitional movements that are wholly internal to a 
person’s will and that are inherently opposed such that they cannot all be 
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satisfied (Frankfurt 1999: 99).  This condition could be due either to being 
drawn both to and away from the same state of affairs, or to a conflict that 
makes it impossible for all of the desired states of affairs to be brought about 
(Frankfurt 1988: 165).  The result is the “possibility that there is no 
unequivocal answer to the question of what the person really wants, even 
though his desires do form a complex and extensive hierarchical structure” 
(Frankfurt 1988: 165).  His will is unformed due to being inclined in opposite 
directions such that “it is true of him neither that he prefers one of his 
alternatives, nor that he prefers the other, nor that he likes them equally” 
(Frankfurt 1999: 100).  
 While this description of ambivalence does not make it sound good, it is 
worth being very clear about why ambivalence is so problematic in terms of 
personal welfare.  If ambivalence is a volitional malady, our wills are comprised 
of desires, and the correct theory of personal welfare is some form of desire 
satisfactionism, then ambivalence is a potentially troublesome mental state.  
Frankfurt (1999: 99) sums up the problem in this way: 
A person is ambivalent, then, only if he is indecisive 
concerning whether to be for or against a certain psychic position.  
Now this kind of indecisiveness is as irrational, in its way, as 
holding contradictory beliefs.  The disunity of an ambivalent 
person’s will prevents him from effectively pursuing and 
satisfactorily attaining his goals.  Like conflict within reason, 
volitional conflict leads to self-betrayal and self-defeat.  The trouble 
is in each case the same: a sort of incoherent greed – trying to have 
things both ways – which naturally makes it impossible to get 
anywhere.  The flow of volitional or of intellectual activity is 
interrupted and reversed; movement in any direction is truncated 
and turned back.  However a person starts out to decide or to 
think, he finds that he is getting in his own way. 
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 Although ambivalence is a problem, it is sometimes warranted.  Many a 
case could be conceived in which being unsure whether to endorse or repudiate 
a desire would be helpful or wise.  Yet this ambivalence will only be good for 
what it leads to, not in itself.  In other words, ambivalence may ultimately help 
produce a better decision, but it could never be a mental state that one could 
desire for its own sake (Frankfurt 1999: 102).  This is easy to see if one 
imagines an all-encompassing ambivalence such that the person involved is, 
with regard to every action and motive, always completely unsure of what to do 
and why to do it.  Such an outcome would seem to be an almost perfect state of 
mental torment that could be equivalent to the hearing-voices-in-my-head 
scenario that is often portrayed as being the paradigmatic case of mental 
torment.  Given this description of ambivalence, then, it is true of persons that 
they are not ambivalent about ambivalence.  We fully and unequivocally desire 
to be volitionally unified (i.e., desire to avoid the volitional division that is 
ambivalence) (Frankfurt 1999: 106). 
 Being volitionally unified is what Frankfurt (2004: 96) calls being 
wholehearted.  When a person is not ambivalent, then the person is 
wholehearted.  However, the conflicting desires need not change in either their 
objects or their intensity.  What being wholehearted requires is that the person 
become finally and unequivocally clear as to what side of the conflict he is on 
(Frankfurt 2004: 91).  When this happens wholly within the volitional complex, 
the opposed desire is externalized and is now opposed by the person and not by 
just another competing desire (Frankfurt 2004: 91).  In this way, being 
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wholehearted is compatible with virulent psychic conflict as long as the person 
is uninhibitedly and unqualifiedly on one side of the conflict or the other.  
Wholeheartedness is a kind of self-satisfaction whereby a person willingly 
accepts and endorses his own volitional identity (Frankfurt 2004: 96).  There is 
no equivocation or resistance from the parts of himself with which he identifies, 
and this lack of division within the will means that the will the person has is 
the will he wants. 
 And although I think the term “wholehearted” is a good one for the 
concept in question, there is some concern about confusion given its popular 
usage.  Wholeheartedness is a structural characteristic and “not a measure of 
the firmness of a person’s volitional state, or of his enthusiasm.  What is at 
issue is the organization of the will, not its temperature” (Frankfurt 1999: 100).  
Wholeheartedness is just the basis for practical rationality, which renders our 
practical lives coherent.  This means that what counts here is the quality of our 
wills, not the quantity of its objects.  Being wholehearted with respect to one 
desire is also consistent with assigning a higher priority to another desire that 
happens to contingently conflict with it, as in the case of the successful friend 
discussed above (Frankfurt 1999: 103).  It should also be noted that a person’s 
will can be defeated without disrupting its unity, as in the case of Dexter’s 
identifying himself with the second-order volition not to kill, yet being overcome 
by the externalized effective first-order desire to kill.  Finally, being 
wholehearted does not entail being closed-minded.  “The wholehearted person 
need not be a fanatic.  Someone who knows without qualification where he 
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stands may nonetheless be quite ready to give serious attention to reasons for 
changing that stand.  There is a difference between being confident and being 
stubborn or obtuse” (Frankfurt 2004: 95 n.7). 
 One final aspect of wholeheartedness merits an extended discussion in 
order to avoid confusion.  Most of the ways wholeheartedness has been 
described above are just the effects of being wholehearted (e.g., an undivided 
will), but we should be very clear about what produces wholeheartedness.  
Being wholehearted consists in being fully satisfied that the desires in 
question, rather than others that inherently conflict with them, “should be 
among the causes and considerations that determine [one’s] cognitive, affective, 
attitudinal, and behavioral processes” (Frankfurt 1999: 103).  Satisfaction 
entails an absence of restlessness and resistance such that the person has no 
active interest in bringing about any change.  However, this does not mean that 
the person could not be satisfied with any change in his condition.  While it is 
almost certainly true that a person would be satisfied with an improved 
condition, this possibility does not engage his concern because being satisfied 
does not require an all-encompassing drive to maximize (Frankfurt 1999: 103).  
In fact, a person may even be satisfied with a condition inferior to the one in 
which he now finds himself.  The bottom line is that being satisfied is having no 
interest in making changes because psychic elements of certain kinds do not 
occur (Frankfurt 1999: 105). 
 It is important to draw attention to this fact because it explains why 
there is no danger of a problematic regress in our hierarchical structure of the 
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will.  If being satisfied with a desire required some other intentional act in order 
to make it the case that the person was satisfied, then a regress problem would 
ensue: 
Suppose that being satisfied did require a person to have, as 
an essential constitutive condition of his satisfaction, some 
deliberate psychic element – some deliberate attitude or belief or 
feeling or intention.  This element could not be one with which the 
person is at all dissatisfied.  How could someone be wholehearted 
with respect to one psychic element by virtue of being halfhearted 
with respect to another?  So if being satisfied required some 
element as a constituent, satisfaction with respect to one matter 
would depend upon satisfaction with respect to another; 
satisfaction with respect to the second would depend upon 
satisfaction with respect to still a third; and so on, endlessly.  
Satisfaction with one’s self requires, then, no adoption of any 
cognitive, attitudinal, affective, or intentional stance.  It does not 
require the performance of a particular act; and it also does not 
require any deliberate abstention.  Satisfaction is a state of the 
entire psychic system – a state constituted just by the absence of 
any tendency or inclination to alter its condition.  (Frankfurt 1999: 
104) 
 
 Finally, satisfaction must be uncontrived and reflective.  Any attempt to 
simulate satisfaction through an intentional effort would bring us right back to 
the regress issue.  The satisfaction at issue must be integral to the person’s 
psychic condition and not due to any effort by the person to make it so 
(Frankfurt 1999: 104).  However, the absence of the psychic elements in 
question must nonetheless be reflective. 
In other words, the fact that the person is not moved to change 
things must derive from his understanding and evaluation of how 
things are with him.  Thus, the essential non-occurrence is neither 
deliberately contrived nor wantonly unselfconscious.  It develops 
and prevails as an unmanaged consequence of the person’s 
appreciation of his psychic condition.  (Frankfurt 1999: 105)23 
                                       
23 Frankfurt (1999: 105 n.16) continues to clarify this concept as follows: 
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 The value of being wholehearted results from the fact that it fixes a 
serious problem for us.  Saint Augustine (Confessions: 8.9) noted that while it 
is “no strange phenomenon partly to will to do something and partly to will not 
to do it,” he claimed that this was a “disease of the mind” perhaps inflicted on 
us by god as a punishment for original sin.  Spinoza (1981: 199) made a very 
similar claim about the deleterious effect of a divided will when he claimed that 
the sort of satisfaction or self-approval described above “is in reality the highest 
object for which we can hope.”  According to Frankfurt (2006: 18), this is the 
highest thing for which we can hope: 
Perhaps because it resolves the deepest problem.  In our transition 
beyond naive animality, we separate from ourselves and disrupt 
our original unreflective spontaneity.  This puts us at risk to 
varieties of inner fragmentation, dissonance, and disorder.  
Accepting ourselves reestablishes the wholeness that was 
undermined by our elementary constitutive maneuvers of division 
and distancing.  When we are acquiescent to ourselves, or willing 
freely, there is no conflict within the structure of our motivations 
and desires.  We have successfully negotiated our distinctively 
human complexity.  The unity of our self has been restored. 
 
                                                                                                                           
Being or becoming satisfied is like being or becoming relaxed.  
Suppose that someone sees his troubles recede and consequently 
relaxes.  No doubt it is by various feelings, beliefs, and attitudes 
that he is led to relax.  But the occurrence of these psychic 
elements does not constitute being relaxed, nor are they necessary 
for relaxation.  What is essential is only that the person stop 
worrying and feeling tense. 
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VIII. CARING 
 The concept of caring has played a prominent role in this project thus 
far.  I have argued for both the Principle Concerning Caring (PCC)24 and the 
Internalist Principle' (IP').25  As both of these principles rely heavily on the 
concept of caring, it is time to clarify this concept and demonstrate it 
adequately handles the reliance placed upon it. 
 Before turning to an examination of the concept of caring, I would like to 
adopt a terminological stipulation that should both help our understanding of 
caring and help to avoid some potentially awkward phrasing.  Although the 
phrases “he cares about X” and “he regards X as important to himself” are, 
perhaps, not perfectly synonymous, I will treat them as substantially 
equivalent from this point forward.  This should not create any confusion, as I 
think it is fair to say both that people care about things they regard as 
important to themselves and that regarding something as important also 
entails caring about that thing.  As Frankfurt adopts this same stipulation, it 
will have the added benefit of helping us to understand his arguments 
(Frankfurt 1999: 155-56). 
 So what does it mean, exactly, when a person claims to care about 
something?  It appears as though desire must be at least part of the right 
                                       
24 The Principle Concerning Caring states: If X does not care about anything 
and could not be made to care about anything in the future, then it is not 
possible for X’s personal welfare to be affected going forward. 
 
25 The Internalist Principle' states: The value of a life (or part of a life) for the 
one who lives it is determined to a significant degree by what the person in 
question cares about. 
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account.  This is because it does not seem coherent to claim both that a person 
cares about X and that this person has no desires pertaining to X.  
Accordingly, it is a necessary condition of caring about an object to have at 
least one desire concerning that object.   
 It is possible, then, that this is both a necessary and sufficient condition 
for caring.  In other words, when we say we care about something, are we 
merely claiming that we have some desire concerning it?  No.  The reason is 
that it looks to be quite coherent to claim that we want X, but that we do not 
really care about X or our desire for X.  For example, I may see an 
advertisement for a Slurpee and then find that I now have a slight desire for 
one.  However, after a bit of reflection, I conclude that this desire is not one 
that I care about.  And it need not be because I have some competing desire 
that I care about more, like a desire to avoid junk food or to avoid impulse 
buying.  I could simply and coherently decide that it is true both that I have 
this new desire for a Slurpee and that this desire is not one that I care about 
satisfying.   
 While it may be true that a person does not care about a fairly weak 
desire, perhaps it is true that a person must necessarily care about a desire of 
a certain intensity level.  In other words, maybe caring is simply having a 
sufficiently strong desire.26  The most obvious, and perhaps only, argument 
                                       
26 The argument that we saw earlier from William James (1948: 73) might 
produce this conclusion: “Take any demand, however slight, which any 
creature, however weak, may make.  Ought it not, for its own sole sake, to be 
satisfied? . . .  Any desire is imperative to the extent of its amount; it makes 
itself valid by the fact that it exists at all.” 
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that would support this conclusion would go as follows.27  An unsatisfied 
desire involves, by definition, frustration.  Frustration is unpleasant.  There is 
a presumption in favor of minimizing unpleasantness.  Therefore, there is a 
presumption in favor of satisfying desires.  One objection to this argument 
would be to deny that all desire frustrations involve unpleasantness.  Whatever 
the merits of this claim, it is not applicable here, as we are only dealing with 
the class of relatively intense desires.  Accordingly, we could stipulate that 
frustrations of desires in this class do involve some degree of unpleasantness.  
Does this mean, then, that caring consists in having desires of a sufficient level 
of intensity? 
 No.  One way to see this is to understand that caring is an evaluative 
attitude and that differences in the intensities of our desires may be due to all 
sorts of things that are independent of this evaluative attitude.  Indeed, if this 
evaluative attitude simply measured the relative intensity of desires, it would 
not be much of an “evaluative attitude” at all.  In that case, it would be much 
more appropriate to call caring a score-keeping function.  The bottom line is 
that what a person thinks of a desire need not be strictly determined by the 
intensity of the desire; it is just another factor to consider.  Another way to see 
this is to look back at the argument based on James’s claim.  The only 
conclusion actually warranted by the premises is that there is a presumption 
in favor of satisfied desires over frustrated ones.  This, however, does not 
exhaust the logical space when it comes to desires.  Even if we suppose that 
                                       
27 This argument would work only for desire satisfactions and frustrations that 
the desirer is aware of. 
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the frustration of a desire entails some unpleasantness, this unpleasantness 
can be avoided without satisfying the desire.  This is because a person may 
give up or, in some other way, lose a desire.  This is, in fact, the preferred 
course of action for some people when it comes to desires of any intensity.  
Therefore, James’s argument fails to establish that we must care about intense 
desires because we must care about avoiding the unpleasantness of 
frustration. 
The inference that we must care about satisfying an intense desire is 
fatally flawed in yet another way.  Not only may we not care about satisfying an 
intense desire, we may actually care about frustrating an intense desire.  For 
example, a drug addict has, by definition, an intense desire for his drug of 
choice.  However, he may struggle against his addiction and, thus, have a 
strong higher-order desire for his first-order desire for the drug to be 
frustrated.  This last point helps clarify another way in which we can see that 
caring does not reduce to desires.  Suppose I am watching television in 1976 
and that I prefer watching Wide World of Sports to watching the only other 
alternatives of American Bandstand, Soul Train, or The Electric Company.  Can 
we infer that I care about watching Wide World of Sports to any of the other 
three alternatives?  No.  As noted above, the fact that I prefer one to the other 
does not entail that I care about it more, because it does not entail that I care 
about it at all (Frankfurt 1999: 157).  
Well, if the intensity of desires does not determine what it is we care 
about, perhaps caring is desiring something and believing the thing sought is 
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intrinsically valuable such that it is pursued as a final end.  Of course, 
intrinsic value alone will not suffice since we have already determined that 
desire is at least part of the correct account of caring: 
Even if a person believes that something has considerable intrinsic 
value, he may not regard it as important to himself.  In attributing 
intrinsic value to something, we do perhaps imply that it would 
make sense for someone to desire it for its own sake⎯that is, as a 
final end, rather than merely as a means to something else.  
(Frankfurt 2004: 12) 
 
Further:  
 
Despite his recognition of its value, it may just not appeal to him; 
and even if it does not appeal to him, he may have good reason for 
neither wanting it nor pursuing it.  Each of us can surely identify a 
considerable number of things that we think would be worth doing 
or worth having for their own sakes, but to which we ourselves are 
not especially drawn and at which we quite reasonably prefer not 
to aim.  (Frankfurt 1999: 158) 
 
Moreover, even if we do attribute intrinsic value to some object, and we desire 
it for its own sake and pursue it as a final end, it still cannot be presumed that 
we care about it.  This is because intrinsic value is merely a type of value and, 
thus, does not reflect the amount of value we attribute to the object (Frankfurt 
2004: 13).  We may, in fact, attribute a small amount of intrinsic value to 
something, as is the case with many of the inconsequential pleasures we seek.  
I may want doughnuts, for example, and want the doughnuts simply for the 
intrinsic value of the pleasure they bring me.  This does not mean that I care 
about the doughnuts or about my desire for them.  “There is no incoherence in 
appraising something as intrinsically valuable, and pursuing it actively as a 
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final end that is worth having in itself, and yet not caring about it” (Frankfurt 
1999: 159). 
If caring involves desires of a certain kind, and if strong desires and 
believing something to be intrinsically valuable are not enough, what, then, 
does it mean to care about something?  Perhaps the best way to understand 
caring is first to examine what it means not to care about something.  As we 
have seen, it is possible to have a desire for X and not care about either X or 
the desire for X.  The most reasonable explanation for this is that there is a 
lack of commitment to this desire such that the person would be quite willing 
to give it up. 
In an idle moment, we may have an idle inclination to flick away a 
crumb; and we may be quite willing to be moved by that desire.  
Nonetheless, we recognize that flicking the crumb would be an 
altogether inconsequential act.  We want to perform it, but 
performing it is of no importance to us.  We really don’t care about 
it at all. 
 What this means is not that we assign it a very low priority.  
To regard it as truly of no importance to us is to be willing to give 
up having any interest in it whatever.  We have no desire, in other 
words, to continue wanting to flick away the crumb.  It would be 
all the same to us if we completely ceased wanting to do that.  
When we do care about something, we go beyond wanting it.  We 
want to go on wanting it, at least until the goal has been reached.  
Thus, we feel it as a lapse on our part if we neglect the desire, and 
we are disposed to take steps to refresh the desire if it should tend 
to fade.  The caring entails, in other words, a commitment to the 
desire.  (Frankfurt 2006: 18-19) 
 
Therefore, caring requires more than just having a desire and more than 
accepting, approving of, or endorsing a desire.  Caring requires wanting the 
desire sustained (Frankfurt 2004: 16).  Wanting a desire sustained should be 
thought of as being disposed to be active in ensuring that the desire is not 
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abandoned or neglected (Frankfurt 1999: 162).  This focus and attention on the 
desire stem from the fact that this desire is one with which the person identifies 
himself, and which he accepts as expressing what he really wants (Frankfurt 
2004: 16). 
 At this point, it should be clear that caring is a matter of will.  This is 
because we are dealing with a subset of higher-order volitions (i.e., a second-
order desire such that the person wants the first-order desire in question to be 
the desire that moves him effectively to act).  Specifically, caring consists in 
having a higher-order volition that the person also wants sustained (Frankfurt 
2004: 16).  An objection to locating caring within the will might claim that 
caring is more properly a function of a person’s beliefs or feelings.  While these 
are certainly germane to the discussion of what one cares about, Frankfurt 
(1999: 110-11) argues that there is more to the story: 
[Caring] is not primarily either a cognitive or an affective matter.  
Cognitive and affective considerations are its sources and grounds.  
But though it is based on what a person believes and feels, caring 
is not the same as believing or feeling.  Caring is essentially 
volitional; that is, it concerns one’s will.  The fact that a person 
cares about something or considers it important to himself does 
not consist in his holding certain opinions about it; nor does it 
consist in his having certain feelings or desires.  His caring about it 
consists, rather, in the fact that he guides himself by reference to 
it.  This entails that he purposefully direct his attention, attitudes, 
and behavior in response to circumstances germane to the 
fortunes of the object about which he cares.  A person who cares 
about something is, as it were, invested in it.  By caring about it, 
he makes himself susceptible to benefits and vulnerable to losses 
depending upon whether what he cares about flourishes or is 
diminished.  We may say that in this sense he identifies himself 
with what he cares about. 
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 Desires that a person does not care about, on the other hand, may still 
persist.  After all, one cannot simply be rid of first-order desires that one does 
not want through an exercise of the will or otherwise.  However, these desires 
are denied any place at all in the person’s order of preferences⎯not simply 
assigned a lower priority⎯in an effort to cease to be moved by their appeal.28  
By alienating a desire in this way, the person is aiming at disenfranchising the 
desire, so to speak (Frankfurt 1999: 161).  It is only when a desire persists 
through the person’s own doing that it can be properly claimed that the person 
cares about it, although this volitional activity need not be fully conscious or 
explicitly deliberate (Frankfurt 1999: 160). 
 Having established that to care about something means being motivated 
by a concern for it in the way just described, we should examine the objects of 
our caring more closely.  Here, it seems relatively clear, the object of our caring 
can be almost anything: “a life, a quality of experience, a person, a group, a 
moral ideal, a nonmoral ideal, a tradition, whatever” (Frankfurt 2006: 40).  It 
should also be noted here that caring about something need not be limited to 
the typical nurturing connotation associated with this term.  The concern 
necessary for caring “may be positive or negative: hatred or love, a desire to 
possess or a desire to avoid, an interest in sustaining the object or in 
destroying it” (Frankfurt 1999: 93). 
                                       
28 In other words, the person does not identify with these desires, even though 
the desire may still persist and, obviously, be located within the person’s body. 
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 While these preliminary remarks concerning the objects of our caring are 
all well and good, they do not get us any closer to the 800-pound gorilla in the 
room.  This is, of course, the normative question concerning what we should 
care about.  For everyone trying to avoid the unexamined life that Socrates 
warned us about,29 this is a question that inevitably arises.  So, what should 
we care about?  This question is normally interpreted as inquiring about the 
identity of things that are inherently and objectively important such that they 
are worth caring about.  Is there a sufficient basis for establishing something 
as being genuinely important in itself, regardless of what anyone thinks about 
it?  No.  “There can be no rationally warranted criteria for establishing anything 
as inherently important” (Frankfurt 2006: 22).30  There are at least two ways to 
see this.  First, an examination of objects that might qualify will demonstrate 
this fact⎯a bottom-up approach to the question.  Second, a closer examination 
of the question will also establish this fact⎯a top-down approach. 
 The bottom-up approach to the question of inherent importance begins 
with a survey of objects that might qualify for this distinction and then would 
try to show how they were, in fact, inherently important.  The most obvious 
way to do this, and the only reasonable way, is to ground the justification for 
                                       
29 Plato (Apology: 38a). 
 
30 Two points bear mentioning here.  First, this claim need not be true for my 
overall project to succeed.  The reason to include it, then, relates to the second 
point.  And that point is, to the extent this claim is true, it helps to further 
weaken the case for objective-list theories, which in turn may increase the 
plausibility for other theories of welfare (including the one put forward in 
Chapter Five). 
  
136 
our believing that certain things are inherently important in judgments about 
the value of those objects.  Let us start with a particular value judgment and 
then broaden our scope to examine value judgments in general.  If you were to 
ask a sufficiently large group of people what you should care about, I suspect 
the most common answer would be either other persons in general or some 
subset thereof.  If you should care about other people, then this seems to entail 
that you should care about morality since morality deals with how one should 
conduct oneself in affairs that affect other people.31  Now the strictures of 
morality are only what they are in virtue of a value judgment; namely, that 
other persons are of some value.32  So morality tells us that other people do 
have value, but does this make other people necessarily important to us or, 
perhaps, the most important thing?  No. 
Now why should that be, always and in all circumstances, the most 
important thing in our lives?  No doubt it is important; but, so far 
as I am aware, there is no convincing argument that it must 
invariably override everything else.  Even if it were entirely clear 
what the moral law commands, it would remain an open question 
how important it is for us to obey those commands.  We would still 
have to decide how much to care about morality.  Morality itself 
cannot satisfy us about that (Frankfurt 2006: 28). 
 
The bottom line here is that a person who does not value other people is not 
making any sort of logical mistake.  It may be unthinkable and abhorrent to 
                                       
31 Limiting the scope of morality to persons here strengthens the objection that 
I am arguing against.  However, expanding the scope to all sentient beings, the 
proper ambit in my opinion, would do nothing to weaken the argument. 
 
32 This can easily be seen if one tries to imagine the content of morality if other 
persons have no value whatsoever.  This point has been made by others in 
their discussions of ethical egoism.  They question whether ethical egoism is a 
moral theory at all, as opposed to just a system of practical reasoning, because 
it fails to assign any value to the interests of others. 
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us, but there are no contradictions to be found here.  This is just another in 
the long line of unfortunate facts about the reality we find ourselves in, but of 
course the fact that we may want something to be different than it is does not 
make it so or, for that matter, even more likely that it is so.  
 What, then, about value judgments in general?  As was touched on 
earlier in the chapter, these suffer the same fate as the value judgments of 
morality, and for the same reason.  Using a bit of imagination, you should be 
able to come up with a relatively long list of objects, activities, and states of 
affairs that you consider to be inherently valuable, or worthy of being pursued 
for their own sakes, but that are not important to you and about which you do 
not care.  Other things, perhaps even things that we freely recognize have less 
value than some of the things on the list of valuable things that you do not care 
about, are more important to us.33  What we should care about simply cannot 
be based on judgments about value.  Simply stated, “From the fact that we 
consider something to be valuable, it does not follow that we need to be 
concerned with it” (Frankfurt 2006: 27).  Accordingly, importance is never 
inherent, with one exception that need not detain us here.34  
                                       
33 A prime example of this might be a football coach who, although he has 
dedicated his life to football, might freely acknowledge many other things as 
being more valuable.  Of course, this is not meant to unfairly single out sports.  
One could substitute all sorts of other career paths, artistic endeavors, etc., to 
make the same point. 
 
34 The exception Frankfurt makes here need not detain us because it does not 
undermine my argument.  If it has any effect at all, this exception strengthens 
my earlier argument concerning the definition of personhood:  
What is important to someone depends upon what he cares 
about.  This might well seem to imply that there can be nothing 
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 Perhaps one might not be persuaded by this bottom-up approach to the 
question of what one should care about.  The top-down approach will produce 
the same conclusion, albeit from the opposite direction.  The problem with the 
                                                                                                                           
whose importance to anyone is inherent in it.  The fact that 
something is important to a person is invariably a function of that 
person’s feelings, attitudes, and intentions.  Considered just in 
itself, entirely apart from any consideration of what the person in 
question cares about, nothing can be said either to be or not to be 
important to him.  For the extent to which something is important 
to him depends essentially upon considerations other than its own 
inherent characteristics alone. 
However, there is an exception to this principle that the 
importance of anything depends upon considerations outside itself.  
People are capable of making themselves important.  If a person is 
important to himself, then this importance is manifestly self-
endowed; for he is important to himself simply by virtue of the fact 
that he cares about himself.  In this one case, the source of 
importance lies in the characteristics of the object.  The 
importance of a person to himself is unique in that it is in no way 
extrinsic.  From this it follows, of course, that someone who enjoys 
this importance cannot be deprived of it by anything other than 
himself.  Only if a person does not care about himself can he fail to 
be important to himself. 
Now whether a person is or is not important to himself may 
appear to be a straightforwardly contingent matter.  It depends 
just upon whether he cares about himself; and surely, it seems, he 
might either do so or not.  The importance of a person to himself is 
clearly intrinsic, in that it depends exclusively upon his own 
characteristics.  If the characteristics upon which it depends are 
indeed contingent, however, then it is also conditional.  But is it 
actually possible for there to be a person who does not care about 
himself?  Perhaps caring about oneself is essential to being a 
person.  Can something to whom its condition and activities do not 
matter in the slightest properly be regarded as a person at all?  
Perhaps nothing that is entirely indifferent to itself is really a 
person, regardless of how intelligent or emotional or in other 
respects similar to persons it may be. 
Suppose that the sort of reflexivity in question here were, 
indeed, a conceptually essential characteristic of persons.  Then 
there could not possibly be a person of no importance to himself.  
To be sure, the importance of a person to himself would still be 
conditional.  But no person could fail to meet the required 
condition.   (Frankfurt 1999: 89-90) 
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question “What should I care about?” is that it is doomed from the start 
because it is systematically inchoate (Frankfurt 2004: 25).  What this means 
can be discerned by taking a closer look at the question.  In particular, let us 
examine what one would need in order to answer the question.  Carrying out a 
rational evaluation of the various things that one should care about would 
require one to know what evaluative criteria to employ and how to employ 
them.  Specifically, one would need to know what considerations count in favor 
of caring about something, what considerations count against caring about 
something, and the relative weights of each (Frankfurt 2004: 24).  An 
evaluation of potential objects of caring without specifying these things cannot 
even be called an evaluation⎯at least not a rational one⎯and, thus, cannot 
succeed because it cannot even begin.  This explains why the question is 
systemically inchoate.  Alternatively, the question could be described as 
suffering from a vicious sort of circularity, which is necessarily the case if the 
question is not incomplete.  This is because fully formulating the question in a 
way that would allow it to be answered requires having already settled upon 
the judgments at which the question aims to provide.  In other words, 
identifying the question is tantamount to answering it since the answer is that 
one should care about the things that best satisfy the criteria set out in the 
question itself (Frankfurt 2004: 25).35 
                                       
35 David Sobel (1994: 808) makes a similar point in the context of discussing 
the difficulties associated with full-information accounts of well-being: 
The narrative unity of a life can provide the context to make sense 
of choosing one option over another, but this context is 
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 This seems to be a discouraging result.  After all, this does seem to be 
the most basic inquiry that a person trying to lead an examined life could 
make.  Knowing what one should care about, and being able to construct a 
plan of life on that basis, seems central to that effort.  So where does that leave 
us?  It turns out that we still can sensibly ask what we should care about, but 
only after we have an answer to the question of what we actually do care about.  
In other words, the factual question of what we do care about must precede the 
normative question of what we should care about (Frankfurt 2006: 23).  This 
conclusion becomes clear if we examine the case of a person who does not care 
about anything.  If a person cares about nothing, then a rational inquiry into 
what he should care about cannot begin because the fact that he cares about 
nothing entails that there is nothing that can count with him as a reason for 
caring about one thing over another or caring about anything at all (Frankfurt 
2004: 26).  And if he truly does not care about anything, then he will not care 
about this, either.  However, if a person does care about something, then it 
may be possible for him to discover other things that he should care about as 
well.  For example, suppose a person cares about his health, but does not care 
about the nutritional value of the food he consumes.  If this person inquired 
                                                                                                                           
significantly dropped when we are choosing between lives rather 
than from within them.  It is not just the different life paths that 
we could lead that are to be chosen between, it is also who we are 
to be; what kind of person we want to be who is having these 
different lives.  Without anything like the context provided by our 
actual lives, the chooser becomes disorientingly “unencumbered.” 
The context Sobel speaks of is provided by what we do care about.  If we are 
unaware of what we care about, it is impossible to get a foothold in the 
question of what we should care about in the possible alternate lives we could 
lead. 
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into what he should care about, he may discover that he should care about the 
nutritional value of his food on the basis of a fact that he does care 
about⎯namely, his physical health.  For unless he does care about his health 
(or something else that pertains to the ingredients in his food), then there 
would be nothing that would count for him as a reason that he should care 
about what is in the food he eats.36 
 Needing to answer the factual question of what we do care about before 
the normative question of what we should care about is better than not being 
able to coherently ask the normative question at all, but this result is still 
unsatisfying.  After all, we wanted to know what we should care about, and we 
were reduced to simply asking what we do care about.  The unsatisfying nature 
of this conclusion stems from the notion that merely knowing how things 
actually are⎯in this case what we do care about⎯seems to do nothing in terms 
of justifying them or giving us a reason to accept them (Frankfurt 2004: 27-28).  
Justification and acceptance were the main considerations in asking what we 
should care about in the first place.  However, as this section has shown 
repeatedly and in a variety of ways, it is the normative question that misses the 
point, not the factual question.  Demonstrating, from the ground up, what we 
                                       
36 While it is possible that there could be someone who literally did not care 
about anything, this is largely a theoretical consideration.  Nearly everyone 
cares about something.  In fact, the things people care about overlap to a 
significant degree, although the ordering of these things does vary a great deal.  
So people care about their physical and mental health, family, friends, hobbies, 
livelihood, etc.  This is not a coincidence, but rather is due to the fact that 
human nature and the basic conditions of human life are not subject to a great 
deal of variation or change (Frankfurt 2004: 27). 
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should care about⎯what Frankfurt calls the “pan-rationalist fantasy”⎯is 
incoherent and must be abandoned (Frankfurt 2004: 28).37  Caring does not 
require proof or definitive arguments, but rather clarity concerning what we do 
care about.  And, as we saw earlier in this chapter, hopefully our clarity is 
accompanied by our being wholehearted in the pursuit of those things. 
 From what has been said about the primacy of the factual question 
concerning what we care about, there are likely many misconceptions lurking.  
I will try to correct a couple of the most glaring ones here.  First, the search for 
what we actually do care about may seem to imply that we are aiming at a fixed 
target in that what we care about does not change.  This is not the case, as 
even a cursory examination of persons over time would reveal.  What we care 
about is a function of generic human nature, in most cases, and of a person’s 
own particular makeup and experience.  And as our makeup can change and 
our experience does change, what we care about can, and almost always does, 
change along with these two things.  The good news here is that this outcome 
meshes well with the overwhelming weight of the empirical evidence.  The bad 
news is that we cannot simply attempt to figure out what we care about and 
then be done with it once and for all. 
 Another likely misconception would be that, given that we are only 
performing a factual inquiry on ourselves, there would be little to no chance 
                                       
37 This outcome is analogous to a broader problem with philosophy in general.  
Unless we have some fixed starting points in philosophy, it is impossible even 
to begin.  For example, without at least the minimal principle of 
noncontradiction, one could not hope to establish a premise, much less a 
conclusion. 
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that we could get this wrong.  This is not the case.  There are two categories of 
mistakes that people can and do make in this regard.  The first involves the 
objects of our caring themselves and our understanding of them.  One way a 
lack of understanding of an object we care about could cause us to get it wrong 
is when the object turns out to be different than we initially thought it was.  I 
have personally witnessed this in the legal profession.  Some people care about 
becoming a lawyer only to discover that the practice of law is different than 
they thought it would be, which causes them to no longer care about being a 
lawyer.  It may also turn out to be the case that, as we learn more about the 
things we care about, we discover that they conflict with each other in some 
fundamental way.  One might imagine a person who cares about both science 
and a particular religion.  Over time he comes to understand that these two 
things cannot be reconciled.  Perhaps this realization will lead him to the 
conclusion that he in fact cares more about one than the other so that his 
internal conflict might be resolved.  The bottom line here is that we may not 
understand the objects we care about such that they turn out to be different 
than we thought or that the requirements and consequences of caring about 
them turn out to be different than we thought (Frankfurt 2006: 49). 
 The second general category of mistakes one can make concerning caring 
involves not the objects, but ourselves.  Just as we can fail to understand the 
objects we care about, we can fail to understand ourselves.  Really 
understanding ourselves to such a degree to allow us to be clear about what we 
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care about is no small feat.  Frankfurt (2006: 49-50) sums up the difficulty 
quite well: 
Our motives and our disposition are notoriously uncertain and 
opaque, and we often get ourselves wrong.  It is hard to be sure 
what we can bring ourselves to do, or how we will behave when the 
chips are down.  The will is a thing as real as any reality outside 
us.  The truth about it does not depend upon what we think it is, 
or upon what we wish it were.38 
 
 In terms of the things we can get wrong when it comes to what we care 
about, this is the end of the list.  In fact, it is hard to imagine what else we 
could get wrong that would not involve something metaphysically far-fetched.  
There is simply nothing else to get right once we understand both the objects we 
care about and ourselves.  As we saw earlier in this section, what we care 
about cannot be demonstrated by impersonal considerations that all rational 
agents would accept.  This outcome helps to highlight another unfortunate fact 
of life.  Since what we care about cannot be demonstrated in this way, it may, 
and very often does, turn out that certain conflicts between people involving 
what they care about are irreducible.  Neither party can be shown to have 
                                       
38 This point helps to illuminate the fact that deciding to care about something 
is not tantamount to actually caring about it (Frankfurt 1988: 84).  By deciding 
to care about something, a person merely forms an intention to care about it, 
which may or may not be fulfilled.  As Frankfurt (1988: 84) rightly points out, a 
“decision to care no more entails caring than a decision to give up smoking 
entails giving it up.”  The issue here is not primarily that the person will 
change his mind or that he will forget his decision; rather, it concerns the 
distinct possibility that he will be unable to carry out his decision (Frankfurt 
1988: 84).  Should this occur, it would just be another manifestation of the 
person’s not knowing himself well enough such that, when the time comes to 
follow through on his decision, he finds that his decision does not accurately 
reflect what he cares about and the relative priorities of those things.  In short, 
the problem of what to care about cannot be overcome simply by making a 
decision. 
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made a mistake, which leaves little hope for a resolution that both parties can 
accept (Frankfurt 2006: 50).  Once again, the fact that we might prefer a 
different outcome does not even make it slightly more likely that this is so. 
 In previous chapters, an intuitive sense of the concept of caring was used 
extensively to argue against both hedonistic and objective-list theories.  In this 
chapter, the concept of caring has been thoroughly defined and illustrated.  
Through this process, the general importance of caring to persons should have 
become clear.  However, it is worth being as clear and explicit as possible about 
the importance of caring before turning to other matters. 
 First, it is through caring that we infuse the world with importance 
(Frankfurt 2004: 23).  Since caring about an object is what makes that object 
important to the person who cares about it, it is only through caring that 
anything can be important to a person at all.  This fact, however, does nothing 
to taint the objects we care about.  It certainly does not do so for those people 
who do not know it, but it also does not do so for the people who do know it.  
This is because caring entails that we regard the objects of our caring as 
valuable in themselves, despite the fact that our viewing objects in this way 
cannot be established independently of our caring (Frankfurt 2004: 56). 
 Here one might object to the idea of importance mattering at all.  It 
seems like a relatively uncontroversial proposition, but is it?  Why is it better 
for a person (assuming the person cares about himself and his welfare) to care 
about things⎯thus making those things important⎯than it is to care about 
nothing at all?  There are two primary reasons why this is the case.  The first 
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involves final ends.  In short, caring gives us our final ends by being the 
originating source of terminal value (Frankfurt 2004: 55).  Given the arguments 
earlier in this chapter, that point should be all but obvious by now.  
Nonetheless, one might still object to this line of argumentation on the grounds 
that final ends do not matter any more than importance does.  What then? 
 A person without important final ends would, according to Frankfurt, 
inevitably be led to boredom, which is a serious problem in its own right.  To 
see why this is so, a closer examination of final ends is in order.  Aristotle 
(Nicomachean Ethics: 1094a) claimed that desire is “empty and vain” unless 
“there is some end of the things we do which we desire for its own sake.”  In 
other words, if everything we do is done merely for the sake of doing something 
else, then there seems to be no real point or foundation for any of it.  
Accordingly, it would be difficult to be genuinely satisfied by any of the things 
we do since our sequence of actions will always be unfinished, by hypothesis.  
This, in turn, will cause us to lose interest in what we do (Frankfurt 2004: 52-
53). 
 Frankfurt (1999: 88-89) does an excellent job of describing the problem 
that results from this condition: 
A life in which it were actually the case that nothing was 
important would be, by hypothesis, a life without important final 
ends.  It follows that it would be a life without meaningful activity.  
Anyone who lived that life would be indifferent and unengaged with 
respect to whatever it might be that he did.  Furthermore, he 
would be bored.  I believe that the avoidance of boredom is a very 
fundamental human urge.  It is not a matter merely of distaste for 
a rather unpleasant state of consciousness.  Being bored entails a 
reduction of attention; our responsiveness to conscious stimuli 
flattens out and shrinks; distinctions are not noticed and not 
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made, so that the conscious field becomes increasingly 
homogeneous.  The general functioning of the mind diminishes.  It 
is of the essence of boredom that it involves an attenuation of 
psychic liveliness.  Its tendency is to approach a complete 
cessation of significant differentiation within consciousness; and 
this homogenization is, at the limit, tantamount to the cessation of 
conscious experience altogether.   
A substantial increase in the extent to which we are bored 
undermines the very continuation of psychic activity.  In other 
words, it threatens the extinction of the active self.  What is 
manifested by our interest in avoiding boredom is therefore not 
simply a resistance to discomfort but a quite elemental urge for 
psychic survival.  It is natural to construe this as a modification of 
the more familiar instinct for self-preservation.  It is connected to 
“self-preservation,” however, only in an unfamiliarly literal sense – 
in the sense of sustaining not the life of the organism but the 
persistence of the self. 
 
 Thus we arrive at the second reason why caring about something is 
essential to having a good life, and it involves the issue of personal identity.  
Needless to say, I do not have the space here to set out and defend a theory of 
personal identity⎯a topic that would require another dissertation.  However, 
there are clearly issues of personal identity lurking here.  And while there are 
strong claims regarding the relationship between Frankfurt’s account of the 
will and personal identity, I am proposing a fairly modest claim: It is at least 
plausible that a particular person no longer exists qua that person if his will is 
either removed or completely changed. 
 Although Frankfurt never fully addresses the topic of personal identity, 
some of his remarks do lend support to my claim.  Consider what Frankfurt 
(1988: 83-84) says about the “temporal characteristics” of caring: 
The outlook of a person who cares about something is inherently 
prospective; that is, he necessarily considers himself as having a 
future.  On the other hand, it is possible for a creature to have 
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desires and beliefs without taking any account at all of the fact 
that he may continue to exist. 
Desires and beliefs can occur in a life which consists merely 
of a succession of separate moments, none of which the subject 
recognizes – either when it occurs or in anticipation or in memory – 
as an element integrated with others in his own continuing history.  
When this recognition is entirely absent, there is no continuing 
subject.  The lives of some animals are presumably like that.  The 
moments in the life of a person who cares about something, 
however, are not merely linked inherently by formal relations of 
sequentiality.  The person necessarily binds them together, and in 
the nature of the case also construes them as being bound 
together, in richer ways.  This both entails and is entailed by his 
own continuing concern with what he does with himself and with 
what goes on in his life.   
Considerations of a similar kind indicate that a person can 
care about something only over some more or less extended period 
of time.  Desires and beliefs have no inherent persistence; nothing 
in the nature of wanting or of believing requires that a desire or a 
belief must endure.  But the notion of guidance, and hence the 
notion of caring, implies a certain consistency or steadiness of 
behavior; and this presupposes some degree of persistence.  A 
person who cared about something just for a single moment would 
be indistinguishable from someone who was being moved by 
impulse.  He would not in any proper sense be guiding or directing 
himself at all. 
 
The most important passage from this section for purposes of my personal 
identity claim above is Frankfurt’s claim that there is no continuing subject 
when the appropriate temporal recognition is lacking.  This could occur in the 
case of the boredom described above or, a fortiori, in the case where the will is 
removed altogether. 
 Next, consider Frankfurt’s (1999: 162) remarks concerning a situation 
wherein we cared about nothing: 
In that case, we would be creatures with no active interest in 
establishing or sustaining any thematic continuity in our volitional 
lives.  We would not be disposed to make any effort to maintain 
any of the interests, aims, and ambitions by which we are from 
time to time moved.   
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Of course, we would still be moved to satisfy our desires; 
that is irreducibly part of the nature of desire.  We might also still 
want to have certain desires, and to be motivated by them in what 
we do; and we might want not to have certain others and want not 
to be moved by them to act.  In other words, our capacity for 
higher-order desires and higher-order volitions might remain fully 
intact.  Moreover, some of our higher-order desires and volitions 
might tend to endure and thus to provide a degree of volitional 
consistency or stability in our lives.  From our point of view as 
agents, however, whatever coherence or unity might happen to 
come about in this way would be merely fortuitous and 
inadvertent.  It would not be the result of any deliberate or guiding 
intent on our part.  Desires and volitions of various hierarchical 
orders would come and go; and sometimes they might last for a 
while.  But in the design and contrivance of their succession we 
ourselves would be playing no concerned or defining role. 
 
Now if the identity of this person is dependent upon his identity as an agent at 
all, then there does not appear to be a continuing subject here either.  As 
Frankfurt (2004: 23) says of such a person in a separate article, “Even if it 
could meaningfully be said of such a person that he had a will, it could hardly 
be said of him that his will was genuinely his own.” 
 This idea of caring as critical to being one and the same person over time 
is underscored by the final reason in support of the importance of caring.  This 
reason is the product of two distinct facts we have examined previously.  First, 
there are no rationally warranted criteria for establishing anything as 
inherently or objectively important.  Second, we have seen that caring is 
essential in providing us with final ends, saving us from boredom, and 
maintaining our identity as a continuing subject over time.  The result: 
The significance to us of caring is thus more basic than the 
importance to us of what we care about. . . .  [T]he value to us of 
the fact that we care about various things does not derive simply 
from the value or the suitability of the objects about which we care.  
Caring is important to us for its own sake, insofar as it is the 
  
150 
indispensably foundational activity through which we provide 
continuity and coherence to our volitional lives.  Regardless of 
whether its objects are appropriate, our caring about things 
possesses for us an inherent value by virtue of its essential role in 
making us the distinctive kind of creatures that we are.  (Frankfurt 
1999: 162-63) 
 
IX. VOLITIONAL NECESSITY 
The concept of volitional necessity is also related to personal identity, but 
before that connection is explained we need to explain the concept itself and 
how it completes the discussion of what we should care about.  In his 
discussion of this topic, Frankfurt (2004: 56) claims that caring entails not only 
that we regard the objects of our caring as valuable in themselves, but also 
that “we have no choice but to adopt those objects as our final ends.”  While 
this claim will strike some as threatening to both autonomy and personal 
identity, it is actually indispensable to achieving both. 
Recall that the question of what we should care about could not be 
coherently asked until the question of what we actually do care about was 
answered.  The reason was that the answer to the factual question of what we 
do care about is the only metaphysically plausible, nonarbitrary basis upon 
which we could inquire what else we should care about.  Now suppose that 
what we actually do care about is in fact entirely up to us and that it is not 
constrained in any way.  In other words, suppose we could have whatever will 
we wanted⎯and thus care about whatever we wanted⎯simply by deciding to 
do so (remembering, of course, that caring is a fact about the will).  How could 
the question of what to care about be answered if the basis for the answer 
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must be both nonarbitrary and entirely impartial (i.e., not taking into account 
any volitional predisposition)?  This question cannot be answered.  The answer 
must either be arbitrary or take into account things about which we cannot 
help caring (Frankfurt 1999: 93).  This is because even raising the question of 
whether to keep your will as it is or to change it is to suspend the authority of 
any antecedent volitional state that could have provided the basis for an 
answer (Frankfurt 1999: 93).  In order for a person to have an appropriate (i.e., 
nonarbitrary) basis for determining his final ends, two things must obtain.  
First, there must be something that is antecedently important to him 
(Frankfurt 1999: 93).  And, as we saw before, these can change as they depend 
on a variety of causally influential factors.  Second, even though what we care 
about can change, it cannot be subject to our own immediate, voluntary 
control (because if it were we would immediately be faced with the problem 
described at the beginning of this paragraph) (Frankfurt 1999: 93).  This does 
not mean that the person cannot change it himself, but it cannot be as simple 
as his just making up his mind one way or the other (Frankfurt 1999: 94).  
The things that are antecedently important to us that we cannot help 
caring about encompass the concept of volitional necessity, which is an 
instrumental concept for understanding several aspects of personhood.  
Autonomy, for example, requires volitional necessity.  The things we cannot 
help caring about provide us with nonarbitrary reasons for exercising our 
autonomy.  “Unless a person makes choices within restrictions from which he 
cannot escape by merely choosing to do so, the notion of self-direction, of 
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autonomy, cannot find a grip” (Frankfurt 1999: 110).  This is because any 
choice a person totally lacking in any fixed volitional points makes cannot be 
regarded as having originated in his own will.  To the extent that such a person 
can decide upon anything at all, his choice will be necessarily arbitrary, thus 
lacking any personal significance or authority that could serve as the basis for 
true autonomy. 
Volitional necessity also provides a basis for establishing our identities as 
active beings.  Frankfurt claims it is by these necessities that “our individual 
identities are most fully expressed and defined” (Frankfurt 2004: 50).  He 
elaborates on this idea in a separate article: 
 The essential nature of a person is constituted by his 
necessary personal characteristics.  These characteristics have to 
do particularly with his nature as a person, rather than with his 
nature as a human being or as a biological organism of a certain 
type.  They are especially characteristics of his will.  In speaking of 
the personal characteristics of someone’s will, I do not mean to 
refer simply to the desires or impulses that move him.  We 
attribute impulses, desires, and motives even to infants and 
animals, creatures that cannot properly be said either to be 
persons or to possess wills.  The personal characteristics of 
someone’s will are reflexive, or higher-order, volitional features.  
They pertain to a person’s efforts to negotiate his own way among 
the various impulses and desires by which he is moved, as he 
undertakes to identify himself more intimately with some of his 
own psychic characteristics and to distance himself from others. 
 To be a person entails evaluative attitudes (not necessarily 
based on moral considerations) toward oneself.  A person is a 
creature prepared to endorse or repudiate the motives from which 
he acts and to organize the preferences and priorities by which his 
choices are ordered.  He is disposed to consider whether what 
attracts him is actually important to him.  Instead of responding 
unreflectively to whatever he happens to feel most strongly, he 
undertakes to guide his conduct in accordance with what he really 
cares about. 
 To the extent that a person is constrained by volitional 
necessities, there are certain things that he cannot help willing or 
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that he cannot bring himself to do.  These necessities substantially 
affect the actual course and character of his life.  But they affect 
not only what he does; they limit the possibilities that are open to 
his will, that is, they determine what he cannot will and what he 
cannot help willing.  Now the character of a person’s will 
constitutes what he most centrally is.  Accordingly, the volitional 
necessities that bind a person identify what he cannot help being.  
They are in this respect analogues of the logical or conceptual 
necessities that define the essential nature of a triangle.  Just as 
the essence of a triangle consists in what it must be, so the 
essential nature of a person consists in what he must will.  The 
boundaries of his will define his shape as a person.  (Frankfurt 
1999: 113-14) 
 
 Before discussing volitional necessity further, it is worth keeping in mind 
that the central topic of this project is personal welfare.  Specifically, it may be 
objected here that the necessity of the sort described (or perhaps necessity of 
any kind) is antithetical to the very notion of personal welfare.  I have some 
deep-seated sympathy for this position.  However, I think the fear of the notion 
of necessity in the area of personal welfare must be abandoned, as I will 
attempt to show in the remainder of this section and in the next section on free 
will.  Moreover, this section has already demonstrated how volitional necessity 
makes genuine autonomy possible and how volitional necessity is necessary in 
defining us as persons, both of which may be tangentially related to the 
concept of personal welfare.39 
 The remaining aspects of volitional necessity that are worthy of note can 
best be illustrated by using an example.  Martin Luther’s famous declaration, 
                                       
39 Autonomy is widely considered to be at least an important condition for the 
enhancement of personal welfare.  This gives a coherent account of autonomy 
and supports the intuition that autonomy and welfare are related.  The issue of 
personal identity could also be thought to be tied to the issue of personal 
welfare because one may want to establish the identity of the person who is to 
be the subject of the personal welfare calculation. 
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“Here I stand; I can do no other,” is probably the best historical example to 
examine for this purpose.  How are we to understand Luther here?  He is 
saying that it is not possible for him to do other than he is doing.  The 
impossibility is clearly not a logical necessity.  It is also not a causal necessity, 
as Luther is fully aware that he possesses both the capacity and the power to 
do otherwise (Frankfurt 1988: 86).  If we take Luther at his word, the only way 
to understand him is to describe him as lacking the will to do otherwise. 
 Accordingly, we could say that Luther, and anyone else subject to 
volitional necessity, must act as he does (Frankfurt 1988: 86-87).  But if a 
person must act as he does in this situation, how are we to distinguish 
between volitional necessity on the one hand, and compulsions, obsessions, 
and addictions on the other?  Since we may experience each of these as being 
irresistible, this cannot be the difference.  The difference is that when we 
succumb to addiction and the like, we do so unwillingly and experience these 
forces as alien to ourselves (Frankfurt 1999: 136).  The explanation of this goes 
back to the issue of identification; it is because we do not identify with 
obsessions and compulsions that we experience them in this way.  When we do 
not identify with these irresistible forces, we do not want these motives to be 
ones that move us, and we deprive them of all authority.  Considered strictly in 
themselves, this type of psychic raw material can only move us through sheer 
brute force (Frankfurt 1999: 137). 
 Volitional necessity is different.  After all, there is no reason why 
irresistible forces must conflict with the desires by which we would prefer to be 
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moved (Frankfurt 1999: 136).  Volitional necessity, as Frankfurt uses the term, 
describes the irresistible forces we identify with, endorse, and are pleased to 
have move us to action, even though we could not do otherwise.  Accordingly, 
as in Luther’s case, he does not accede to the manner in which he is compelled 
to act because he lacks sufficient strength of will to defeat it.  “He accedes to it 
because he is unwilling to oppose it and because, furthermore, his 
unwillingness is itself something which he is unwilling to alter” (Frankfurt 
1988: 87). 
 And it is precisely through identifying ourselves with the irresistible 
forces of volitional necessity and wanting to be moved by them that we 
experience these forces as liberating (Frankfurt 2004: 64).  This is because the 
volitional necessity that binds the will puts an end to any indecisiveness 
concerning what we are to care about (Frankfurt 2004: 65).  Our final ends are 
settled for us, we know what we are to care about, and we care about caring 
about those things.  For these reasons, Frankfurt (2004: 64) likens the 
commanding necessity of volitional necessity to the commanding necessity of 
reason, in that “neither entails for us any sense of impotence or restriction.”  
The reason is that both volitional and rational necessity eliminate uncertainty.  
They thereby lessen or remove self-doubt.  In the case of reason, necessity tells 
us what must be the case and thus removes any doubts we might have 
concerning what to believe.  In the case of the will, necessity tells us what we 
must care about and puts an end, at least for a time, to our indecisiveness in 
this area (Frankfurt 2004: 65).  In other words, volitional necessity is liberating 
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rather than coercive because it may constrain the person to do what he really 
wants to do. 
X. FREE WILL 
 The final topic in this chapter concerning the theoretical foundation of 
my theory of personal welfare is Frankfurt’s theory of free will.  The sole 
purpose of covering this theory is to explore the relationship, if any, between 
free will and personal welfare.  The reason to inquire into this relationship 
involves a basic intuition concerning the value of free will in personal welfare 
calculations.  Specifically, it seems reasonable to suppose that the exercise of 
free will would positively impact personal welfare, other things being equal.  In 
other words, the idea that free will does not and could not have any effect at all 
on how well a life goes for the person who lives it may strike many as being 
counter-intuitive. 
 However, the devil is always in the details.  There are several significant 
obstacles to showing how free will and personal welfare are related.  Grounding 
the intuition concerning this relationship requires an account of free will and 
an account of personal welfare, ensuring not only that these accounts are 
internally coherent, but that they are coherent considered as a whole.  
Moreover, it requires an account of personal welfare that does not simply 
assign an arbitrary value to the effect of free will on the calculation⎯a problem 
that, as we will see later, is the most intractable one of the bunch for 
competing theories that may attempt to incorporate this basic intuition. 
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 Each of these problems I have outlined comes with its own subset of 
problems.  In the remainder of this section, I will limit the scope to giving an 
account of free will and the problems associated with doing so.  To this end, it 
will be helpful to think about the requirements for a theory of free will along 
with other non-essential, yet desirable, features of any such theory.  First and 
foremost, a theory of free will should be coherent and plausible.  Although this 
hardly seems worth mentioning, the number of theories of free will on offer that 
are either incoherent or based on highly questionable metaphysics⎯or 
both⎯suggests otherwise.  Second, a theory of free will should make it clear 
why we should care about it at all.  Free will is commonly supposed to be 
humankind’s most prized attribute (along with rationality), and a theory of free 
will should help us to understand why this is the case.  Third, as it is also 
commonly supposed that animals do not possess free will, our theory should 
give us some reason to think that I do have free will, while the squirrels outside 
my window do not.  Finally, given the content of the previous section on 
volitional necessity, the theory of free will presented here will need to explain 
how free will and volitional necessity are compatible. 
 The beginning is often a good place to begin, so let us start with 
Frankfurt’s account of free will.  In order to understand his account properly, 
we need to review some of Frankfurt’s account of personhood.  Persons, 
according to Frankfurt (1988: 16), are all and only those creatures that have 
second-order volitions.  A second-order volition is a second-order desire for a 
certain first-order desire to be his will (Frankfurt 1988: 16).  A person’s will, 
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then, is identical to one or more of his effective first-order desires, which are 
ones that move (or will or would move) a person all the way to action (Frankfurt 
1988: 14).  Accordingly, to “identify an agent’s will is either to identify the 
desire (or desires) by which he is motivated in some action he performs or to 
identify the desire (or desires) by which he will or would be motivated when or 
if he acts” (Frankfurt 1988: 14). 
 After providing this account of personhood, Frankfurt notes the close 
relationship between the capacity for forming higher-order volitions and the 
capacity for free will.  These are so closely connected that, Frankfurt (1988: 19) 
states, the concept of a person could “also be construed as the concept of a 
type of entity for whom freedom of its will may be a problem.”  This is because 
freedom of the will can only be achieved through the formation of higher-order 
volitions, which, as we have just seen, are limited to persons.  
 Of course, just how a person’s higher-order volitions and his will 
combine to produce free will needs to be explained.  To do so, Frankfurt (1988: 
20) makes an analogy between freedom of action and freedom of the will.  
Frankfurt (1988: 20) defines freedom of action as, “roughly, . . . the freedom to 
do what one wants to do.”  And although he thinks freedom of action and 
freedom of the will are analogous, Frankfurt (1988: 20) claims that freedom of 
action is both a distinct concept from freedom of the will and that freedom of 
action is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for freedom of the will.  
It is not a sufficient condition because we recognize that the squirrels outside 
my window enjoy freedom of action (i.e., they are free to run in whatever 
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direction they please), yet they do not enjoy freedom of the will (Frankfurt 
1988: 20).  It is also not a necessary condition.  While it is often true that a 
person who is aware that he lacks freedom of action may feel the effect of this 
in the desires that comprise his will, which in turn will limit the range of 
decisions he is able to make, this is not the case for a person who is unaware 
that his freedom of action has been limited.  Consider the case of a person who 
is either temporarily or permanently paralyzed, yet is unaware that this 
misfortune has befallen him.  In such cases, the person’s will is as free as it 
was before even though the desires and determination of his will that were 
transparently translated into action no longer have the same effect. 
 Accordingly, when we inquire about the freedom of a person’s will, we are 
not asking if the person possesses freedom of action (i.e., whether he is in 
position to translate his first-order desires into action) (Frankfurt 1988: 20).  
Rather, as we can see from the paralysis example, we are inquiring into the 
person’s desires themselves when we address the topic of free will, and it is 
here that the analogy between free action and free will proves useful.  If 
freedom of action is roughly the freedom to do what one wants to do, then we 
can think of freedom of the will as, roughly, the freedom to want what one 
wants to want (Frankfurt 1988: 20).  “More precisely, it means that he is free to 
will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants” (Frankfurt 1988: 20).  
In other words, freedom of action concerns whether it is the action a person 
wants to perform and freedom of the will concerns whether it is the will the 
person wants to have (Frankfurt 1988: 20). 
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 How, then, are we to understand a person having the will he wants in 
terms of the concepts relating to the will that we have already deployed?  A 
person exercises freedom of the will by securing the conformity of his will to his 
higher-order volitions (Frankfurt 1988: 20).  Therefore, there are two distinct 
ways in which a person may experience a lack of free will.  The first way is 
obvious⎯when there is a discrepancy between his will and his higher-order 
volitions (Frankfurt 1988: 20).  The second way is much less obvious and calls 
attention to the fact that the person must secure the conformity in question.  A 
person also lacks free will if the person is aware that, although his will and his 
higher-order volitions are properly aligned, the coincidence of these two things 
“is not his own doing but only a happy chance” (Frankfurt 1988: 20). 
 To illustrate, let us examine the cases of three addicts who all lack free 
will, albeit for different reasons.  Each of the three is physiologically addicted, 
and each has access to his drug of choice⎯glue.  The first is an unwilling 
addict because his second-order volition is for his first-order desire not to sniff 
glue to be effective.  The unwilling addict does not have free will with respect to 
this act because the will he has is not the will he wants.  The second is a 
wanton addict because he either does not or cannot care which of his 
competing first-order desires wins out.  He does not have the will he wants or 
the will he does not want.  Since he is not a person (i.e., he is a creature 
without second-order volitions), freedom of the will cannot be a problem for 
him.  “He lacks it, so to speak, by default” (Frankfurt 1988: 21).  The third is a 
willing addict in that he has a second-order volition for his first-order desire to 
  
161 
sniff glue to be effective.  Even though his will conforms to his second-order 
volition, he lacks free will.  This is because the conformity is not his own doing.  
He is not free to have the will he wants because his first-order desire to sniff 
glue will be his will regardless of whether he wants this to be the case or not 
(Frankfurt 1988: 24-25). 
 What Frankfurt has supplied us with⎯a coherent and plausible account 
of free will⎯is no small feat.  To appreciate this achievement, compare 
Frankfurt’s account to one put forward by Roderick Chisholm.  Every free 
action, on Chisholm’s account, is a literal miracle (Frankfurt 1988: 23).  Free 
acts are the outcome of a series of physical causes, but some event in the 
series, “and presumably one of those that took place within the brain, was 
caused by the agent and not by any other events” (Chisholm 1966: 18).  This 
account elevates us to quite a lofty status by attributing to us “a prerogative 
which some would attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime 
mover unmoved” (Chisholm 1966: 23). 
 While this account appears to be coherent, it is far from plausible.  The 
amazing metaphysics required to support this account of free will would only 
be rivaled by the amazing nature of the corresponding epistemology.  However, 
Chisholm is by no means alone here.  In fact, there is not a single satisfactory 
account of libertarian free will yet on offer.40  And as the other group of 
                                       
40 As Michael Tooley (2010: § 7.2) notes: 
One problem with an appeal to libertarian free will is that no 
satisfactory account of the concept of libertarian free will is yet 
available.  Thus, while the requirement that, in order to be free in 
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incompatibilists⎯hard determinists⎯denies the existence of free will 
altogether, the only satisfactory account of free will will be a compatibilist 
account.  Moreover, of the three main types of compatibilist accounts of free 
will, the type developed by Frankfurt is an example of the most common, and 
most plausible, type.41   
 Frankfurt’s account also provides us with an account of why free will is 
thought to be desirable.  As Tooley (2010: §7.2) notes, why free will, on a 
libertarian account, should be thought valuable “is far from clear.”  Consider 
again the Chisholm account.  As Frankfurt (1988: 23) notes: 
But why, in any case, should anyone care whether he can 
interrupt the natural order of causes in the way Chisholm 
describes?  Chisholm offers no reason for believing that there is a 
discernible difference between the experience of a man who 
miraculously initiates a series of causes when he moves his hand 
and a man who moves his hand without any such breach of the 
                                                                                                                           
the libertarian sense, an action not have any cause that lies 
outside the agent is unproblematic, this is obviously not a 
sufficient condition, since this condition would be satisfied if the 
behavior in question was caused by random events within the 
agent.  So one needs to add that the agent is, in some sense, the 
cause of the action.  But how is the causation in question to be 
understood?  Present accounts of the metaphysics of causation 
typically treat causes as states of affairs.  If, however, one adopts 
such an approach, then it seems that all that one has when an 
action is freely done, in the libertarian sense, is that there is some 
uncaused mental state of the agent that causally gives rise to the 
relevant behavior, and why freedom, thus understood, should be 
thought valuable, is far from clear. 
 The alternative is to shift from event-causation to what is 
referred to as ‘agent-causation’.  But then the problem is that there 
is no satisfactory account of agent-causation. 
 
41 A claim I do not have the space to defend here.  For a discussion of free will 
and the three compatibilist positions, see Derk Pereboom’s (2001: 571-74) 
account in the Encyclopedia of Ethics. 
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normal causal sequence.  There appears to be no concrete basis for 
preferring to be involved in the one state of affairs rather than in 
the other. 
 
Frankfurt’s account, on the other hand, does provide a reason for desiring free 
will.  The experience of exercising free will entails the satisfaction of higher-
order desires that signify that his will is his own (Frankfurt 1988: 22).  The 
frustrations of such desires suffered by a person experiencing the lack of free 
will are those of a person who is being violated by forces that he has attempted 
to alienate from himself (Frankfurt 1988: 22). 
 In addition, Frankfurt’s account provides us with a strong basis for 
doubting that most nonhuman animals have free will.  If an animal lacks the 
requisite reflexive capacity, then it would also lack free will.  In other words, if 
a creature lacks the capacity to know that it has a will, then it would also seem 
to lack an ability to exercise the control of its will that could serve as the basis 
for ascribing free will to that creature.  As Frankfurt (1988: 23) notes, 
“Chisholm says nothing that makes it seem less likely that a rabbit performs a 
miracle when it moves its leg than that a man does so when he moves his 
hand.” 
 Before revisiting the issue of volitional necessity, this time examining its 
relationship to free will, let us take stock of where we are in terms of the 
amount of freedom it is possible for us to enjoy: 
 Suppose now that someone is performing an action that he 
wants to perform; and suppose further that his motive in 
performing this action is a motive by which he truly wants to be 
motivated.  This person is in no way unwilling or indifferent either 
with respect to what he is doing or with respect to the desire that 
moves him to do it.  In other words, neither the action nor the 
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desire that motivates it is imposed upon him against his will or 
without his acceptance.  With respect neither to the one nor to the 
other is he merely a passive bystander or a victim. 
 Under these conditions, I believe, the person is enjoying as 
much freedom as it is reasonable for us to desire.  Indeed, it seems 
to me that he is enjoying as much freedom as it is possible for us 
to conceive.  This is as close to freedom of the will as finite beings, 
who do not create themselves, can intelligibly hope to come.  
(Frankfurt 2004: 20) 
 
There are two ideas here that bear highlighting, the first of which is that we do 
not create ourselves.  This seems fairly uncontroversial, but the implications of 
this are often thought to be very controversial.  This raises the issue of causal 
determinism and the view that free will and determinism are incompatible.  
Determinism does not threaten our freedom, but our power.  We human 
persons are not omnipotent: 
As finite creatures, we are unavoidably subject to forces 
other than our own.  What we do is, at least in part, the outcome of 
causes that stretch back indefinitely into the past.  This means 
that we cannot design our lives from scratch, entirely 
unconstrained by any antecedent and external conditions.  
However, there is no reason why a sequence of causes, outside our 
control and indifferent to our interests and wishes, might not 
happen to lead to the harmonious volitional structure in which the 
free will of a person consists.  That same structural unanimity 
might also conceivably be an outcome of equally blind chance.  
Whether causal determinism is true or whether it is false, then, the 
wills of at least some of us may at least sometimes be free.  In fact, 
this freedom is clearly not at all uncommon.  (Frankfurt 2006: 16) 
 
All of this points to the second item of note in the last excerpt.  This is the idea 
that when we act freely, the key is that we are not passive victims.  There is no 
sense in which we are being violated or defeated or coerced.  The essential 
element, then, is that we are autonomous when we are free (i.e., “whether we 
are active rather than passive in our motives and choices⎯whether, however 
  
165 
we acquire them, they are the motives and choices that we really want and are 
therefore in no way alien to us”) (Frankfurt 2004: 20 n.5). 
 Finally, just as causal necessity does not threaten our freedom or 
autonomy, volitional necessity does not do so either.  We can see this by 
thinking about what free will is⎯being free to have the will one wants.  
Volitional necessity, when present, simply ensures that the person does not 
want another first-order desire to be his will.  It is in these cases that we can 
feel our autonomy is being enhanced by eliminating any uncertainty as to what 
we should care about.  Contrast this with another type of necessity that does 
threaten our freedom.  When the necessity comes from our first-order desires, 
and not our higher-order volitions, then we experience a lack of free will.  As 
with each of our three physiologically addicted glue addicts, they are not free to 
have the will they want.  At worst, they will be dissatisfied with the motive that 
moves them, thus ensuring that they are passive victims of forces that coerce 
and defeat them.  At best, they will recognize that the will that moves them is 
not of their own doing, but is merely a fortuitous coincidence.  Accordingly, 
volitional necessity, like causal necessity, does not threaten our autonomy, but 
rather enhances it. 
 In the next chapter we will put the final pieces of our theory in place 
before⎯in the last chapter⎯setting out the theory in detail and seeing it in 
action. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: PUTTING THE FINAL PIECES IN PLACE 
 With the Frankfurtian foundations solidly in place, we are well on our 
way to setting out a complete theory of personal welfare—a task that will be 
accomplished in the next chapter.  However, we do not yet have all the tools we 
will need at our disposal.  That is the goal of this chapter.  While it should be 
clear that the next chapter will contain a desire-satisfaction theory based on 
Frankfurt’s conception of the will, there is more to the story.  
 The rest of the story will be filled in by surveying the desire-satisfaction 
literature with an eye to separating the wheat from the chaff.  The more 
detailed and precise explanation for the content and structure of this chapter is 
as follows.  As discussed previously, desire-satisfaction theories that in no way 
limit the desire satisfactions that are claimed to increase personal welfare (i.e., 
unrestricted desire satisfactionism) are not plausible.  Critics have suggested 
that there are many types of desires the satisfaction of which, at best, do not 
make a life go better for the person who lives it, or, at worst, actually decrease 
personal welfare.  Every major desire-satisfaction theorist has taken some 
subset of these objections to heart, and, in turn, each of them presents a 
version of a restricted desire-satisfaction theory.  As I intend to follow this same 
general strategy, this chapter will contain an examination of the most common 
types⎯as well as the most promising types⎯of restrictions.  The goal is to 
come up with a list of restrictions and other considerations that must be taken 
into account in constructing the theory to be presented in the next chapter. 
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I. IDEALIZED DESIRES 
 As mentioned above, both critics and proponents of desire theory claim 
that the satisfaction of some desires either has no effect on personal welfare or 
even makes the person’s life go worse.  Heathwood presents a nice sampling of 
these so-called defective desires.1  Weak-willed Willie, who has an irrational 
fear of dentists, wants to avoid the dentist more than he wants relief from his 
suffering (Heathwood: 6).  Unimaginative Maggie fails to adequately appreciate 
how bad the paparazzi will make her life when she satisfies her desire of 
becoming a pop star (Heathwood: 6).  Ignorant Ignacio wants to drink water 
from a river that, unbeknownst to him, is poisonous and will make him sick for 
months (Heathwood: 6).  It is these sorts of desires, among others, that have 
persuaded some that desire satisfactionism must be abandoned entirely and 
others to adopt a restricted form of the theory. 
 The strategy most commonly employed to deal with the problem of 
defective desires is to restrict desire satisfactionism to desires that have been 
idealized in some way.2  Ideal desires are those desires that have supposedly 
been rendered free from all defects by going through the process of idealization.  
In other words, ideal desires are those desires you would have if your desires 
were either subjected to or produced by Process X.  Process X has taken several 
                                       
1 Brandt (1979: 88) notes that the idea of defective desires goes back to the 
Greeks, who considered “intense desire for reputation, or power, or wealth” to 
fall into this category. 
 
2 For a nearly exhaustive list of the ways this can be achieved, see Fehige & 
Wessel’s Preferences (1998: xxv-xxvi). 
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slightly different forms, but it appears to have its modern origins in Sidgwick.3  
Sidgwick (1907: 711-12) explores the claim that a person’s good is “what he 
would now desire and seek on the whole if all the consequences of all the 
different lines of conduct open to him were adequately foreseen and adequately 
realized in imagination at the present point in time.”  Rawls (1999: 366) then 
uses Sidgwick’s idea in formulating his notion of deliberative rationality, 
claiming the rational plan for a person 
is the plan that would be decided upon as the outcome of careful 
reflection in which the agent reviewed, in the light of all the 
relevant facts, what it would be like to carry out these plans and 
thereby ascertained the course of action that would best realize his 
more fundamental desires. 
 
This statement contains the seeds for all the idealized versions of desire 
satisfactionism.  This is because Rawls’s (1999: 366) deliberative rationality 
requires that there be “no errors of calculation or reasoning,” requires that 
“facts are correctly assessed,” requires that the agent possess “full 
information,” requires that “the agent is under no misconception as to what he 
really wants,” and presumes that “the agent’s knowledge of his situation and 
the consequences of carrying out each plan . . . [is] accurate and complete.”  
Rawls (1999: 366) claims that his version of Process X “is the objectively 
rational plan for him and determines his real good.” 
 Brandt subsequently uses a very similar idea in discussing his notion of 
rational desires.  Brandt (1979: 88) claims that, after exposing a person to 
                                       
3 Another possibility for the modern origins of these theories is Mill’s (2006: 
321-22) competent-judges test as a means for determining the quality of 
different pleasure. 
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cognitive psychotherapy (his version of Process X), there are some desires 
“which a fully rational person would not experience.”  Cognitive psychotherapy, 
for Brandt (1979: 113), is the “whole process of confronting desires with 
relevant information, by repeatedly representing it in an ideally vivid way, and 
at an appropriate time.”  Similar views have also been accepted elsewhere.4 
 On the surface, the appeal to desires that have been idealized in some 
way as a solution to the problem of defective desires seems very promising.  
Take defective desires, add just the right amount of information and/or error-
free processing power, and⎯Shazam!⎯the resulting desires, no longer 
defective, are ensured of increasing personal welfare upon satisfaction.  Of 
course, it is not that easy.  The devil is always in the details, and nowhere is 
that more true than here.  Several objections have been leveled against both 
the concept of ideal desires and the process used to produce those desires.  
While the following list is not exhaustive, it does include a brief summary of 
most, if not all, of the more popular objections: 
 Statements about what a person would desire after undergoing Process X 
lack determinate meaning and/or a truth value.  Theories making use of 
idealized desires rely on counterfactual statements about what a person would 
desire if she underwent Process X.  However, it has been argued that 
statements of this sort lack a determinate meaning and truth value.  For 
example, J. David Velleman (1988: 365) argues that fully representing 
                                       
4 See, e.g., Hare (1981: 214-16), Darwall (1983: 85-100), Griffin (1986: 26-31), 
Lewis (1989: 121-26), and Overvold (1982: 188). 
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information to yourself does not refer to any determinate state of affairs 
because “the same facts can be represented in many different ways with 
different motivational consequences.”  Connie Rosati (1995: 309) makes a 
similar point in discussing the problem of “experiential ordering.”  Roughly, the 
idea here is that facts must be presented in some sort of order, the particular 
order may affect our final judgment or attitude about those facts, and there is 
no single “correct” way to present those facts.  For additional statements of this 
type of objection, see, e.g., Carson (2000: 226-29), Adams (1999: 86), Loeb 
(1995: 4), and Griffin (1986: 16). 
 Some defective desires can survive Process X.  Gibbard (1990: 19-20) 
provides an example of a defective desire that could survive Brandt’s cognitive 
psychotherapy.  He asks us to imagine a person who is so obsessed with germs 
that he washes his hands several times each hour.  However, even after 
undergoing the process of being vividly and repeatedly made aware of the 
relevant facts about the relatively low risk that germs pose and the opportunity 
costs associated with the frequent washings, he still does not want to have 
those “creepy-crawly things” on his hands and does not “want to be a person 
who would be willing to tolerate them on his hands” (Gibbard 1990: 20).  For 
additional statements of this objection, see, e.g., Adams (1999: 87), Loeb (1995: 
9-11), Sumner (1996: 130-32), Heathwood (2006: 545), and Carson (2000: 
226). 
 Process X could fundamentally change the person.  This idea is stated in a 
number of ways, but the underlying idea is that the entity that undergoes 
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Process X is radically different from the entity that existed before the process.  
Rosati (1995: 310-11) is concerned that the person exposed to this process will 
not still be you in any meaningful sense.5  Loeb (1995: 13-14) states that it 
would be impossible for “ordinary people” to undergo the required change in 
their intellectual and imaginative powers⎯so much so that the beings 
undergoing this would have to be “vastly different from ordinary people.”  
Carson (2000: 229) takes this line of thought to its logical conclusion by 
questioning “whether it makes sense to say that someone who is fully informed 
is a human being.”  This objection is pursued extensively in Sobel’s (1994: 794) 
article wherein he argues that the notion of a fully informed self is a “chimera” 
because all the available lives that need to be considered cannot exist in one’s 
consciousness.  The problem with the change in the person from the actual to 
the ideal, if this is even possible, is that “it would be surprising if the well-being 
of the two of us . . . consisted in the same things” (Sobel 1994: 793).6  Indeed, 
it would seem counterintuitive at best and dogmatic at worst to insist that the 
good for the person who underwent Process X must always be identical to the 
good of the person who began the process.7 
                                       
5 A similar objection is presented by Adams (1999: 86). 
 
6 This point is also made, albeit in slightly different forms, by Rosati (1995: 
299) and Loeb (1995: 16). 
 
7 If you are still unpersuaded on this point, consider the case of Dullard Dan.  
Dullard Dan, a 40-year-old junior high school graduate, loves Pabst Blue 
Ribbon, TV dinners, and NASCAR.  Now we take Dan and send him through 
Process X, which can be properly characterized as a kind of turbo-charged 
education/souped-up broadening-of-horizons project.  Then we have to answer 
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 Process X could change the person for the worse.  This objection puts 
pressure on the idea that the process of idealization will, at the very least, leave 
a person in a better condition than she was before.  When Process X requires 
full information, Carson (2000: 229-30) questions, for example, whether a 
person would lose her sanity if she were vividly aware, in a very detailed 
fashion, of all the suffering caused by World War II.  Similarly, Loeb (1995: 19-
20) wonders whether the idealized version of oneself might be too depressed to 
care about the actual person’s welfare if that idealized version had been 
exposed to every kind of pain imaginable (e.g., burned to death, drowned, eaten 
alive, etc.).  Gibbard (1990: 20-21) worries that a person who is vividly aware of 
what people’s innards are like might never want to eat around people again or 
that an honest civil servant might start taking bribes if he became aware of the 
nice things this could lead to.  Arneson (1999: 133-34) believes this to be the 
most serious objection to theories based on idealized desires, and Rosati (1995: 
312-13) and Velleman (1988: 360) offer similar objections. 
 Objective-list theories may be masquerading as the problem of defective 
desires.  Many of the theories based on idealized desires seem to be little more 
than the objective-list theory wolf dressed in desire theory sheep’s clothing.  
Rather than mounting a frontal assault on desire theory by providing a list of 
                                                                                                                           
the question: Is the good the same for the Dan who entered the process and the 
Dan who exited the process?  Of course it can be claimed⎯perhaps even 
plausibly⎯that the good for these two might be the same, but that is not 
strong enough for the proponents of this version of desire theory.  The 
conclusion that they must reach is that the good for these versions of Dan must 
always be identical.  This is not plausible. 
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things that make a person’s life go better whether he wants them or not, the 
cunning objective-list theorist secretly parachutes behind enemy limes, dons 
the uniform of a quietly slain desire satisfaction theorist, and then discovers 
some “defective” desires.  Needless to say, the proposed remedy to this problem 
turns out to be to substitute the desires you would have if you implement 
Process X for those desires that you actually do have.  While this is a much 
better marketing plan for the objective-list theorist, the result is the same: a list 
of things that will make your life go better no matter what your actual desires 
might be.  Sen (1985: 191-92) presents the objection this way: 
To ask what one would desire in unspecified 
circumstances⎯abstracting from the concreteness of everyone's 
life⎯is to misunderstand the nature of desire and its place in 
human life.  Of course, we can pretend to answer this question.  
Since all this is imaginary anyway, we need not live in fear of being 
proved wrong.  This can be done by making⎯explicitly or by 
implication⎯some simple assumption, e.g., that our desires would 
be in line with what Scanlon has called “an objective criterion” of 
well-being, appealing to a certain “consensus” of values about the 
content of well-being.  But if that is what we are going to do, we 
could just as easily have started from the objective criterion itself, 
and “founded” it on the consensus of values on well-being, rather 
than having the imaginary exercise of counterfactual desiring. 
 
Feldman (2004: 17) makes this form of the objection explicit, while Sobel 
(1994: 795) (“the purportedly naturalistically described informed viewpoint 
invokes unreduced normative notions”) and Adams (1999: 86) (idealized 
versions of desire satisfaction guilty of paternalism) offer the same objection 
using more euphemistic terms. 
Does this list of objections render idealized versions of desire 
satisfactionism implausible beyond repair?  The answer to this question can 
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best be assessed by examining the two most plausible versions.  First, Peter 
Railton (2003: 54) proposes a version that purportedly avoids the objections 
listed above: 
The proposal I would make, then, is the following: an 
individual’s good consists in what he would want himself to want, 
or to pursue, were he to contemplate his present situation from a 
standpoint fully and vividly informed about himself and his 
circumstances, and entirely free of cognitive error or lapses of 
instrumental rationality.  The wants in question, then, are wants 
regarding what he would seek were he to assume the place of his 
actual, incompletely informed and imperfectly rational self, taking 
into account the changes that self is capable of, the costs of those 
changes, and so on. 
 
Carson (2000: 244), in turn, provides us with a similar, albeit turbo-
charged, version of the theory wherein God is substituted for the idealized 
version of you, and we look to what God would prefer you to prefer.8  Carson’s 
version trades in the advantage of Railton’s theory⎯that the idealized entity is 
actually “you”⎯for the advantages of addressing the concerns about humans 
not having the capacity to undergo the required process, about the process 
changing the person for the worse, and about statements concerning what the 
idealized entity would want lacking truth values. 
                                       
8 While Carson actually specifies that we are to consider what a loving God 
would prefer you to prefer, this aspect of his theory can be safely ignored.  This 
is because Carson’s use of a loving God is either circular or fails to accomplish 
its goal.  It is quite obviously circular if loving entails increasing the welfare of 
the person in question (as most ordinary uses of loving, such as in a parent-
child relationship, seem to do).  If it does not incorporate notions of increasing 
welfare, then it is very unclear how adding the qualifier of “loving” to God is 
supposed to ensure that the preferences of this entity will increase a person’s 
welfare in a way that just plain ol’ God’s preferences would not (leaving aside, 
of course, that the mere mention of divine intervention with regard to any 
problem is supposed to remedy that problem without the need for questioning 
how it is supposed to occur). 
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However, it is not necessary to assess the relative merits of these two 
competing theories because, even if they avoid all the objections listed above,9 
there are at least two additional decisive objections.  First, both of these 
theories have to allow for the possibility that either God or your idealized self 
does not like you.10  A little imagination is required to understand this 
possibility, but not much.  Imagine how you or I might be perceived by God or 
your idealized self (which seems to be nothing more than a Mini-Me version of 
God).  We would be perceived as being physically weak, stupid, morally iffy at 
best, weak-willed, and probably just generally silly.  Now what impact does this 
have on what these beings would prefer me to prefer?  It appears as though 
nothing is entailed in this scenario, and therein lies the problem.  God or Mini-
Me God may find me too pathetic to contemplate and therefore may assign a 
subordinate to pick preferences randomly out of a hat that are supposed to be 
what he wants me to want.  God or Mini-Me God may hate me in the way that 
some humans hate rats, spiders, snakes, or some parasites and make it his 
mission to prefer that I prefer things that will make my life go as poorly for me 
as possible.  Of course, God or Mini-Me God may take a shine to my perfect 
                                       
9 It is highly unlikely that either Railton’s or Carson’s theory do avoid all the 
earlier objections.  For example, it is unlikely that both theories avoid the 
objection that some defective desires can survive idealization and the objection 
that idealization is just a disguise for objective-list theory, as these are the 
Scylla and Charybdis of idealized theories.  If a theory is not actually an 
objective-list theory, then some defective desires are bound to survive 
idealization.  Alternatively, if no defective desires survive idealization, then it is 
likely an objective-list theory in disguise. 
 
10 Fight Club’s Tyler Durden states this objection with gusto: “You have to 
consider the possibility that God does not like you.  He never wanted you.  In 
all probability, he hates you.  This is not the worst thing that can happen.” 
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instantiation of patheticness and prefer me to prefer things that will make my 
life go swimmingly.  The problem for these theories is that there does not 
appear to be any non-circular way to ensure that this third possibility is the 
case and that the first two (or any of the other myriad of possibilities) never 
occur. 
The second objection is one we have seen before.  The reason it is 
applicable here is the same reason it was applicable before, and it pertains to 
what all idealized desire theories are at their core.  All of these theories claim 
that a person’s life goes better for her if desires that she would have if some 
counterfactual event were to occur are satisfied.  Now, of course, a person may 
actually have some of the desires that the idealized theory in question would 
deem welfare-enhancing, but this is a contingent matter, as nothing in these 
theories ensures that any person will have even one of these desires.  In other 
words, these idealized desire theories claim that a person’s life goes better for 
her if she has desires⎯that she actually does not have⎯satisfied.  More 
straightforwardly false claims are hard to find in modern philosophy.  And it is 
false because it violates our Internalist Principle' (IP'): The value of a life (or 
part of a life) for the one who lives it is determined to a significant degree by 
what the person in question cares about.  Another way of stating this objection 
is that “unwanted satisfactions of merely ideal desires are not . . . necessarily 
intrinsically good for a person,” (Heathwood 2006: 545)⎯an objection that has 
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been repeatedly accepted in the literature.11  To see this point more vividly, 
imagine a person who (1) gets all of the things that would be recommended by 
the idealized desire satisfaction theory in operation, and (2) absolutely loathes 
each and every confounded thing recommended by the theory when she gets it.  
The theory would claim that her life went very well for her.  This is a claim that 
simply cannot be taken seriously. 
II. FIRST FIX: FUTURE DESIRES 
 Although the appeal to ideal desires is unsuccessful, there are lessons to 
be learned.  The first lesson, which is really just a reinforcement of a lesson we 
have already learned, is that the right theory of personal welfare must take our 
actual desires into account.  Constantly telling a person throughout his life 
what desires he should have and then satisfying these desires for him, without 
more, does him no favors. 
 The second lesson is less obvious.  Recall that the concern that prompted 
the move to idealization was various types of “defective” desires.  Now let us 
assume that ideal desire-satisfaction theories are not just incognito objective-
list theories.  This will mean that all objects are possible objects of desire for 
purposes of increasing personal welfare.  If this is the case, then what are the 
remaining possible ways in which a desire may actually be defective relative to 
welfare?  One way is that the satisfaction of the desire in question may lead to 
an increase in the ratio of desire frustrations to desire satisfactions than would 
                                       
11 See, e.g., Heathwood (2006: 545), Griffin (1986: 11-12), Sobel (1994: 792-
93), and Feldman (2004: 17). 
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have been the case had the desire in question been frustrated instead.  In other 
words, the desire is defective because, due to the relative mix of future desire 
satisfactions and frustrations, the satisfaction of the desire leads to a decrease 
in personal welfare when compared to what would have happened if the desire 
had not been satisfied. 
 A closer examination of the defective desires mentioned above will help to 
make this point clear.  Filling in the details for each will make the defect 
explicit as well as demonstrate how an appeal to actual future desires, rather 
than idealized desires, will yield the correct answer in each case.  Recall 
Heathwood’s examples of defective desires.  Weak-willed Willie has an intense 
fear of dentists that prevents him from going to the dentist to seek relief from a 
tooth problem.  The intuitive appeal of this case as an example of a defective 
desire stems from the assumptions we make about Willie and his two possible 
paths.  Let us call Path One the path in which Willie does not go to the dentist 
to have the cause of his discomfort treated, and Path Two the one in which he 
does go to the dentist.  The intuition here is that, on Path One, the suffering 
caused by his tooth will eventually lead to a desire frustration total that will 
outweigh the desire satisfaction provided by his not seeing the dentist.  
Accordingly, Path Two will lead to a better personal-welfare outcome for Willie.  
If this is the correct assessment of Willie’s desires on each path, then the desire 
to avoid the dentist is defective.  Taking notice of the fact that it is not at all 
clear that this defective desire could not survive idealization, what is clear is 
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that an appeal to Willie’s actual future desires accurately tells us that Willie is 
worse off for not going to the dentist. 
 The same holds true for both Unimaginative Maggie and Ignorant 
Ignacio.  The guiding intuition in the case of Unimaginative Maggie is that the 
balance of desire satisfactions and frustrations in the life in which she is a pop 
star is less favorable than in the life in which she is not a pop star due to her 
failing to properly foresee that, although her desire to be a pop star is satisfied, 
there will be associated desire frustrations relating to the paparazzi, being 
stalked, losing privacy, etc.  Ignorant Ignacio has a similar problem.  The 
intuitive assumption here is that when Ignacio drinks the water that 
is⎯unbeknownst to him⎯tainted, the desire satisfaction he gets from drinking 
the water will be more than outweighed by the myriad of desire frustrations 
that will befall him as a result of this drink.  If this is in fact the correct 
assessment of Maggie’s and Ignacio’s desires on each of their two potential 
paths, then these desires are defective as they relate to personal welfare, which 
can quite accurately be shown simply by appealing to their actual future 
desires.12 
                                       
12 Indeed, the appeal to actual future desires for a desire theorist seems almost 
unavoidable, as this scene from the movie Charlie Wilson’s War nicely 
illustrates: 
GUST: Listen, not for nothing, but do you know the story about the 
Zen master and the little boy? 
CHARLIE: Oh, is this something from Nitsa, the Greek witch of 
Aquilippa, Pennsylvania? 
GUST: Yeah, as a matter of fact, it is.  There was a little boy, and 
on his 14th birthday he gets a horse.  And everybody in the village 
says, “How wonderful! The boy got a horse.”  And the Zen master 
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 Now, of course, the right theory will not appeal to all of a person’s actual 
desires since, as we have seen before, they may not be desires that the person 
cares about.  However, the appeal to (the proper subset of) actual future 
desires seems to be such an obvious and elegant solution to the problem of 
defective desires that one may wonder how the messy and complicated versions 
of ideal desire theory even came to exist.  Upon reflection, the course of this 
tedious jaunt down the wrong track can be easily imagined.  It seems to have 
started with an intuition, or maybe just a plain ol’ desire, that Sidgwick and 
Rawls shared regarding the potential usefulness of the theory.  (I used to share 
it as well, and I suspect many other people do, too.)  It can be seen in the way 
that both Sidgwick and Rawls formulate their ideas in this area.  Sidgwick 
(1907: 711-12) considers the view that a person’s good is “what he would now 
desire and seek on the whole if all the consequences of all the different lines of 
conduct open to him were adequately foreseen and adequately realized in 
imagination at the present point in time,” and Rawls (1999: 366) says that the 
rational plan for a person “is the plan that would be decided upon as the 
outcome of careful reflection in which the agent reviewed, in the light of all the 
                                                                                                                           
says, “We’ll see.”  Two years later, the boy falls off the horse, 
breaks his leg.  And everybody in the village says, “How terrible!”  
And the Zen master says, “We’ll see.”  Then a war breaks out, and 
all the young men have to go off and fight, except the boy can’t 
’cause his leg’s all messed up.  And everybody in the village says, 
“How wonderful!” 
CHARLIE: And the Zen master says, “We’ll see.” 
The obvious moral to the story is that the satisfaction of any desire⎯almost no 
matter how good or bad it may seem at the time⎯can start a chain of events 
that leaves one with radically different appraisals at different times. 
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relevant facts, what it would be like to carry out these plans and thereby 
ascertained the course of action that would best realize his more fundamental 
desires.”  Notice that each formulation involves an agent looking forward in 
time and trying to ascertain what he should do from the standpoint of 
increasing his personal welfare.  In short, Sidgwick and Rawls want their ideas 
to be useful.  As in: Dear Agent, the best course of action for you can be figured 
out, more or less, if you get the facts about your options and then properly 
ponder those facts relative to your psychic makeup⎯now get crackin’!  
Philosophers coming after Sidgwick and Rawls, given their tremendous stature, 
simply picked up this trail and figured that the answer must be down at the 
end of the trail somewhere.  The problem is that, as between a useful theory 
and a right theory, we (hopefully) obviously want the right one.  And there is no 
guarantee (or even any a priori likelihood) that the right theory will either be as 
useful as some might like or even be useful at all.  The right theory’s appeal to 
actual future desires involving counterfactuals has just this feature relative to 
the more useful Sidgwick/Rawls approach.  While this is another unfortunate 
fact about reality, it does nothing to undermine the truth of the theory. 
III. REMOTE DESIRES 
 The problem of remote desires was touched on in Chapter Two and 
involves the fact that it is possible to desire anything at all, even if the 
existence of the object of the desire is not possible.  Thus, it is at least 
conceptually possible to want anything, to want any conjunction of things all 
the way up to all things (including things that are merely possible and not 
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actual), and to want those “things” that are neither actual nor possible.  As 
mentioned before, the problem lurking here is “that one’s desires spread 
themselves so widely over the world that their objects extend far outside the 
bound of what, with any plausibility, one would take as touching one’s well-
being” (Griffin 1986: 17).  The problem, in other words, is that there may be too 
much conceptual space between a desire and our personal welfare, thus 
rendering the desire too remote to be a factor in our well-being.  Sumner (1996: 
135), who refers to this issue as a “problem of scope,” states that these 
“problems of scope can be regarded as an invitation to qualify the theory so as 
to contour desire-satisfaction better to well-being.” 
 Before we accept the invitation Sumner mentions, it will be worthwhile to 
survey the various examples of alleged remote desires in the literature.  The 
force of the objection from remote desires relies on at least three different 
intuitions concerning welfare.  Sumner (1996: 125) provides a good example of 
the type of case that is supposed to produce the first of these intuitions: 
Sumner asks us to suppose that his brother, who suffers from a debilitating 
disease for which he cannot get adequate treatment at home, moves to Papua 
New Guinea where a promising new treatment is available.  Sumner’s brother 
is subsequently cured⎯thus satisfying Sumner’s desire that this state of affairs 
occur⎯yet Sumner never knows of this because his brother broke off contact 
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with Sumner after moving abroad.13  Sumner questions how a desire 
satisfaction like this can make him better off. 
 At first glance, examples like this seem to rely on the spatial proximity 
between the desires and the state of affairs in question.  Parfit (1984: 494-95), 
for example, gives several scenarios that involve his being in “exile” and 
desiring outcomes that involve the children he left behind⎯spatially remote 
states of affairs.  However, it is highly implausible that the distance between 
the desires and the relevant states of affairs is relevant in any way.  To 
illustrate this, let us change Sumner’s example so that he lives in one half of a 
duplex and his brother lives in the other half.  One day, Sumner’s brother tells 
him he has cancer, erects a massive wall over the common wall of the duplex 
so that Sumner never again sees his brother’s comings and goings, and also, as 
in the previous example, cuts off contact with Sumner.  Again, unbeknownst to 
Sumner, his brother is cured, which is what Sumner wants.  Now, whose life is 
going better: Papua New Guinea Sumner or Duplex Sumner?  One has to 
conclude that these Sumners are equal with respect to personal welfare unless 
one wants to introduce a spatial component into desire theory.  This is not 
plausible.  What is plausible to suggest is that the relevant factor in the 
Sumner and Parfit examples is that the states of affairs in question are remote, 
not in spatial terms, but in terms of what Sumner and Parfit are aware of. 
                                       
13 Parfit (1984: 494) gives a similar example involving a stranger instead of a 
brother⎯a substitution that clouds the specific kind of intuition we are 
supposed to be relying on in the case. 
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 The second intuition driving the objection from remote desires can be 
seen in an example from Shelly Kagan (1998: 37).  Kagan asks us to imagine 
that, as a fan of prime numbers, he wants the number of atoms in the universe 
to be a prime number.  Kagan says it is “absurd” to believe that his life is going 
better if this desire is satisfied.  We could take this to be another example of 
the intuition Sumner was driving at, but Kagan could also plausibly be driving 
at something else entirely.  Perhaps Kagan is relying on the fact that it will 
strike most people as highly implausible that anyone could really find that the 
number of atoms in the universe is a fact that is important to him.  In short, 
this state of affairs is remote from what we care about. 
 To appreciate the third driving intuition behind the objection from remote 
desires, a very brief recap of what standard versions of desire theory claim is in 
order.  The theory claims that personal welfare is enhanced when (1) a person 
desires state of affairs P, and (2) state of affairs P obtains.  So now suppose 
that when I am seven years old I want a gorilla named Davey to beat up the 
skateboard kids who pull on my underwear and, being the moral little kid I am, 
I want the gorilla to take his orders from The Talking Walnut so that it wouldn’t 
be my bad thing.  Lo and behold this comes to pass as a Festivus miracle!  
According to the theory, my life is going better than it was before this well-
deserved beating came to pass.  But is it really?  The details I neglected to 
mentioned are that 75 years have passed, I had long ago totally forgotten about 
this desire, and the skateboard kids are now wheelchair invalids.  The problem 
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here, or at least one of the problems, is that this desire satisfaction seems too 
remote in time to have any impact on my well-being. 
 A particularly persuasive subset of these desires that are too remote in 
time includes the desires of the dead.  So if one were inclined to think that the 
beating in the last example did make my life go better for me, does it matter if I 
die sometime in the interval between the desire and its satisfaction?  In other 
words, can my personal welfare be affected after I am dead?  No.  It seems 
wildly implausible to claim that my life is going better for me at any point after I 
am dead, as the following example should decisively demonstrate.  Suppose I 
become a loopy narcissist immediately after defending my brilliant dissertation, 
and I want people from that day forward to approach me, genuflect, recite a few 
lines of my dissertation, and then yell “Hallelujah Hyde!”  After years of this 
pure awesomeness, I form very strong desires (one for each person-day 
combination) that, upon my death, every living person on each day at noon for 
the rest of time stop what he or she is doing and perform this ritual with a 
blow-up doll of me instead of actual me.  If these posthumous desire 
satisfactions and frustrations can affect my personal welfare, then the 
assessment of my welfare will likely look radically different 100 years after my 
death than it did the day I died.  Although this is not necessarily the case 
(these posthumous satisfactions and frustrations may perfectly offset each 
other during the intervening 100 years), what is necessarily the case is that a 
person who only knows the final assessment of my welfare 100 years after my 
death will have no idea how to answer the question of how well my life went for 
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me while I was alive.14  This is a serious defect.15  Any theory with this 
implication should be rejected.16 
IV. SECOND FIX: (TRUE?) BELIEF 
 Just as the move to idealized desires had something to teach us about 
how the right theory should look, the objection from remote desires does as 
well.  In particular, this section will address, mainly, the objection from desires 
that are remote from what we are aware of (illustrated in the last section by the 
examples of Sumner’s sick brother and Parfit’s exile).  The guiding intuition 
here is that desire satisfactions or frustrations that one is not aware of do not 
affect one’s personal welfare.  The following hypothetical may help strengthen 
this intuition.  Suppose one of Satan’s helpers, Stan, is assigned the task of 
ensuring, with respect to all the welfare-relevant desires I have, that I never 
become aware of whether these desires are satisfied or frustrated (at least with 
respect to those desires that could be satisfied or frustrated without my 
awareness).  If some version of desire satisfactionism is true (which should be 
                                       
14 Unless, of course, one holds that what goods one enjoys while one is alive is 
not affected by posthumous events.  However, to hold such a view simply 
underlines the fact that this is not a view about how well a life goes for the one 
who lives it. 
  
15 “Let us discuss the changes in how well George Carlin’s life is going for him 
since his death.”  If someone were to start a conversation with me using this 
line, I would, at the very least, have to question his command of the English 
language. 
 
16 For an endorsement of this position regarding posthumous desires, see, e.g., 
Overvold (1980: 108), Haslett (1990: 81), and Fuchs (1993: 215-20).  For a 
rejection of this position, see, e.g., Carson (2000: 76-77) and Portmore (2007: 
27).  
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well-settled by this point in the proceedings), then it seems as though Stan’s 
efforts will wreak havoc on my personal welfare by making it very difficult for 
my life to go better or worse.  Why do Stan’s meddlings have this effect on my 
welfare? 
To explain this fact, it may be useful to return to the distinction between 
the concepts of good for the world and good for a subject.  It is plausible to 
claim that, when a desire is satisfied, this is good for the world.  In other 
words, when a desire is satisfied, other things being equal, this makes the 
world a better place.  Yet it is not clear how this is better for the desirer, 
because the desirer has no idea if the desire has been satisfied or frustrated.17  
We could explain how this in fact becomes good for the desirer if we add in the 
requirement that the desirer actually believe the desired state of affairs has 
obtained.  Griffin (1986: 13) calls this the Experience Requirement and 
describes it as “the link between ‘fulfillment of desire’ and the requirement that 
the person in some way experience its fulfillment” if it is to make the person 
better off.18 
 Before turning to the question of whether something in addition to belief 
is required, a brief examination of what, exactly, must be believed is in order.  
The obvious first step here is to claim that, if one desires X, then one must just 
                                       
17 Recall that the technical definition of a desire satisfaction is merely that the 
desired state of affairs obtains⎯not that the desirer be aware that the state of 
affairs has obtained. 
 
18 Kagan (1992: 186) appears to be making a similar claim when he says that 
for something to genuinely benefit a person, “it must make a difference in the 
person.” 
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simply believe X has obtained.  This is the approach favored by Heathwood 
(17): “Thus I propose that we require only that the subjects believe that the 
proposition desired is true . . . .”  Although Heathwood (17) recognizes that the 
incorporation of the Experience Requirement “makes a serious break with 
traditional desire theory,” the change he proposes marks a break that is too 
serious.  While the objection from remote desires taught us that the 
constituents of our welfare must enter our experience, we would be wise not to 
completely abandon the general approach of desire theory that has served us 
so well to this point.  Accordingly, the problem with the Heathwood approach is 
not the incorporation of the Experience Requirement, it is the fact that a major 
requirement of desire satisfactionism has been jettisoned in the process.  Recall 
that desire theory claims that your life is going better for you once your desire 
has been satisfied.  Not only does Heathwood’s theory not require that your 
desire actually be satisfied in order to enhance your personal welfare (more on 
this below), you also do not need to believe that it has been satisfied.  An 
example of this is Heathwood’s (32) claim that I am benefited now if (1) I want 
my body to be buried rather than cremated, and (2) I believe that my body will 
be buried rather than cremated.  Here is a case in which a person’s life is 
claimed to be going better when no rational person could believe⎯and this 
person in fact does not believe⎯that the relevant desire has been satisfied.  
While this move may or may not have any theoretical value,19 it appears to 
                                       
19 It does, as Heathwood’s example demonstrates, allow for the addition of 
posthumous benefits and harms, but as we saw earlier the right theory will not 
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come at much too high a cost, as a return to Loopy Narcissist should 
demonstrate.  Let us change Loopy Narcissist’s story such that nearly all the 
desires I had during my life that could have been satisfied during my life (i.e., 
not future desires) were frustrated and that I believed they were frustrated.  
However, I believed that all my desires about the genuflecting masses after my 
death were going to be satisfied.  If we work the numbers in the theory right 
(which, given the sheer number of people and days involved, would not be 
hard), then Heathwood’s theory will tell us that Loopy Narcissist had perhaps 
the best life that has ever been lived, even though all I knew during my life was 
rampant desire frustration.  This is not plausible.  Accordingly, the correct 
theory will require that the person believe the desired state of affairs has 
obtained or that it merely does obtain.20 
 We now turn to the question of whether the right theory will require 
something in addition, yet related, to believing that the desired state of affairs 
either has obtained or does obtain.  The salient and obvious fact that needs to 
be evaluated here is that believing a state of affairs obtains does not entail that 
the state of affairs actually does obtain.  The question is, then, does the right 
theory require, in addition to belief, that it be true that the desired state of 
affairs either has obtained or does obtain? 
                                                                                                                           
count these toward personal welfare.  I cannot explore all of the other potential 
benefits and costs associated with this move here. 
 
20 The second option is meant to deal with states of affairs that do not begin to 
obtain at any time, as in the case, for example, of mathematical truths. 
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 We can begin to evaluate the requirement of true belief in this context by 
starting with an uncontroversial case.  Let us begin with the Cartesian-style 
assumption that we cannot be wrong about how experiences seem to us.  In 
other words, it is not possible to have experience X while at the same time 
believing that one is not having experience X.21  Now let us suppose that I 
merely desire the experience of X⎯not that the state of affairs of X actually 
obtains⎯and that I believe I am having the experience of X.  Requiring true 
belief in this case is unproblematic since this is a case in which belief does 
entail truth. 
 However, the situation is much more problematic when belief does not 
entail truth, as in every case in which the desire is not merely for the 
experience but for the desired state of affairs to obtain outside one’s head.  
Heathwood (17), who as mentioned above also incorporates a belief 
requirement in his desire-satisfaction theory, thinks truth poses such a 
problem that he proposes dropping it altogether: 
If the theory still requires the desire really to be satisfied, then the 
Argument from Remote Desires has not gone away.  Suppose Parfit 
comes to believe and to desire that the stranger has been cured.  
Then the proposal under consideration will imply that whether 
Parfit’s life is made better depends upon the further issue of 
whether the stranger has really been cured, a state of affairs 
remote to Parfit.  If one was moved by Parfit’s original case, one 
must be equally moved again.  Just tacking a belief requirement 
onto a traditional desire theory therefore isn’t enough to avoid the 
problem of remote desires after all. 
 
                                       
21 Of course, it would be possible to have experience X while at the same time 
believing that one is only experiencing X and that the state of affairs 
corresponding to experience X is not occurring in reality. 
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What is not clear in this passage is in what way the stranger’s being cured is “a 
state of affairs remote to Parfit.”  Is it because Parfit comes to believe that the 
stranger has been cured on the basis of no evidence whatsoever?  If so, then 
there are avenues left open to a desire-satisfaction approach⎯short of 
amputating the truth requirement altogether⎯that merit consideration.  I will 
not pursue any strategy of that sort here since I take Heathwood to mean 
something much more problematic for a desire-satisfaction theory of personal 
welfare.  In claiming that “a life in the experience machine is just as good for 
the person who lives it as the corresponding non-hallucinatory life,” Heathwood 
(36) is in essence claiming that all states of affairs beyond our own experiences 
are too remote from us to impact our well-being. 
 Thus Heathwood drops the requirement⎯in a purported desire-
satisfaction theory⎯that desires be satisfied in two ways.  First, as we saw 
earlier, it need not even be possible that a desire be satisfied as long as the 
person believes it will be satisfied in the future.  Second, a desire need never 
actually be satisfied as long as the person believes it either has been or will be 
satisfied in the future.  Accordingly, the theory entails that there is no well-
being-related reason not to enter the experience machine (Heathwood: 36 
n.52). 
 Three points about this aspect of Heathwood’s theory merit discussion 
here.  First, this theory faces a much more concrete and prevalent problem 
than evaluating lives lived in experience machines.  Dreams seem to present a 
problem here that would not plague other desire-based theories.  Traditional 
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desire-satisfaction theory could easily handle counting our desires about our 
dreams toward our welfare and safely ignore our desires in our dreams as they, 
qua dream desires, are not satisfied or frustrated in reality.  However, if there is 
no welfare-related reason not to enter the experience machine, then it is 
unclear on what basis Heathwood would exclude dream desire satisfaction and 
frustration.  This will lead to some counter-intuitive results concerning welfare 
(e.g., the Loopy Narcissist will be a great life once again if we merely shift his 
posthumous desires to his dream life). 
 Second, there does seem to be a compelling well-being-related reason not 
to enter the experience machine.  The reason is that a great deal of what people 
actually do care about are not experiences at all, but rather are things outside 
of their own heads.  And it is only as a result of caring about something that 
the life of a person can go better or worse at all.  This idea will be fully fleshed 
out in the next chapter. 
 Finally, dropping the truth component from desire satisfactionism causes 
the theory to suffer from a relatively subtle form of paternalism, which does 
seem to violate our Principle Concerning Paternalism.22  At first, though, the 
theory is very liberal; a large subset of one’s actual desires counts toward well-
being.  Moreover, this subset of desires is not limited to one’s experiences, as 
“desires about the external world count, too” (Heathwood 18 n.30).  The 
problem is that, although desires about the external world do count, the actual 
                                       
22 PCP: Paternalistic claims in axiology must be justified by a compelling 
theoretical interest and must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 
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external world itself does not count.  The paternalism comes in the form of 
reinterpreting our desires for us.23  If I were to say that I have welfare-related 
reasons for having my desire for X satisfied, the theory tells me not to be 
silly⎯what I really have are welfare-related reasons for the experience of having 
the desire for X satisfied.  This response would likely strike those with these 
kinds of desires as deeply unsatisfying since this is really not what they want 
at all. 
 However, what if there were a solution to this issue that did not involve 
any sort of paternalism (in keeping with the requirements of PCP)?  The most 
obvious solution of this sort is simply to resort to the fact of the matter as to 
what the person in question actually cares about.  In other words, is it enough 
for you merely to believe that this particular desire has been satisfied (i.e., you 
just want the experience of X), or do you care both to believe the desire has 
been satisfied and to actually have the desired state of affairs obtain (i.e., you 
want the experience of X and for the state of affairs X to actually obtain)?  
Another way to understand this question is to see it simply as an effort to find 
out what the person really cares about.  For example, some people (likely 
future philosophers) really care about only the experience of having their 
                                       
23 Interestingly, standard forms of desire theory may also be guilty of a similar 
kind of paternalism by not reinterpreting our desires for us.  So if I claim that I 
desire to own Jack Rabbit Slim’s and the theory takes my desire at face value, 
then it will be good for me only if I actually come to own Jack Rabbit Slim’s.  
However, perhaps it is the case that I only want the experience of owning Jack 
Rabbit Slim’s even though I claim to want to actually own it.  The problem here 
is that the theory is telling me, paternalistically, that the actual state of affairs 
affects my welfare when all I really wanted was just the experience. 
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desires satisfied, but are unaware of this fact because they have never had 
thought experiments like the experience machine brought to their attention.  
This emphasis on getting to the bottom of what the person actually cares about 
yields desires that are much less problematic from a paternalism standpoint.  
For those desires in which the object is just the experience, the truth 
requirement is entirely unproblematic (as noted above).  For those desires in 
which the object is a state of affairs outside the head, the truth condition is 
much more controversial.  The bottom line here is that what the person 
actually cares about⎯the experience or the state of affairs⎯determines what 
the object of the desire is for purposes of calculating welfare, thus allowing the 
theory to hook into reality, or not, based on the actual desire in question. 
 The advantage of this approach can be seen by examining an issue 
raised by Feldman.  Although Feldman, a committed hedonist, acknowledges 
that “pleasure taken in things that are true does seem somehow better than 
equal pleasure taken in things that are false,” he is “puzzled by an apparent 
disanalogy between pleasure and pain here” (Feldman 2004: 111).  He is 
puzzled because he has “no clear intuitions concerning the impact of the falsity 
of the object” when it comes to pain, which is in conflict with his intuitions 
concerning false pleasures (Feldman 2004: 111).  While I am inclined to agree 
with Feldman here, as I would have, other things being equal, no compelling 
basis for preferring a true pain to a false one (or vice versa), my preference does 
not alter the theory in a way that would make my preference everyone’s 
preference.  The approach of looking to what the person in question actually 
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cares about will allow my theory to handle everyone’s preferences seamlessly 
and nonpaternalistically on this (and every other) issue. 
V. WARM DESIRES 
 While the objection from remote desires is an invitation to reduce the 
ambit of desires that are relevant to welfare in one way, another way to reduce 
the ambit is to limit the theory to warm desires⎯a term apparently coined by 
David Lewis (1988: 323) to refer to desires for which “you feel enthusiasm, you 
take pleasure in the prospect of fulfilment.”  This is the strategy employed by 
Heathwood (20-22) in response to this distinction drawn by Lewis and others.  
An evaluation of this strategy should reveal that either this distinction is 
correct and needs to be included in the right theory, or that the right theory 
needs to include the guiding intuition that prompted the move to this 
distinction. 
 Notably, in drawing this distinction Heathwood offers no analysis of the 
central concepts.  This complicates the evaluation by requiring us to aim at an 
undefined target.  The first step here, then, will be to construct a target as 
charitably as we can from the tools we have been provided, which include some 
examples of both warm and cold desires and some quotes from other 
philosophers who have drawn a similar distinction.  Heathwood (20) provides 
the following examples of warm desires: 
• anticipating a job interview tomorrow and strongly wanting it to 
go well, 
 
• wanting so badly to go back to sleep when one’s alarm clock 
sounds, 
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• checking the newspaper and hoping intently that one’s 
candidate has won the election, 
 
• dreaming about one day owning one’s own business. 
 
Heathwood (20) then gives a list of examples of cold desires: 
• preferring, after all, to let one’s guest have the last piece of 
pizza, 
 
• forcing oneself to get out of bed despite how tired one is, 
 
• saying No to a cigarette, despite its appeal, because one is 
trying to quit, 
 
• deciding to continue slogging through a tedious article. 
 
After giving these examples, Heathwood (20) goes on to cite with approval three 
philosophers who have drawn “more or less the distinction illustrated by the 
examples above.”  Sumner (1996: 121), the only one of the three addressing the 
issue of welfare, draws a distinction between wanting in the “attitudinal sense” 
(Heathwood’s warm desires) and wanting in the “behavioural sense” 
(Heathwood’s cold desires).  “Wanting to do something in the behavioural 
sense, is just having some reason or other for doing it, with no restriction 
whatever placed on the range of possible reasons” (Sumner 1996: 121).  
Examples of behavioural motivations, according to Sumner, are altruism, a 
sense of obligation, or doing what we feel we ought or must.  In the attitudinal 
sense, on the other hand, “wanting to do something requires finding the 
prospect of it pleasing or agreeable, or welcoming the opportunity to do it, or 
looking forward to it with gusto or enthusiasm” (Sumner 1996: 121).  In other 
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words, the attitudinal sense of desire is a subset of the behavioural sense that 
contains, roughly, just those desires we, in some sense, like. 
 G.F. Schueler (1995: 35) makes a similar distinction between what he 
calls “desires proper” (Heathwood’s warm desires) and “pro attitudes” 
(Heathwood’s cold desires).  Desires proper “will presumably include such 
things as cravings, urges, wishes, hopes, yens, and the like, as well as at least 
some motivated desires, but not such things as moral or political beliefs that 
could appear in practical deliberation as arguing against the dictates of ones 
[sic] urges, cravings, or wishes” (Schueler 1995: 35).  Pro attitude, by contrast, 
“refers to whatever led the agent to perform that action” (Schueler 1995: 35).24  
                                       
24 One problem, which is not particularly relevant for our purposes, is that 
these descriptions of the two senses of desire do not square with the 
descriptions Schueler gives on page one of his book, which Heathwood cites 
approvingly in full: 
The aim of this book is to try to understand how, and indeed 
whether, desires can have a role in practical reason and the 
explanation of intentional action.  To that end a rather simple and 
(I think) obvious distinction is explained in chapter 1 and then put 
to work in the following chapters.  The distinction is that between 
two senses of the term “desire”: On the one side is what might be 
called the philosophers’ sense, in which, as G. E. M. Anscombe 
(1963, 68) says, “the primitive sign of wanting is trying to get,” that 
is, the sense in which desires are so to speak automatically tied to 
actions because the term “desire” is understood so broadly as to 
apply to whatever moves someone to act.  On the other side is the 
more ordinary sense, in which one can do things one has no desire 
to do, that is, the sense in which one can reflect on one’s own 
desires, try to figure out what one wants, compare one’s own 
desires with the desires of others or the requirements of morals, 
the law, etiquette or prudence, and in the end, perhaps, even 
decide that some desires one has, even very strong ones, shouldn’t 
be acted on at all.  (Schueler 1995: 1) 
The problem is that the “more ordinary sense” to which Schueler refers⎯what 
he later calls desires proper and what Heathwood calls warm desires⎯includes 
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In short, desires proper are a subset of pro attitudes that do include certain 
types of value judgments. 
 Finally, Heathwood cites Wayne Davis, who distinguishes between the 
volitive sense of desire (Heathwood’s cold desires) and the appetitive sense of 
desire (Heathwood’s warm desires).  Davis (1984: 181-82) claims that volitive 
desire is synonymous with “want, wish, and would like,” while appetitive 
desires has “the near synonyms appetite, hungering, craving, yearning, 
longing, and urge.”  Moreover, Davis (1984: 186) claims that “volitive desires 
are typically based on reasons,” in this sense resembling beliefs, whereas 
appetitive desires “are not the sorts of things we have reasons for or against,” 
and in this sense “are more like aches and pains.”  In addition, although both 
senses of desire influence action, “volitive desire is a more reliable indicator of 
action” (Davis 1984: 187).  “Appetitive desire, on the other hand, is a more 
reliable indicator of enjoyment,” although the satisfaction of a desire in either 
sense “tends to be enjoyable” (Davis 1984: 187).  Finally, Davis (1984: 183-88) 
claims that the objects of appetitive desire are “appealing” and “viewed with 
pleasure,” while volitive desires are powerfully influenced by “value-judgments” 
and are “manifestations of the will.”25 
                                                                                                                           
“morals” and “law,” which are specifically excluded in the definition of desires 
proper given above. 
 
25 One difference between Davis, on the one hand, and Sumner and Schueler 
on the other is that Davis claims his two senses of desire are logically 
independent (i.e., one category is not a subset of the other).  However, the cost 
of this logical independence in terms of violence to the language is high, in that 
it allows him to claim coherence for such gems as “I desire a hammer, but do 
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 Now that we have presented all the evidence it is time to look for the 
common thread.  What, then, is the essential feature of warm desires that 
makes them, according to Heathwood’s theory, relevant to welfare?  The most 
obvious answer is that the essence of warm desires is that, when satisfied, they 
increase one’s welfare.  However, this cannot be the correct analysis, as this 
would make the appeal to warm desires viciously circular, at least when it 
comes to their use in a theory of welfare.  The actual essence of warm desires is 
much more subtle, but it becomes clear if one carefully examines the evidence 
while keeping the general approach of desire theory⎯satisfied desires increase 
well-being⎯firmly in mind.  Once this is done, it becomes apparent that 
Heathwood’s warm desires are simply those desires that express what the 
agent really wants to do.26  And while I think the appeal to warm desires, so 
defined, fails, a closer look at this strategy will prove fruitful. 
 The first thing to notice about defining warm desires as those that 
express what the agent really wants to do is that this definition can be 
interpreted in different ways.  Moreover, this is not merely an academic 
exercise, as I think Heathwood’s examples and the literature he cites employ at 
least two different senses of this phrase.  Let us start with the sense in which I 
                                                                                                                           
not have a desire for a hammer,” and, “We desire to eat, but do not have a 
desire to eat” (Davis 1984: 184). 
 
26 Heathwood (24) seems to endorse just such an interpretation in the 
explanation of a hypothetical that “exploit[s] the notion of warmth of desire,” 
which reads in relevant part: “For it would be very natural to hear me put it 
like this: ‘I don’t really want to be feeling this sensation, but I have to feel it in 
order to avoid infection, so give it to me,’ while Father would not say anything 
analogous.  He does ‘really want’ to see A’s.” 
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understand (or, at least, as I take Heathwood to understand) Sumner, 
Schueler, and Davis to be using this phrase.  These three seem to be using the 
phrase roughly to convey the idea that this desire reflects what the agent wants 
to do before the agent takes into account the broader context generally and 
other people in particular.  Both Schueler and Davis use the words craving and 
urge (Sumner talks about relish and gusto) in relation to Heathwood’s warm 
desires.  These warm desires become cold once they are introduced to the buzz 
kills of ought and must (Sumner), responsibility and moral obligation (Schueler), 
and reasons and value judgments (Davis).27 
 Does this understanding of warm desires succeed in ensuring that the 
satisfaction of these desires will increase personal welfare?  No.  Ultimately this 
attempt fails, as an example from Davis should help illustrate.  Using 
Heathwood’s terminology, Davis claims that cold desires are manifestations of 
the will and that both warm desires and value judgments act on the will.  
Weakness of will, according to Davis, occurs when warm desires and value 
judgments come into conflict and the warm desire wins out over the value 
judgment in motivating the action that is actually taken.  Accordingly, under 
Heathwood’s theory, when a person displays weakness of will (leaving aside the 
issue of any resulting future desire satisfactions and frustrations and given 
                                       
27 Heathwood (26) seems to endorse this understanding of cold desires in 
claiming that “what we most prefer in the cold, rationalistic way is heavily 
influenced by our values⎯by what we think would be impersonally good, or 
just, or right, or otherwise worthy of being preferred.”  As we will see at the end 
of Chapter Five, the claim that the satisfaction of these types of desires cannot 
enhance welfare is untenable. 
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Davis’s account of this phenomenon), this will make that person’s life go better.  
It might prove to be an interesting debate as to whether weakness of will ever 
increases personal welfare, but it should be an exceedingly short and 
uninteresting debate as to whether it always does so.  It is not plausible to 
claim that it does, and this helps to underline the reason that the satisfaction 
of warm desires, understood in this sense, fails to increase welfare.  In addition 
to the problem of weakness of will, it would be an odd result if value judgments 
generally and moral judgments in particular⎯the very essence of cold 
desires⎯were always irrelevant to determining one’s welfare.  Many historical 
figures⎯Lincoln, Gandhi, MLK⎯might be rather surprised by such a claim!  
Equally surprising is the claim that the stuff that bubbles up from our 
ids⎯cravings, urges, and the like⎯serves as the basis for our well-being.  If 
this is what is meant by warm desires⎯those desires that express what the 
agent really wants to do⎯then it is a nonstarter. 
 There is, however, a more plausible interpretation of warm desires that 
can be gleaned from Heathwood’s examples.  What the agent really wants to do 
in each of his examples has much less to do with values in general and 
morality in particular.  While there is still conflict in the cold desires, it is more 
value neutral, at least on its face.  If we begin by examining the four examples 
of warm desires, it is easy to see each one as expressing what the agent really 
wants to do, as there are no readily apparent conflicting desires.  The warm 
desires also seem less problematic because they appear, for the most part, to 
be the product of reasoned thought as opposed to the id’s urges and cravings.  
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So far so good, but it is not yet clear what work the addition of the warm 
desires distinction is performing, as these desires would be included in 
traditional versions of desire theory.  The weakness in this approach, however, 
becomes apparent when we focus on the four examples of cold desires.  In each 
of these cases, there is a very clear conflict between two desires that cannot 
both be satisfied.  The traditional desire theory approach would be to look at 
the intensity of each desire and then subtract the intensity of the frustrated 
desire from the intensity of the satisfied desire in order to determine the impact 
of this episode on the person’s welfare.  This is not the approach Heathwood 
takes, as we are told these cold desires are not relevant to welfare.  What, then, 
makes these desires cold so that they are completely dismissed from welfare 
calculations?  One possibility is that anytime there is an inherent conflict the 
desires are dismissed as being cold.  This cannot be the case, as desires 
squarely within any desire theory often come with some degree, however minor, 
of inherent conflict (e.g., desires concerning personal relationships, careers, 
etc.).  Since these desires are being singled out for exclusion, the traditional 
approach is being eschewed, and inherent conflict cannot be sufficient to 
create a cold desire, the only remaining possibility is that⎯upon satisfaction of 
a cold desire⎯the person is not getting what he really wants due to the 
person’s choosing to satisfy the less intense of the two conflicting desires.  If 
this were not the case, how could satisfying the stronger desire be classified as 
the person’s not getting what he really wants?  An examination of each of the 
cases reveals this to be the case.  The clear indication is that the weaker desire 
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in each of these cases is being frustrated at the expense of the stronger.  So 
what the person really wants⎯to eat the last piece of pizza, to stay in bed, to 
smoke the cigarette, to quit reading⎯is not what he ends up getting. 
 Cold desires, then, are those desires which, when satisfied, do not result 
in the person getting what he really wants because he chooses to satisfy the 
weaker of two conflicting desires.  This approach obviously raises some 
questions.  First, why exclude such desires from welfare calculation?  A 
traditional desire theory would claim the satisfaction of cold desires so 
understood would make a life go worse.  Why is this not the case?  Could it be 
that every situation involving cold desires, no matter if they are frustrated or 
satisfied, can safely be ignored for personal welfare purposes?  This is a claim 
in need of a justification.  Second, if this really reflects the situation⎯if a 
person really chooses to satisfy a less intense desire⎯why do they do this?  
This is difficult to explain unless one makes use of a hierarchical model of the 
will such as Frankfurt’s.  And it just so happens that by resorting to the tools 
provided by Frankfurt in the last chapter, we can capture the central intuition 
behind the appeal to warm desires in a very clear and straightforward manner. 
VI. THIRD FIX: CARING 
 Chapters One and Two repeatedly made the case for caring being a 
central component in any theory of welfare.  Chapter Three, among other 
things, provided an in-depth analysis of caring and related concepts.  This 
section will show how the concept of caring can be deployed in a 
straightforward manner to solve the problems that have traditionally plagued 
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other desire-satisfaction theories.  Specifically, we will see how it helps with 
issues related to warm desires, ideal desires, and several types of remote 
desires, as well as some distinctions that have not yet been introduced. 
i. Warm Desires 
 Before we get to these other topics, let us continue our discussion of 
warm desires in order to see what light caring can shed here.  Note that we 
determined the warm desires of Sumner, Schueler, and Davis were best 
understood as desires that express what we really want before factoring in 
value judgments in general and morality in particular.28  The question, then, is 
whether or not it is plausible to claim that desires that factor in value 
judgments (Heathwood’s cold desires) are not even relevant to well-being.  As 
was suggested in the last section, this would be a very odd result.  It is very 
common for us to value our significant others, children, parents, siblings, 
friends, careers, and hobbies.  Yet cold desires, so understood, would make our 
desires concerning all of these things irrelevant to our welfare.  This view is not 
plausible and should be rejected, as it is precisely because of the things we 
value, or care about, that it is possible for our lives to go better or worse. 
                                       
28 It could be the case that warm desires are those that express what we really 
want before factoring in either value judgments or morality, but not both.  
Such a position is untenable, I think, if we take the (proper) view of morality as 
expressing one’s value judgments about people (i.e., the weight we assign to the 
interests of others in deciding upon a course of action).  Taking this view, it is 
very hard to see a plausible motivation for excluding value judgments about 
people from warm desires while including value judgments about nonpersons, 
and vice versa. 
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 Next, we considered the possibility that cold desires could be defined as 
those involving incompatible, conflicting desires where the person chooses to 
satisfy the weaker desire at the expense of frustrating the stronger.  Two 
problems with this approach were immediately identified. First, why is the 
satisfaction of the cold desires described previously irrelevant to one’s welfare, 
as Heathwood claims, as opposed to being detrimental to one's welfare, as a 
traditional desire theory would claim?  Second, why would one choose to 
satisfy a weaker desire at the expense of a stronger desire?  This seems difficult 
to explain unless an odd definition of desire is being used or relevant details 
are being omitted, or both.  However, both of these questions can be readily 
answered by deploying the conceptual framework set out by Frankfurt in the 
last chapter.  Here is how Frankfurt would explain Heathwood’s (20) cold 
desire⎯“saying No to a cigarette, despite its appeal, because one is trying to 
quit”⎯described above.  The person, let’s call him Hitchens, has two 
incompatible first-order desires⎯a desire not to smoke and a stronger desire to 
smoke.  In addition, due to a recent health scare, Hitchens has a strong and 
unconflicted second-order volition that his first-order desire not to smoke be 
effective, thus constituting his will.  Now we have an answer for both of our 
questions.  First, Hitchens does not smoke because he wants to want not to 
smoke, despite his stronger first-order desire to smoke.  Second, this state of 
affairs does not make Hitchens’s life go worse (as a traditional desire theory 
might claim), nor is it irrelevant to his welfare (as Heathwood’s theory does 
claim).  Instead, assuming that Hitchens cares about his desire not to smoke, 
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this sequence makes his life go better, as he is getting what he cares about, he 
has the will he wants to have, he is exercising his free will, etc. Accordingly, in 
the context of the welfare debate, Frankfurt’s concept of caring both embraces 
the intuition behind the warm/cold desire distinction and provides a better 
explanation for the entire array of warm and cold desires, no matter what the 
proper analysis of those terms turns out to be. 
ii. Ideal Desires 
 Caring also resolves a lingering issue raised during the discussion of 
idealized desires.  Recall that the appeal to idealized desires was in response to 
the problem of defective desires.  Assuming the move from actual desires to 
idealized desires is not a mere Trojan Horse for objective-list theories, then how 
can desires be “defective”?  Since it cannot mean that some objects cannot be 
desired, we are left with two remaining possibilities.  The first of these we 
examined in the section on future desires, where we concluded that a desire 
could be defective because, in satisfying the desire, we will be frustrating more 
of our actual future desires than if we had not satisfied the desire.  We could 
think of this as a situation in which the object of our desire is not something 
one “really” wants, in that it will make our lives go worse by frustrating our 
actual future desires.  The second way in which a desire may be characterized 
as being defective could also be characterized as a case in which the object of 
our desire is not something we really want.  Although this possibility was 
mentioned in the section called “Caring” in the last chapter, a slight return 
adapted for this particular context will be instructive.  Our desires or, more 
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specifically, the things we care about, may be defective in that the objects are 
not things we really want, or care about, because we either do not know 
ourselves well enough, do not know the objects well enough, or both. 
 Not knowing the objects of our desire well enough should not be a 
surprising phenomenon.  After all, some of the things we want are things we 
have never had, so it should not be surprising to learn that the object of our 
desire was different from what we imagined it to be.  This may occur in one of 
two ways.  First, we may notice that one of the things we care about conflicts 
with another one.  Frankfurt (2006: 49) gives the example of a person who 
cares about worldly success and about peace of mind, only to discover that 
pursuing one tends to interfere with attaining the other: “As we learn more 
about what each is and what it entails, it will often become clear that one 
arouses in us a more substantial interest and concern than the other.”  
Second, we may discover that we just do not understand the thing we want 
well enough, independent of any conflict in the things we want.  We may 
discover either that the object is just different than we thought it was or that 
the consequences and requirements of caring about it differ from what we had 
supposed (Frankfurt 2006: 49). 
 Not knowing ourselves very well should not be that surprising either.  
Frankfurt puts it quite well: 
Our motives and our dispositions are notoriously uncertain and 
opaque, and we often get ourselves wrong.  It is hard to be sure 
what we can bring ourselves to do, or how we will behave when the 
chips are down.  The will is a thing as real as any reality outside 
us.  The truth about it does not depend upon what we think it is, 
or upon what we wish it were.  (Frankfurt 2006: 49-50) 
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 The strategy, then, for dealing with desires that are defective (i.e., those 
desires that do not express what we really care about) because we do not 
understand some combination of the object or ourselves very well will be as 
follows.  Following Heathwood (25): 
I will assume that desires and beliefs are very brief entities – so 
brief that there is no time for their intensity to change.  What we 
would normally describe as a change in intensity of a single desire 
or belief we will, for the purposes of the theory, describe as an 
occurrence of a new desire or belief of a different intensity for the 
same [state of affairs]. 
 
Defined in this way, the theory (which will be explained in much greater detail 
in the next chapter) will reach the right conclusion, in terms of impact on 
welfare, for the entire range of cases in which what we care about changes over 
time.  The most obvious case is when we get either ourselves or the object 
wrong such that when we get the object, we no longer want it.  The theory will 
claim that the impact on our welfare decreases exactly as fast as we determine 
that the object is not something we care about after all.  The theory will reach 
the same result in cases in which what we care about changes over a much 
longer time period.  For example, suppose that over a 25-year period you cease 
caring about your significant other, whom you cared about very deeply at one 
time.  The theory will claim that the impact on your personal welfare of having 
that person in your life exactly tracked your decreasing level of caring about 
that person during those 25 years.  Thus, the problem that idealized desires 
handled very poorly, the concept of caring can solve easily. 
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iii. Remote Desires 
 Next, caring resolves the issues left over from the discussion of remote 
desires.  Earlier in this chapter, we discussed a resolution to one type of remote 
desires; namely, that some desired states of affairs are remote from what we 
are aware of.  The resolution was that the desirer had to have a true belief 
about whether the desire was actually satisfied.  While this is a solution for 
desires that are remote from our experience, it will not solve the other types of 
remote desires that were mentioned.  The first included desires that seemed to 
be remote from what a person could care about, as in the case of Kagan’s 
wanting the number of atoms in the universe to be a prime number.  Although 
it should be fairly easy to see how caring will resolve issues dealing with 
desires that are remote from what we care about, a closer look at this case is in 
order.  First, it seems to combine two types of remote desires in one desire.  In 
other words, not only does it seem remote from what Kagan would care about, 
but also it is remote from what Kagan could realistically expect to be aware of.  
Although the combination of true belief and caring is sufficient to deal with this 
case effectively, separating these two issues for the purposes of this topic will 
help to simplify the analysis.  Accordingly, let us change the example to 
eliminate the experience-requirement issue while keeping the difficulty-caring-
about-prime-numbers issue.  Kagan, in the new scenario, is still a huge fan of 
prime numbers, but he is also a huge fan of the St. Louis Cardinals.  What 
Kagan wants is for the Cards’ total number of runs scored in the 2011 regular 
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season to be a prime number.  When Albert Pujols29 scores the 1,229th run, a 
prime number and a new MLB record, with a walk-off homerun in the bottom 
of the ninth inning in Houston on September 28th (the last game of the season), 
Kagan is simply elated. 
 Now those who would deny that this desire satisfaction increased 
Kagan’s welfare have two possible options left at this point in the proceedings.  
First, the opponent could simply deny that satisfactions such as this one can 
increase welfare.  But what feature of this desire could one single out as 
making it irrelevant to welfare?  The fact that it involves a number?  A prime 
number?  A sports team?  If all these possible exceptions seem ad hoc, that is 
because they would be, as our next option should help reinforce.  The second 
option for the opponent is not to deny that this desire could impact one’s 
welfare if someone actually cared about it, but to deny that it would ever 
actually impact anyone’s welfare because, in fact, no one could care about it.  
When stated so clearly, this empirical claim does not look plausible because of 
its absolute nature (i.e., no one could ever care about this).  However, I think 
this is precisely where Kagan’s hypothetical gets the bulk of its intuitive force.  
We just cannot get to a place, mentally, where we can imagine caring about 
such things.  To those people I would simply ask them to feed their 
imaginations a bit.  If it is actually the case that you do not care about 
anything that would strike a cross-section of your acquaintances as odd, then 
spend an afternoon at the library picking up random books to get a sense of 
                                       
29 Fact: Pujols is the best player in MLB history through the first ten seasons of 
a career. 
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what some other people actually do care about.30  Or peruse random videos on 
YouTube to get a sense of what people care about.  I promise you there is a 
very large number of people who care deeply about something that you have 
never heard of⎯and some of these things will most likely strike you as being at 
least as hard to care about as the number of runs a baseball team scores in a 
season.  It is just a fact about humans that we care about all sorts of stuff.  If it 
is a thing humans are aware of, then it is likely a thing someone cares about.  
Sectioning off some subset of these things as being necessarily irrelevant to 
welfare will either involve some highly implausible metaphysical claims (e.g., 
objective-list theories) or some highly implausible empirical claims (e.g., no one 
could ever care about X). 
 Caring also provides a solution for all the remaining types of remote 
desires discussed previously.  While these desires are sometimes described, as 
they were earlier in this chapter, as being too remote in time to impact welfare, 
a more accurate description is that these desires are just additional types of 
desires that are remote from what we care about.  Recall that the first type of 
desire described as being remote in time included my desire, as a seven-year-
old kid, to have Davey the gorilla⎯on orders from The Talking Walnut⎯beat up 
the skateboard bullies who were harassing me.  The problem is that, by the 
time my desire is satisfied as a Festivus miracle 75 years later, I have long 
forgotten about this desire and now feel sorry for the bloodied senior citizens 
                                       
30 The writer obviously cared about the topic, as she wrote an entire book on 
the subject.  Moreover, the library carries the book, so its staff likely thinks 
that other people care about it as well. 
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who have long since traded in their skateboards for wheelchairs.  However, 
according to standard desire theory, my life is going better now because (1) I 
had this desire, and (2) the desire was satisfied.  This is not plausible. It seems 
dogmatic to claim that a desire I had when I was seven, and subsequently 
forgot about, could make my life go better if satisfied when I am 82. 
 We could characterize this situation as representing a problem with 
changing desires, as Brandt (1982: 179) does when he writes: 
The fundamental difficulty for the desire-satisfaction theory is that 
desires change over time: Some occurrence I now want to have 
happen may be something I did not want to have happen in the 
past, and will wish had not happened, if it does happen, in the 
future. 
 
However, the concept of changing desires, without more, does not present any 
particular difficulty for a properly constructed desire-satisfaction theory.  To 
see this, consider a slight modification to the case of Davey and The Talking 
Walnut.  Keeping all other facts the same, now suppose I had the desire for 
Davey-delivered retribution for the whole year I was seven, and then, after the 
skateboard bullies became my friends, I had an equally strong desire for the 
whole year I was nine that no harm from Davey would befall them.  Both 
desires lasted for exactly one year, and both have long been forgotten when 
Davey visits my former enemies/friends at the Happy, Happy, Joy, Joy 
Retirement Center.  Since my desire changed before it was satisfied, does this 
complicate our analysis of the impact of the beatings on my welfare when I am 
82?  It should not.  If the forgotten pro-beating desire is not relevant, it is hard 
to see why my forgotten anti-beating desire could be relevant.  Nor does it seem 
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to make any difference that my desire changed to one that directly opposed the 
first desire.  For purposes of this analysis, the only relevant detail seems to be 
that I had two long-forgotten desires.  Indeed, it does not even appear to be 
relevant that one was subsequently satisfied and the other frustrated.  This 
analysis of the issue should become clearer if we think back to the problem 
with idealized desire-satisfaction theories; specifically, their claim that a 
person’s welfare can be increased not only by getting something that he does 
not care about, but by getting something that he does not even want.  Here, if 
we count these past desires toward welfare, we would be doing the same 
thing⎯giving the person something he does not want and counting it as 
enhancing his well-being.  And it does not appear to matter whether the person 
remembers having the desire or not because, either way, it is not something he 
currently wants or cares about.  Should it matter whether he merely 
remembers having had a desire for the object at some point in the past? 
 One solution to this issue, suggested by Parfit (1984: 151), is as follows: 
Some desires are implicitly conditional on their own persistence.  If 
I now want to swim when the Moon later rises, I may want to do so 
only if, when the Moon rises, I still want to swim.  If a desire is 
conditional on its own persistence, it can obviously be ignored once 
it is past. 
 
This approach suggests dividing desires into two camps⎯those that are 
conditional on their own persistence and those that are not.  The former would 
be counted toward welfare only if they still persist at the time they are satisfied, 
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while the latter would be counted toward welfare regardless of whether the 
person still has the desire when satisfied.31 
 This proposal fails for a number of reasons.  The first comes to light if we 
examine the basic idea behind desire theory.  The most plausible basic form of 
desire theory claims, roughly, that a person is benefited when what he desires 
obtains while he still wants it.  We can call this a concurrence requirement 
whereby there is a temporal overlap between the desire and desired state of 
affairs.32  Desires that are not conditional on their own persistence will struggle 
with this requirement, as the options here should make clear.  The first option 
is just to claim that there is no necessary overlap between the desire and the 
desired state of affairs.  The problem here is that it is not clear how the 
occurrence of a state of affairs benefits the person, who, by hypothesis, no 
longer wants the state of affairs in question.  The second option is to claim that 
there is indeed an overlap of some sort between the desire and the desired state 
of affairs.  However, it seems as though this sort of claim will require some 
interesting metaphysics.  There is no mystery concerning the metaphysical 
status of desires that are conditional on their own persistence.  These are 
desires that a person has and then, at some point (at least at death if not 
before), no longer has.  So these desires exist in the mind for a time and then 
                                       
31 For both classes of desires, any other requirements set out in the theory 
would have to be satisfied before the desire in question would count toward 
welfare. 
 
32 The justification for this requirement stems from the problems, detailed 
below, associated with the claim that giving a person something that she does 
not currently want is good for the person. 
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exist merely as historical facts.  The same simple story does not apply for 
desires that are not conditional on their own persistence.  Here there are 
serious questions about both how one is created and what it is.33 
 Now let us suppose that we figure out how to get one of these things 
created.  We have a desire that is not conditional on its own persistence.  What 
is it after the desirer no longer has the desire?  It is a desire that is not 
currently had by the desirer, yet it is still relevant until such a time that it is 
either satisfied or frustrated.  The idea seems to be that these are desires, not 
located entirely in the past or in any present mind, that still possess the 
welfare oomph (technical term) of a live desire.  It is almost as if they are 
supposed to be a chunk of a soul or a fragment of a ghost.  Accordingly, it is 
easy to see the way in which the how of these things being created is 
complicated by the what of their actual existence.  I had wanted to avoid the 
quip that perhaps one needed to utter some magic words to bring one into 
existence, but perhaps magic words are required when conjuring up magical 
entities.  The bottom line here is that this picture of how these desires meet the 
concurrence requirement is a bit too fanciful to believe. 
                                       
33 Parfit sheds precious little light on either question.  As for how one of these 
desires is created, he cites nothing and gives only two examples of desires that 
are not conditional on their own persistence.  The only common thread 
between Parfit’s two examples is that the desirer will never know if the desire 
has been satisfied or frustrated (in one case the person to whom the desire 
relates is one the desirer will never meet again, and in the other case the 
desirer will be dead when the desire is either frustrated or satisfied).  Since 
there appears to be no reason at all to suppose that all desires that are not 
conditional on their own persistence involve cases where the desirer will never 
know if the desire was ultimately satisfied or frustrated, these examples are of 
little help. 
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 While I admit the welfare justification for, and metaphysics of, desires 
that are not conditional on their own persistence makes my brain hurt, 
perhaps I am just not clever enough to get it.  That is fine, because at least 
three problems remain.  The first is an issue we have seen before, and it stems 
from the fact that these desires do not operate in the way other desires do.  We 
are accustomed to being able to turn a desire OFF; we have a desire⎯it comes 
ON⎯and then we either forget the desire or change our minds⎯-the desire 
goes OFF.  However, what we have in this case is a desire, by definition, 
permanently stuck in the ON position.34  Therefore, when (not if) the person no 
longer has this desire, the solution proposed would entail that we make the 
person’s life go better by giving her what she no longer wants.  The fact that 
this comes from a prior version of herself⎯as opposed to either an objective list 
or an idealized version of herself⎯does not matter.  We do her no favors by 
giving her what she does not either want or care about.35 
 Another problem stems from the fact that the desirer need not know of 
the satisfaction or frustration of the desire that is not conditional on its own 
persistence.  As we saw earlier in this chapter, it is hard to see how things we 
are not aware of can, in and of themselves, make our lives go better for us.  Nor 
will it help here to add a belief or knowledge requirement.  Suppose I conjure 
                                       
34 I say permanently stuck in the ON position because, once again, it is very 
unclear how the eventual satisfaction or frustration of these desires would alter 
their metaphysical states in such a way as to either destroy them or turn them 
off.  My brain might literally explode if I ever heard someone try to explain this. 
 
35 Heathwood (12) dismisses the appeal to these desires for the same reason. 
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up one of these desires, forget about it, and then years later when the desired 
state of affairs comes to be, I learn of this event.  On what basis will we claim 
that my life is going better as result of my learning about some state of affairs 
that I care nothing about? 
 This issue concerning knowledge or belief brings up a third problem, 
which was discussed in the section on remote desires⎯the problem of 
posthumous desires as being another example of those desires that are too 
remote in time to affect personal welfare.  Recall the example of my being a 
Loopy Narcissist with all sorts of desires about the genuflecting masses after 
my death.  Several issues were discussed, but the primary one was the problem 
of claiming that this was a very good life for me if during my life all my desires 
were frustrated, only to be offset many times over after my death by the 
satisfaction of my numerous desires by the adoring throngs.  However, the 
resort to desires that are not conditional on their own persistence entails 
counting posthumous desire satisfactions and frustrations toward well-being.  
We have desires, no longer residing in the mind of the desirer, that are stuck in 
the ON position.  And since they are not conditional on their own persistence, it 
does not seem as though any act I could perform would destroy or nullify them.  
If that is so⎯which by definition it seems clearly to be⎯then there looks to be 
no reason or mechanism that would accomplish this feat upon my death.  
Thus, the resort to these desires as a solution to desires that are remote in 
time fails for several reasons.  
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 The solution, once again, is caring.  The fundamental problem with past 
desires, changing desires, and posthumous desires is not that they are too 
remote in time, but that they are too remote from what we care about.  In the 
case of Davey and The Talking Walnut, the problem is not with time, but rather 
with the fact that this is no longer something I care about.  If I did care about it 
for the intervening 75 years, then of course it is reasonable to claim that my 
relishing Davey’s brutality makes my life go better.  The same applies to the 
Loopy Narcissist example.  The problem is not that time has passed, the 
problem is that I no longer care about anything because I am dead.  If I were 
still alive and still cared about such things, then it does make my life go better 
to be worshipped. 
iv. Occurrent Desires 
Here we can highlight another advantage of limiting a desire theory to 
those desires that we care about.  Limiting the theory in this way ensures that 
it will only include what Heathwood (19) calls occurrent desires, which are 
desires “the object of which is currently, in some sense, ‘before the subject’s 
mind.’”  Heathwood contrasts occurrent desires with dispositional 
desires⎯desires that are “in some sense in the desirer’s unconscious mind, 
and which would, at least in normal cases, become occurrent if the subject 
were to think about the proposition in question”⎯and claims that the correct 
theory will only count occurrent desires toward welfare.  Moreover, Heathwood 
(20) notes that since the correct theory also makes use of the concept of belief, 
that, too, must be taken in its occurrent sense: 
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For there are indefinitely many dispositional desire/ dispositional 
belief pairs that coincide in us at any moment.  For example, each 
of us, at every moment of our adult lives, dispositionally desires 
and believes that she will not be killed in one minute by a falling 
meteor.  But it seems to me absurd to suppose our lives are 
continually made better by this fact – not to mention the millions 
of others like it of which we, and no one, will ever become aware.  
In fact, I see no reason to think there are not infinitely many 
propositions dispositionally desired and believed by each of us at 
each moment of our lives.  If we allow them all to count, we may 
have a hard time explaining how any two actual lives could differ 
in well-being. 
 
I agree with Heathwood’s conclusion and reasoning on this point.  However, the 
advantage of resorting to the concept of caring rather than the concept of 
occurrent desires becomes clear if we follow Heathwood’s (22) meteor example a 
bit further: 
That earlier question was, Did I just make your life better by 
causing you to desire and believe occurrently and simultaneously 
that you will not be killed in one minute by a falling meteor?  
Probably not, or at least not very much.  This is because the desire 
in question probably wasn’t a warm desire, or if there was a warm 
desire on the scene, it was probably very weak.  Interestingly, if 
you received convincing evidence that a giant meteor was heading 
for your block, and truly came to believe it and appreciate it, your 
desire that you not soon be killed by a falling meteor would (if you 
are like me, at least) become very warm indeed.  You’d be frantic, 
and frantically trying to flee.  Such a state is an intrinsically bad 
state to be in, both intuitively and according to [Heathwood’s 
theory], and the reason, according to [Heathwood’s theory], is that 
the state is a subjective frustration of a warm desire.  If you later 
came to learn that there is no meteor after all, your warm desire 
that there be no meteor would remain, but the associated belief 
would change: it would then align with the desire (you’d be 
wanting and believing the same thing).  Such relief is an 
intrinsically good state to be in, both intuitively and according to 
[Heathwood’s theory] – it is a subjective satisfaction of a warm 
desire. 
 
Here we see that Heathwood’s theory has to appeal to both the concept of 
occurrent desire and the concept of warm desire (a concept that, as we have 
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seen, is not clear or successful) in order to accomplish what the concept of 
caring can handle in a simpler and more successful fashion.  You are unlikely 
to care about the possibility of being hit by a meteor when it is no more than, 
as far as you are concerned, a mere logical possibility.  However, when it is 
elevated to a metaphysical certainty, you are likely to care about this state of 
affairs quite a bit. 
v. Intrinsic Desires 
 Finally, caring brings some clarity to the debate over whether desire 
theory should include both intrinsic and extrinsic desires or just intrinsic 
desires.36  The intuition behind limiting a theory to include intrinsic desires 
(i.e., desires for something as an end in itself) and exclude extrinsic desires 
(i.e., desires for something merely as a means to some other end) is motivated 
by cases like the following.  Suppose I want to watch The Wire on DVD.  In 
order to satisfy my intrinsic desire, however, I must form and satisfy several 
extrinsic desires⎯to turn on the TV, to turn on the DVD player, to put the DVD 
in the DVD player, and so on.  While it seems plausible to claim that my life is 
going better for me by getting my (intrinsic) desire to watch The Wire satisfied, 
it does seem a bit strained, at best, to suppose the same goes for my having 
satisfied my (extrinsic) desire to turn the input setting on my receiver from 
Cable to DVD. 
                                       
36 For a discussion of this topic, see Parfit (1984: 117), Brandt (1979: 111), 
Carson (2000: 155-59), and Heathwood (22-24). 
  
221 
 However, the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic desires is not 
always so neat.  Consider the process I am engaged in at this moment.  What I 
want, as an end in itself, is for my dissertation to be finished.  The means to 
that end is my continuing to sit at this desk, researching various issues related 
to personal welfare, pondering solutions as I gaze out the window, writing page 
after brilliant page, etc.  The problem with categorizing my desire to have a 
finished dissertation as wholly intrinsic and my desire to engage in the range of 
activities necessary to write it as wholly extrinsic is that neither of these 
descriptions is accurate.  First, my desire to have a complete dissertation is 
also partly extrinsic⎯it is a means to my receiving a Ph.D. as well as being 
something I desire for its own sake.  Second, my desire to write my dissertation 
is also partly intrinsic.  If I awake tomorrow to find my dissertation finished in 
the exact way I intended and sitting on my desk, I will not be satisfied with this 
state of affairs because I wanted to undertake the activities necessary to 
produce my dissertation.  In other words, I consider at least some of the steps 
in the process to be ends and not just mere means.  However, the same cannot 
be said about my extrinsic desires relating to watching The Wire.  If, after I 
form the desire to watch The Wire and before I set about satisfying this desire, I 
suddenly find myself on the couch watching The Wire, I shall have no 
complaints whatsoever about not getting to bring my purely extrinsic desires to 
fruition by my own hands (although I will have some nagging metaphysical 
questions to attend to). 
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 Therefore, Brandt (1979: 111) was right when he suggested limiting 
desire theory to include those desires that are “at least partly intrinsic.”  
Accordingly, we could add such a requirement to the theory, but a closer 
examination shows that this is not necessary.  We already know that my 
desires relating to my dissertation are partly intrinsic while those relating to 
watching The Wire are not, but what makes that the case?  The difference is 
that I care about writing my dissertation, while I could not care in the least 
about how a show ends up on my TV.  Thus the concept of caring simply and 
straightforwardly resolves yet another issue in the quest for the correct theory 
of personal welfare. 
VII. NO FIX: THE SOUTH PARK DESIRES 
 In this chapter we have encountered many different types of desires that 
are thought to pose problems for desire-satisfaction theories of welfare.  Some 
of these desires are in fact problematic.  As a result, several “fixes” for these 
problems have been advanced.  The right theory will have to take into account 
our future actual desires and not just some form, idealized or otherwise, of our 
present desires.  It will have to count only those satisfactions and frustrations 
that we believe, truthfully, have taken place instead of counting all frustrations 
and satisfactions no matter how remote they may be from our experience.  
Finally, the right theory will include only those desires we care about rather 
than counting every desire we find ourselves having. 
 However, there is another category of supposedly defective desires⎯let us 
call them the South Park desires⎯for which there is no fix.  Some philosophers 
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have claimed that these desires cannot be the basis for increasing one’s 
personal welfare.  Although the claim is not entirely clear, it seems to be that 
the satisfaction of these desires actually makes your life go worse, not that 
these desires are simply not relevant to welfare.37  I call these the South Park 
desires because I think it is a near certainty that every sort of desire any 
philosopher has ever claimed as being defective in this way has been portrayed 
on South Park.  In what follows, I will set out some of these desires, but this list 
is not exhaustive, certainly in terms of examples and probably not in terms of 
categories either. 
In the episode “Scott Tenorman Must Die,” Cartman is repeatedly 
humiliated by Scott Tenorman, causing Cartman to formulate an elaborate 
strategy of revenge ending with Scott unknowingly eating bits of his own 
recently murdered parents (also arranged by Cartman) in a bowl of chili.  It is 
claimed that malicious desires,38 such as these, cannot serve to enhance 
welfare, although Cartman seems quite pleased licking what he calls the “tears 
of unfathomable sadness” off Scott’s face as the episode ends.  In the episode 
“Chickenlover,” the Book Mobile driver has sex with several of the town’s 
chickens, although he later claims that this was just an elaborate plot to 
                                       
37 For an excellent discussion of all these types of desires, see Heathwood 
(2005: 487-88). 
 
38 See, e.g., Feldman’s (2002: 617) terrorist example. 
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encourage Officer Barbrady to learn to read.39  One might claim that base or 
degrading desires such as these also cannot make one’s life go better.40  In the 
episode “Make Love, Not Warcraft,” Stan, Kyle, Kenny, and Cartman play World 
of Warcraft for 21 hours a day for two months, all in an attempt to exact 
personal revenge on a character in the game played by Jenkins, who has been 
playing the game nearly every hour of every day for the year-and-a-half since 
the game was released.  One might claim that pointless desires, such as this 
one, cannot enhance well-being.41  Finally, in the episode “Poor and Stupid,” 
Cartman wants to become a NASCAR driver, but is concerned that he is not 
poor and stupid enough to fulfill his dream.  One might want to claim that 
tasteless or poorly cultivated desires, such as the desire to drive in circles for a 
living (or, even worse, watch those people who drive in circles for a living), 
cannot be the stuff of a good life for the one who lives it.42  And this barely 
scratches the surface of the desires portrayed on South Park that would keep 
those inclined to make lists of defective desires busy for quite some time. 
                                       
39 I think it is a safe bet to stipulate that the desire for chicken sex was at least 
partly intrinsic due to the fact that a much less extreme tactic could have been 
used to reach the same goal. 
 
40 G. E. Moore (1903: § 56) discusses a perpetual indulger in bestiality as an 
objection to a hedonistic theory of value, but the point is easily adapted to this 
context. 
 
41 See, e.g., Rawls’s (1999: 379-80) example of a person who wants to count 
blades of grass instead of study math. 
 
42 See, e.g., Heathwood’s (2005: 488) example of a person’s preferring Muzak to 
Mozart. 
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 In the face of objections based on desires such as these, the desire 
theorist has two options.  He can either admit the theory as it stands is wrong 
and must be rejected or revised, or he can claim that these desires can serve as 
the basis for personal welfare.  An examination of these options should point 
us in the right direction.  If, as we established long ago, desire theory is the 
right general approach to welfare, then carving out an exception for these types 
of desires⎯in addition to the ones set out already earlier in this chapter⎯does 
not look promising.  The problem is one of metaphysics.  While one could 
certainly claim that these desires cannot enhance well-being, finding an 
adequate metaphysical basis for such a claim is highly doubtful.  What would 
be required is a list of desires (or, perhaps, a list of essential characteristics of 
desires) that cannot increase personal welfare even though the person cares 
about the desire, correctly believes it has been satisfied, and does not cause the 
frustration of relevant future desires.  The inherently odd nature of such a list 
might only be exceeded by the theory of epistemology required to discover it or 
the story of how it came to be.  Therefore, unless one wants to dabble in bold 
and adventurous metaphysics and epistemology, there is no basis to exclude 
desires that we may not understand or like, or both. 
 Frankfurt (2006: 50), in a particularly eloquent passage, sums up this 
idea nicely: 
 Once we have learned as much as possible about the natural 
characteristics of the things we care about, and as much as 
possible about ourselves, there are no further substantive 
corrections that can be made.  There is really nothing else to look 
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for so far as the normativity of final ends is concerned.  There is 
nothing else to get right. 
 The legitimacy and the worthiness of our final ends are not 
susceptible to being demonstrated by impersonal considerations 
that all rational agents would accept as appropriately controlling.  
Sometimes, normative disagreements cannot be rationally resolved.  
It may even be true that other people are required by what they 
care about to harm or to destroy what we love.  Our love may be 
inspired by an endearing vision of how relationships between 
individuals might ideally be arranged; but other people may be 
driven by what they care about to struggle against arranging 
things in that way.  There may be no convincing basis for regarding 
either them or ourselves as rationally defective or as having made 
some sort of mistake. 
 So far as reason goes, the conflict between us may be 
irreducible.  There may be no way to deal with it, in the end, other 
than to separate or to slug it out.  This is a discouraging outcome, 
but it does not imply a deficiency in my theory.  It is just a fact of 
life. 
 
 The bottom line is that some people care about things that we do not.  
When we appeal to a fact about value to persuade them that they want the 
“wrong” things, they can simply and conceivably reply that they do not value 
what we value⎯no matter what the object is.  So what we value helps our lives 
go better, and what they value helps make their lives go better⎯end of story (at 
least as far as personal welfare is concerned).  Now it may be that there are 
other ways to assess a person’s life besides welfare.  We may be able to assess 
lives in terms of morality, achievement, excellence, virtue, aesthetic value, 
dignity, or how good for the world (as opposed to how good for its subject) a life 
was.  If so, then it would make sense to rank the lives of those with South Park 
desires low on one or more of these scales while still admitting they were good 
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lives for the people who lived them.43  It would be nice to live in a world where 
instant karma was a part of the fabric of reality; a place where bad deeds were 
always and everywhere met with bad outcomes for the perpetrators.  I even 
have an occasional student who really feels that somehow, some way, this 
must be so.  Sadly, this just does not mesh with the facts on the 
ground⎯many a tyrannical dictator lives in the lap of luxury to a ripe old age, 
and many a mensch suffers some unspeakable and untimely end. 
 In the final chapter, we will (finally!) see my theory in detail, see it put to 
use, and examine some of its more interesting implications. 
                                       
43 This is a common strategy in cases like this.  See, e.g., Griffin (1986: 23), 
Sumner (1996: 20-29), Feldman (2004: 8-12), and Heathwood (2005: 500). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CARING SATISFACTIONISM & THE PARADOX OF WELFARE 
 Some lives go better than other lives for the people who live them.  
Hopefully, both the truth and the import of this claim were established many 
pages ago.  Further, let us suppose that we can, in theory at least, figure out 
what makes one life go better than another in order to determine, as between 
two lives, which one went (or is going or will go) better for the person who lived 
(or is living or will live) it.  Now, if it is true that some lives go better than others 
and that we can figure this out as described, then the conjunction of these two 
facts entails some requirements for a theory of personal welfare that should be 
made explicit. 
I. CARING SATISFACTIONISM 
 First, a theory of personal welfare must identify the fundamental bearers 
of intrinsic value for a subject.  In other words, for a theory to count as a 
theory of welfare at all, it must pick out something that is good in itself for a 
person to get.  This has been the goal of the project to this point.  We have 
examined several possibilities, all with an eye toward finding the thing or 
things that will serve as the basis of our theory.  What we came up with at the 
end of the last chapter was, roughly, the best life for the person who lives it is 
the life that best satisfies the desires the person cares about, where the person 
is also aware of those desire satisfactions. 
 Second, a complete theory of personal welfare must tell us how to 
determine the value of the fundamental bearers of intrinsic value for a subject.  
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For if we are to determine which of two lives went better for the subject, then it 
will not be enough simply to identify the stuff of good lives; we must also be 
able to figure out exactly how good any particular instance of the stuff is in 
order to compare lives. 
 Finally, a theory of welfare should specify how to calculate the overall 
total of intrinsic value for the subject’s entire life.  Presumably, this will simply 
consist of summing up the values mentioned in the last paragraph.  However, 
this need not be the case.1  Perhaps the right theory involves derivatives, 
exponents, and differential equations, but such an exotic approach would 
require a very interesting explanation indeed. 
 Keeping these requirements in mind, we can now state the theory, Caring 
Satisfactionism (“CS”), in full: 
CS(i): Every satisfaction of a caring desire that the desirer believes 
has been satisfied is intrinsically good for its subject; every 
frustration of a caring desire that the desirer believes has 
been frustrated is intrinsically bad for its subject. 
 
CS(ii): The intrinsic value for its subject of a caring desire 
satisfaction or frustration is a function of the intensities of 
the component desires and belief. 
 
CS(iii): The intrinsic value of a life (or part of a life) for the one who 
lives it = the sum of the caring events contained therein. 
 
 The first thing to notice about CS(i), CS(ii), and CS(iii) is that they each 
satisfy one of three requirements for a complete theory of personal welfare 
                                       
1 J. David Velleman (1991) actually does argue that this is not the case by 
suggesting that factors like the timing of the basic goods within a life (i.e., the 
timing of the goods in the overall narrative structure of the life) can affect the 
value of those goods.  I find this claim to be either implausible or one that CS 
can easily accommodate.  I will have to leave this claim undefended here. 
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enumerated above.  CS(i) tells us what is good in itself for a person to get, CS(ii) 
tells us how good these fundamental bearers of intrinsic value are for a person, 
and CS(iii) tells us how the values of fundamental bearers go together in 
assessing the intrinsic value of all or part of a life. 
 Before turning to an examination of some of the noteworthy features of 
CS, a thorough explanation of the theory⎯particularly CS(i) and CS(ii)⎯is in 
order.  CS(i) requires that two types of things be present for something to be 
either intrinsically good or intrinsically bad for a subject: One of those 
requirements, belief, is self-explanatory,2 while the other, caring desire 
satisfaction or frustration, needs some additional explanation. 
 Caring is described at length in Chapter Three.  The most pertinent part 
for our current purpose reads as follows: 
Caring requires more than just having a desire and more than 
accepting, approving of, or endorsing a desire.  Caring requires 
wanting the desire sustained. . . .  This focus and attention on the 
desire owe to the fact that this desire is one with which the person 
identifies himself, and which he accepts as expressing what he 
really wants. . . .  Caring consists in having a higher-order volition 
[or desire] that the person also wants sustained.  (Chapter Three: § 
VIII. Caring) 
 
 Therefore, in order to have a caring desire satisfied, there must be a first-
order desire satisfaction that the subject cares about.  This can be a desire 
                                       
2 For purposes of CS, I think even accidental belief is sufficient.  While 
accidental belief⎯as in the Gettier-type cases⎯is certainly troubling from an 
epistemological perspective, there do not appear to be any corresponding 
concerns here.  If the person believes X has obtained and X has, in fact 
obtained, then this seems to sufficient from a well-being perspective even if the 
person comes to believe X in some epistemically flawed manner.  However, CS 
could easily be adapted to incorporate a knowledge or awareness component in 
place of belief. 
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satisfaction in either the traditional sense (i.e., the desired state of affairs 
obtains) or the broader, but still technically accurate, sense described in 
Chapter Four, where what the subject really cares about is merely the 
experience of the desired state of affairs obtaining, and the subject has the 
desired experience.  CS(i), then, simply claims that when a desire that the 
subject cares about is satisfied and the subject believes this to be the case, 
then this is intrinsically good for the subject.  In addition, the frustration of a 
desire the subject cares about, coupled with the corresponding belief, is 
intrinsically bad for the subject.  These satisfactions and frustrations are the 
“caring events” referenced in CS(iii). 
 The caring events discussed in CS(i) each contain two desires (a first-
order desire and a higher-order desire) and an associated belief.  Desires and 
beliefs vary in intensity from not wanting or believing something all the way to 
wanting or believing something as much as is possible.  CS(ii) simply claims 
that exactly how good (or bad) the events described in CS(i) are for a person is a 
function of the intensities of the relevant desires and beliefs. 
 Now comes the task of specifying exactly how to quantify the theory.  As 
mentioned earlier, this is required in order to allow for a definitive answer to 
the question of which of two lives went better for the people who lived them.  
This is also the point at which many theorists stop, and at which many readers 
will balk at the attempt and begin to quibble with the way in which the theory 
is quantified.  And while a healthy dose of skepticism is perhaps warranted 
here, it should not cloud what has been accomplished to this point if this is 
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where one finds fault with the theory.  The accomplishment would be the fairly 
specific outlines of the correct theory of personal welfare, which specifies both 
what the fundamental bearers of intrinsic value are and generally how good 
they are for a person. 
 The first step in the quantification process will be to follow Heathwood 
(25) in the assumption 
that desires and beliefs are very brief entities⎯so brief that there is 
no time for their intensity to change.  What we would normally 
describe as a change in intensity of a single desire or belief we will, 
for the purposes of the theory, describe as an occurrence of a new 
desire or belief of a different intensity. 
 
This assumption comes at no theoretical cost and will prevent the need for 
some difficult math.  
 The next step in the process of quantifying CS(ii) is to take stock of 
component parts we have at our disposal.  These separate entities⎯two desires 
and a belief, each with its own intensity⎯will comprise each instance of an 
intrinsic good.  Now, for theoretical purposes, let us assume that desires and 
beliefs can range in intensity from zero (no belief or desire at all) to ten 
(maximum possible belief or desire) and may fall at any point along that 
continuum.3  With these assumptions in hand, the math for the theory 
becomes fairly straightforward.  As argued elsewhere in this project, it is hard 
to see how events a person does not care about, want, or believe have occurred 
                                       
3 For any being that is a person in the Frankfurtian sense, there would seem to 
be an upper limit on the intensity of desires.  Thus, the thought that for a 
desire of any intensity we could always imagine a more intense desire does not 
present any difficulties for CS.  Alternatively, CS could easily be changed to 
accommodate the idea that there is no upper limit on the intensity of desires. 
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can, in and of themselves, make a life go better or worse.  And each of these 
outcomes would be represented by an intensity of zero.  Accordingly, if each of 
these three elements must be present (i.e., must have an intensity above zero), 
then the most obvious solution is to multiply each of the three numbers 
together to arrive at the value for CS(ii).  This approach will ensure that the 
utter lack of any of the three will result in no effect upon personal welfare.  
CS(ii), then, will be determined in any particular instance by multiplying the 
intensity of the relevant first-order desire by the intensity of the relevant 
higher-order (caring) desire, and by the intensity of the relevant belief.  The 
product of each instance of a CS(ii) satisfaction will be left positive and the 
product of each instance of a CS(ii) frustration will be made negative. 
 The work left for CS(iii) is also fairly straightforward.  All that is left for 
CS(iii) in determining the intrinsic value of a life (or part of a life) for the one 
who lives it is to simply sum up all the values provided by CS(ii). 
 Before looking more closely at what this theory is, a quick note is in 
order about what this theory is not.  Caring Satisfactionism is not a unified 
theory.  In other words, CS will tell you how well the life of a person is going for 
the person living it, but it will not have anything to say about the lives of pigs, 
puppies, bats, gods, or fetuses.  Having argued extensively against the 
possibility of a unified theory of welfare due to a variety of metaphysical and 
epistemological concerns, there is little reason to comment on this further here.  
Having said that, there is one type of non-person that is covered by CS.  Recall 
that Frankfurt (1988: 16) distinguishes between persons and wantons.  A 
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person cares about her will while a wanton does not.  Frankfurt goes on to 
make a distinction within the class of wantons that is important for our 
purposes.  A wanton either cannot or does not care about his first-order desires 
or which of them will or would move him to act.  However, the difference 
between cannot and does not is substantial.  If he cannot care about his will, 
then the wanton would be excluded from CS because of “his lack of the 
capacity for reflection” (Frankfurt 1988: 18-19).  Lacking even the capacity for 
higher-order desires that serves as the basis for caring, this class of wantons is 
excluded from CS’s ambit.  The other class of wantons, however, is included 
within CS.  This is the class whose lack of caring is due to their “mindless 
indifference to the enterprise of evaluating [their] own desires and motives” 
(Frankfurt 1988: 19).  In other words, these are beings that could care about 
something, yet they do not.  For such beings, CS will yield a personal welfare 
score of zero, which is the correct score because, as I have previously argued, 
there is no way to make the life of such a being go better or worse.  Truly 
caring about nothing, there is no way to benefit or harm them. 
II. FEATURES OF CARING SATISFACTIONISM 
 While I aim to demonstrate several of the advantages of CS in the 
remainder of this chapter, there is one in particular that I should like to make 
explicit at the outset: This is the correct theory of personal welfare.  Making this 
statement here allows me the opportunity to claim, even though I will not have 
the space to demonstrate, that CS will provide the right answer in each 
scenario detailed previously where other theories have failed.  It is also worth 
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mentioning this here because, obviously, all the other features of CS detailed 
below, while perhaps compelling and advantageous, would not be enough to 
make up for the fact that the theory is simply wrong. 
 Other than being correct, the two main advantages of CS are that it 
avoids both paternalism and bad metaphysics.  Although it need not be the 
case, these two features can typically be found together.  Objective-list theory, 
for instance, claims that certain things⎯whether the person cares about them 
or not⎯just do make a life go better (paternalism) and conjures up some 
fanciful objects in order to provide the necessary grounding (bad metaphysics).  
CS, on the other hand, avoids both of these pitfalls.  First, CS allows for the 
fact that a good life for the person who lives it can be made up of anything at 
all and that this anything at all is determined exclusively by the person.4  In 
                                       
4 Another way of demonstrating how CS avoids paternalism concerns is to 
examine how CS measures up to two of the welfare principles set out in 
Chapter One⎯the Internalist Principle' (IP': The value of a life (or part of a life) 
for the one who lives it is determined to a significant degree by what the person 
in question cares about.) and the Principle Concerning Paternalism (PCP: 
Paternalistic claims in axiology must be justified by a compelling theoretical 
interest and must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.).  CS clearly meets 
IP' by claiming that changes in welfare always involve what the person in 
question cares about.  Similarly, CS meets PCP.  The only aspect of CS that 
could possibly be construed as paternalistic is the belief requirement.  
However, the belief requirement does serve a compelling theoretical interest 
because, as noted earlier, it is very hard to see how a state of affairs that one is 
completely unaware of could directly impact one’s welfare.  Moreover, the belief 
requirement is narrowly tailored to serve this theoretical interest by requiring 
only belief and not more robust concepts like awareness or knowledge.  These 
features come into even sharper focus when we examine CS in relation to the 
underlying reason for the concerns about paternalistic claims in the area of 
welfare⎯that we may end up with a theory that claimed I had a very good life 
when I hated every moment of it.  CS, belief requirement and all, could never 
produce this outcome. 
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certain instances this might seem to be a regrettable feature of reality (e.g., it 
might be refreshing to find a moral component to personal welfare), but it is 
usually a comforting and benign feature of reality and is, in any case, ensured 
by the very nature of reality itself.  This is because any paternalistic claim must 
be buttressed by highly speculative, and thus highly questionable, 
metaphysics.  Just consider what sort of object would be required to make it 
true that just these things, and not those things, (where both classes are 
unconnected to what the person in question actually cares about) can increase 
personal welfare.  It would be quite odd for such things to be part of the fabric 
of reality and for us to discover that they so existed.  So, second, CS does not 
require a belief in any strange objects at all.  CS only requires one to believe in 
beliefs, desires, and desires about desires.  Bad metaphysics are avoided, as 
not believing in beliefs is self-defeating and not believing in desires is—while 
coherent—barely so. 
 CS also handles the impact of free will on personal welfare in a natural 
and seamless manner.  While it is true that just about any theory could be 
adjusted to take free will into account, almost any attempt to do so will appear 
to be ad hoc, will assign an arbitrary value to free will, or both.  An example 
from Ishtiyaque Haji’s Freedom and Value will help illustrate this point.  Haji 
(2009: 5) has a similar intuition about the value of freedom and thus argues 
“that on promising hedonistic views or preferentist views or whole-life 
satisfaction views of welfare, free positive ‘life atoms’⎯atoms that contribute to 
welfare value⎯are better than otherwise similar unfree atoms, and free 
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negative life atoms are not as bad as otherwise similar unfree atoms.”  Haji 
(2009: 6) proceeds to advance considerations in support of the view that the 
correct theory of personal welfare “should adjust the value of its life atoms to 
reflect the extent to which they are free,” defends “selected versions of these 
freedom-sensitive views against various objections,” and then settles “on what I 
deem is the best contender.”  This best contender is illustrative for our 
purposes, as it claims that “free intrinsic attitudinal pleasures are better than 
otherwise similar unfree ones, and free intrinsic displeasures are not as bad as 
otherwise similar unfree ones” (Haji 2009: 6).  Haji (2009: 26-28) arrives at this 
version of the theory after considering⎯and rejecting⎯a version that gives no 
weight at all to unfree pleasures and displeasures.  He rejects this version after 
accepting the objection that, especially as it regards displeasures, unfree atoms 
are not intrinsically worthless and that freedom merely enhances the value of a 
life atom (Haji 2009: 27-28).  Given Haji’s general approach, it seems that he is 
clearly right to accept the objection that not all unfree atoms are intrinsically 
worthless, which then leads to his accepting that freedom merely enhances the 
value of a life atom. 
 However, the problem is with Haji’s general approach, which is to 
consider the effects of adding free will to various established theories of 
personal welfare.  Then, when he accepts the almost undeniable objection that 
unfree atoms are not completely worthless, especially as it pertains to pains or 
displeasures, he is forced to retreat to the position that freedom merely 
enhances the value of the life atoms of pleasure and displeasure.  This stance 
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invites the inevitable question: How much does freedom enhance the value of 
these life atoms?  Haji, understandably, does not offer an answer.  This is 
because adding free will in such a seemingly ad hoc manner is going to force 
the value of free will in personal welfare calculations to seem entirely arbitrary. 
 CS, on the other hand, has free will built in, as expressed through what 
we care about, from the beginning.  CS shows how free will impacts personal 
welfare, and no arbitrary value of free will is required in order to state the 
complete theory.  It is hard to see how a modification of another theory could 
accomplish these things. 
 Finally, Caring Satisfactionism gives our reflective attitudes a central 
place in a theory of personal welfare.  Indeed, it is precisely the failure of other 
theories to treat higher-order desires differently than first-order desires that 
has led to some counterintuitive results.  This lack of differentiation may lead 
other theories to claim that a life filled with failures associated with what we 
care about most is still a good life due to a plethora of first-order desire 
satisfactions.  Or that cases of weakness of will pertaining to very strong first-
order desires may actually promote one’s welfare more than self-control.  In 
short, failing to properly account for reflective attitudes is a serious defect in 
other theories of welfare, whether it be desire theories or others.5 
                                       
5 The idea that the correct theory of welfare must give a central place to our 
reflective attitudes appears in many places in the literature.  For example, 
Haybron (2008: 195) writes: “Pleasures or cravings that the individual does not, 
or would not, endorse on reflection cannot be allowed to trump the individual’s 
own best judgment.”  In addition, Kraut (1994: 40), who ultimately rejects 
desire theory as we will soon see, writes that the most plausible form of a 
desire theory might give “special weight to second-order desires. The general 
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III. CARING SATISFACTIONISM’S OVERLAP WITH OTHER THEORIES 
 A theory of personal welfare is (usually) offered by someone because it 
has some degree of initial plausibility.  For example, there is no theory that 
claims your life goes better for you to the extent you get purple things and 
worse for you to the extent you hear Christian rock.  Accordingly, it tends to be 
a productive exercise to attempt to ascertain what actually gives each theory 
the degree of plausibility it has.  Moreover, it is often thought to be a sign of 
increased plausibility of a theory if it can incorporate, and perhaps explain, 
these central intuitions of competing theories.  As will hopefully become clear 
in the next few pages, CS nicely and naturally captures the central intuitions of 
many competing theories. 
 Sidgwick (1907: 111-12) discusses the claim that “a man’s future good 
on the whole is what he would now desire and seek on the whole if all the 
consequences of all the different lines of conduct open to him were accurately 
foreseen and adequately realised in imagination at the present point of time.”  
CS both incorporates this idea discussed by Sidgwick and expands upon it.  Of 
course, CS incorporates the general idea that a person’s future is what will 
ultimately complete his personal welfare picture (as it seems like any theory of 
welfare must), but it also supplies the reason to choose one path over another.  
One could imagine a person vividly foreseeing all the consequences of all the 
lines of conduct available to her⎯just as Sidgwick describes⎯and then asking, 
                                                                                                                           
idea is that so long as one wants something wholeheartedly and with open 
eyes, then it is good for one’s desire to be satisfied, regardless of the content of 
the desire.” 
  
240 
“Okay, what now?  On what basis am I supposed to choose one of these over all 
the others?”  The response from CS would be, roughly, that she should choose 
the one that allowed her to care deeply about a wide array of her strongest 
first-order desires, have those desires satisfied, and strongly believe those 
desires had been satisfied. 
 This idea is very much in line with what Rawls (1999: 370) says when he 
“trie[s] to fill in Sidgwick’s notion of a person’s good.  In brief, our good is 
determined by the plan of life that we would adopt with full deliberative 
rationality if the future were accurately foreseen and adequately realized in 
imagination.”  While Rawls does admit that “from the definition above very little 
can be said about the content of a rational plan, or the particular activities that 
comprise it,” (1999: 372), he does claim that in 
adjusting Sidgwick’s notions to the choice of plans, we can say that 
the rational plan for a person is the one . . . that would be decided 
upon as the outcome of careful reflection in which the agent 
reviewed, in the light of all the relevant facts, what it would be like 
to carry out these plans and thereby ascertained the course of 
action that would best realize his more fundamental desires.”  
(1999: 366) (emphasis added) 
 
Rawls goes on to emphasize this point about the “good” for a person being the 
satisfaction of fundamental desires: 
• “Someone is happy when his plans are going well, his more important 
aspirations being fulfilled, and he feels sure that his good fortune will 
endure” (Rawls 1999: 359). 
 
• “The main features of a plan encourage and secure the fulfillment of the 
more permanent and general aims” (Rawls 1999: 360). 
 
• “But I shall suppose that while rational principles can focus our 
judgments and set up guidelines for reflection, we must finally choose for 
ourselves in the sense that the choice often rests on our direct self-
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knowledge not only of what things we want but also of how much we 
want them.  Sometimes there is no way to avoid having to assess the 
relative intensity of our desires.  Rational principles can help us to do 
this, but they cannot always determine these estimates in a routine 
fashion.  To be sure, there is one formal principle that seems to provide a 
general answer.  This is the principle to adopt that plan which maximizes 
the expected net balance of satisfaction.  Or to express the criterion less 
hedonistically, if more loosely, one is directed to take that course most 
likely to realize one’s most important aims.  But this principle also fails 
to provide us with an explicit procedure for making up our minds.  It is 
clearly left to the agent himself to decide what it is that he most wants 
and to judge the comparative importance of his several ends” (Rawls 
1999: 365-66). 
 
• “In this account of deliberative rationality I have assumed a certain 
competence on the part of the person deciding: he knows the general 
features of his wants and ends both present and future, and he is able to 
estimate the relative intensity of his desires, and to decide if necessary 
what he really wants” (Rawls 1999: 367). 
 
From these quotes, it is not clear that Rawls would disagree with CS at all.  At 
a minimum, CS incorporates Rawls’s most basic intuitions about what 
constitutes a person’s welfare. 
 CS also nicely encompasses the various forms of Aim Achievementism 
that have recently been propounded.  The form of the theory that Simon Keller 
(2004: 36) finds defensible is this: “One aspect of an individual’s welfare is her 
achieving her goals through her own efforts, regardless of what those goals are.  
It is not the only aspect of individual welfare, but it cannot be reduced to any of 
the others.”  T.M. Scanlon (1998: 124-25) makes a similar claim and then 
expounds on the fact that neither he nor Keller offers a complete theory: 
Leaving this question open, I conclude that any plausible 
theory of well-being would have to recognize at least the following 
fixed points.  First, certain experiential states (such as various 
forms of satisfaction and enjoyment) contribute to well-being, but 
well-being is not determined solely by the quality of experience.  
Second, well-being depends to a large extent on a person’s degree 
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of success in achieving his or her main ends in life, provided that 
these are worth pursuing.  This component of well-being reflects 
the fact that the life of a rational creature is something that is to be 
lived in an active sense⎯that is to say, shaped by his or her 
choices and reactions⎯and that well-being is therefore in large 
part a matter of how well this is done⎯of how well the ends are 
selected and how successfully they are pursued.  Third, many 
goods that contribute to a person’s well-being depend on the 
person’s aims but go beyond the good of success in achieving those 
aims.  These include such things as friendship, other valuable 
personal relations, and the achievement of various forms of 
excellence, such as in art or science. 
 These intuitive fixed points provide the basis for rough 
judgments of comparative well-being: a person’s well-being is 
certainly increased if her life is improved in one of the respects just 
mentioned while the others are held constant.  But this list of fixed 
points does not amount to a theory of well-being.  Such a theory 
would go beyond this list by doing such things as the following.  It 
might provide a more unified account of what well-being is, on the 
basis of which one could see why the diverse things I have listed as 
contributing to well-being in fact do so.  It might also provide a 
clearer account of the boundary of the concept⎯the line between 
contributions to one’s well-being and things one has reason to 
pursue for other reasons.  Finally, such a theory might provide a 
standard for making more exact comparisons of well-being⎯for 
deciding when, on balance, a person’s well-being has been 
increased or decreased and by how much. 
 
 CS does provide a complete theory, and it encompasses the credible bits 
of each of these views.  CS, in accordance with Keller’s ideas, claims that 
willing yourself to accomplish goals that you care about will increase your 
welfare, and it puts this on equal footing with every other aspect of individual 
welfare (i.e., all the things a person cares about).6  CS also incorporates much 
                                       
6 In this way, CS avoids the paternalism of Keller’s view, which claims that 
there is added value, other things being equal, in bringing about a state of 
affairs yourself as opposed to its coming to obtain in another way.  CS avoids 
this by recognizing that there is no compelling theoretical interest⎯as required 
by PCP⎯in claiming that it is better for me if I bring about X when I may not 
care how X obtains as long as it does. 
  
243 
of Scanlon’s less permissive version of the theory.  The “fixed points” he lists 
are all often what constitutes a person’s “well-being”, but there is a common 
problem for each of the three things he lists: What happens when the person 
does not care about one (or all) of these things?  One can easily imagine people 
who do not care about anything beyond “experiential states,” who do not care if 
their main ends are supposedly “worth pursuing,” and who do not care about 
personal relations, art, science, etc.7  CS provides a full theory where Scanlon 
does not by doing exactly what he says a full theory needs to do⎯going 
“beyond this list.”  CS provides a unified account of what well-being is for 
persons, provides a clear account of the boundary of the concept, and provides 
a standard for making more exact comparisons of well-being.  Moreover, in 
accomplishing the things Scanlon requires of a theory, CS highlights just 
exactly where Scanlon’s own disjointed, partial theory goes wrong.  
 Caring Satisfactionism also proves useful in understanding why most 
theorists prefer global desire-satisfaction theories to summative desire-
satisfaction theories.  These terms, apparently coined by Parfit (1984: 496-99), 
are misleading, however, since both types of theories are summative in nature.  
As used in this debate, summative theories appeal to all of a person’s desires in 
determining welfare, whereas global theories omit “local” desires and appeal 
only to desires “about some part of one’s life considered as a whole, or about 
                                       
7 As I have argued extensively for these conclusions previously, I will not 
rehash them here. 
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one’s whole life” (Parfit 1984: 497).  Parfit finds the global versions of the 
theories more plausible and gives two examples to help illustrate his point. 
In his first example—let us call it Drug Addict—Parfit (1984: 497) knows 
that you subscribe to a summative theory and says he is going to make your 
life go better by making you a drug addict.  Each morning you will awake with 
a very strong desire for a fix.  Not to worry though—Parfit is going to keep you 
stocked up for the rest of your life, and the injection, the after-effects of the 
drug, and the desire for the drug will be neither pleasant nor painful.  
Everything else about your life stays the same other than your desire not to be 
addicted, which is a less intense desire than your daily desire for a morning fix.  
A summative theory will say that Parfit made your life go better, as being 
addicted to this drug increased your net desire satisfaction.  Parfit rejects this 
conclusion, as the desires generated by the addiction—and the subsequent 
satisfaction thereof—are neither pleasant nor painful. 
 While the drug-addict case is a bit hard to follow and may not generate 
the same intuitions in everyone, Parfit’s (1984: 498) next example—let’s call it 
Great Life—is very compelling.  Parfit asks us to imagine two possible lives.  In 
the first life, Parfit (1984: 498) lives for fifty years, and these fifty years are of 
an extremely high quality: Parfit “would be very happy, would achieve great 
things, do much good, and love and be loved by many people.”  In the second 
life, Parfit (1984: 498) would live indefinitely, but the quality of his life would be 
such that it was always just barely worth living: “there would be nothing bad 
about this life, and it would each day contain a few small pleasures.”  
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Summative theories will have to claim that the second life is better for Parfit if 
it lasts long enough.  Parfit (1984: 498-99) disagrees; he thinks that, in both 
Drug Addict and Great Life, the first lives are better and, as a result, he rejects 
summative theories.8 
 Leaving the choice of lives in Drug Addict aside for the moment, it seems 
likely that almost everyone will choose the first (great) life in Parfit’s Great Life 
example.  If that is so, then it supports the conclusion that summative theories 
are less plausible than global theories.9  A solid understanding of the reason 
for this should prove to be instructive.  First, note that I claimed almost 
everyone would choose the fifty-year life in Great Life.  This is an important 
qualification, and how we characterize the dissenters has significant 
implications.  If we characterize the decision of the people who would choose 
what Parfit (1986: 160) calls elsewhere the “Drab Eternity” as being necessarily 
wrong, then Parfit’s global theories are merely an attempt to put lipstick on the 
objective-list-theory pig.   The claim that the dissenters in this case are 
necessarily wrong is equivalent to the claim that the things contained in the 
fifty-year life just do make a life go better no matter what anyone’s attitude 
                                       
8 Carson (2000: 73-74) examines the same issue and agrees with Parfit that 
“the global view is preferable to the summative view.”  Griffin (1986: 144-45) 
also endorses the primacy of global desires. 
 
9 It is not my goal to present a full-fledged defense of global theories.  For the 
purposes of this project, I think it is sufficient to show that summative theories 
get the wrong answer in, at a minimum, Great Life, and that global theories 
give us a way, at least on their face, to choose the fifty-year life in Great Life.  
In other words, global theories address desires about one’s whole life or some 
part thereof and these theories, at least presumably, allow one to desire the 
fifty-year life over the indefinite.  
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toward them might be.  This would be a claim that appeals to facts that are 
directly about value—a hallmark of objective-list theories.  Desire-satisfaction 
theories like CS, on the other hand, are purely descriptive in that they claim 
that things only have value insofar as they involve desires.  In other words, a 
thing makes a person’s life go better if and because it is desired.  As I reject 
claims that appeal directly to facts about value for the reasons previously 
stated and because I think there is a better solution to this issue, I will not 
treat Parfit’s intuitions in Great Life as an endorsement of objective-list 
theories. 
 Parfit (1984: 498) claims that “there are countless cases in which it is 
true both (1) that, if someone’s life went in one of two ways, this would produce 
a greater sum total of local desire-fulfillment, but (2) that the other alternative 
is what he would globally prefer, whichever way his actual life went.”  Drug 
Addict and Great Life are meant to be two of these countless cases, but if we do 
not appeal directly to facts about value, then what is the best way to explain 
them within a desire-satisfaction theory framework?  Caring provides the 
explanation for most people’s intuition in both cases and, I think, in any of the 
other countless cases as well.  In the case in which Parfit (1984: 497) offers to 
make you a Drug Addict, he says “we can plausibly suppose that you would 
not welcome my proposal.”  The best explanation for this is that the average 
person does not care about becoming a drug addict and, perhaps, does care 
about not becoming a drug addict due to some second-hand experience with 
this topic. 
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Resorting to caring as a solution becomes even more obvious when we 
examine Great Life.  In Parfit’s (1984: 498) example, there is a great deal to 
care about in the fifty-year life for most people; you “would be very happy, 
would achieve great things, do much good, and love and be loved by many 
people.”  In the alternative life of infinite duration, nothing at all that most 
people care about occurs; “there would be nothing bad about this life, and it 
would each day contain a few small pleasures” (Parfit 1984: 498).  Therefore, it 
is plausible to suppose that your personal welfare in Great Life could be very 
high, while in Drab Eternity it would be at or near zero⎯on par with, in terms 
of welfare, never having lived at all.10 
 Caring Satisfactionism can, I think, be employed to explain most of the 
central intuitions of most (all?) of the other theories of personal welfare.  This 
goes, of course, for both of the other major theoretical camps on 
offer⎯hedonism (most people care about the attainment of pleasure and the 
avoidance of pain) and objective-list theories (many, or perhaps most, people 
care about getting many, or perhaps most, of the items that appear on most of 
the proposed objective lists).  However, the time has come to determine if CS 
                                       
10 Considering a slight variant of these cases might also prove to be instructive.  
Leaving the details of Great Life as they are, we can change the details of Drab 
Eternity to directly challenge CS.  In Fab Eternity there would again be nothing 
bad about this life, and it would each day contain the satisfaction of a few first-
order desires that you care⎯only slightly⎯about having satisfied.  Here CS will 
claim, rightly, that life goes better for you in Fab Eternity than it does in Great 
Life.  The claim that Great Life is better for you than Fab Eternity (remember: 
there is nothing bad about this life and each day will contain things that you 
actually care about) is not plausible. 
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can handle two of the problems that are thought to be, if not deadly, then 
extremely difficult for any desire-based approach to solve. 
IV. THE PROBLEM OF SELF-SACRIFICE 
 It is hard to overstate both how detrimental to a desire theory approach 
the problem of self-sacrifice is thought to be and how widely this belief is held 
among philosophers who work in this area.  In what follows I will provide the 
necessary background for both of these claims and then demonstrate how CS 
solves the problem of self-sacrifice. 
 Before addressing the actual argument from self-sacrifice against desire 
theory, we should be very clear about both the target of the argument and the 
indispensable premise that drives it.  The target of the argument is desire 
satisfactionism, of course, but a very particular form in which the agent’s self-
interest is whatever the agent wants most to do.  The bedrock premise that 
drives the argument is that there are at least some cases of actual self-sacrifice 
in the world. 
 The argument, then, is as follows: (1) unless a theory of personal welfare 
can account for this premise (i.e., allow for the possibility of self-sacrifice), then 
the theory is false; (2) desire theory cannot allow for the possibility of self-
sacrifice; (3) therefore, desire theory is false.  The reason for desire theory’s 
failure, or so the argument goes, involves the overlap between the target 
version of the theory and the components of self-sacrifice.  In what appears to 
be the article in which this objection was first given a thorough treatment, 
Mark Carl Overvold (1980: 109-14) claims, roughly, that for an act to be one of 
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self-sacrifice, (1) the loss must be anticipated, (2) the act must be voluntary, 
and (3) there must be at least one other alternative open to the agent that 
would be more in his self-interest.  For the purposes of clearly formulating the 
objection, it will help to reformulate (1), as Overvold himself does later (1980: 
119), so the agent has “an accurate assessment of his alternatives” or “knows 
what he is doing.”  The problem is that the target version of the theory and the 
analysis of acts of self-sacrifice share (1) and (2), yet they reach different 
conclusions on occasion in (3).  In other words, the target version of desire 
satisfactionism claims that if a person knows what he is doing and he does it 
voluntarily (where we only voluntarily do what we most want to do), then (3') 
the act just is what is in our self-interest.  The analysis of acts of self-sacrifice 
claims that some acts that the agent knows he is doing and does voluntarily 
are (3) not what is in the agent’s self-interest. 
 Although this objection was raised relatively recently, it was the 
inevitable next step in the debate over desire theory.  When it was first 
suggested that well-being was increased when a person got what she wanted, 
the critics’ obvious first move was to point to cases in which it was pretty clear 
that well-being was not enhanced when a desire was satisfied.  As pointed out 
in an earlier chapter, the proponents’ next move was to claim that if the agent 
has been properly informed about the consequences of her desire and then 
performed the act aimed at satisfying her desire, then the satisfaction of this 
informed desire would enhance her well-being.  The argument from self-
sacrifice is the critics’ inevitable response to this form of the theory⎯the agent 
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is informed about the consequences of her act, she voluntarily acts to satisfy 
her desire, and it still does not enhance her well-being.  And it is precisely due 
to the rise in popularity of informed desire versions of the theory that this has 
become such a popular objection.  In addition to Overvold, this objection (or its 
nearest cousin⎯the accusation that desire theory has an incurable case of 
egoism) has been pressed by Sen (1977: 323), Brandt (1982: 173), Schwartz 
(1982: 199), Griffin (1986: 316 n.25), Haslett (1990: 79-80), Sumner (1996: 
134), Adams (1999: 89), Carson (2000: 76), and Darwall (2002: 27). 
 Although this list of formidable philosophers makes this objection seem 
rather daunting, Caring Satisfactionism actually handles genuine cases of self-
sacrifice quite well.  Before demonstrating how CS handles these cases, 
however, we should be clear about what, exactly, these cases are.  First, and 
most obviously, the act at issue must be voluntary (Overvold 1980: 109).  It is 
not a case of self-sacrifice when the Fat Man is pushed onto the tracks to stop 
the trolley and its five passengers from suffering a fiery crash.  Second, the 
agent must anticipate the loss (Overvold 1980: 109).  If I voluntarily step in 
front of you and thereby take a bullet that I did not know was coming, then 
this is also not a case of self-sacrifice.  Finally, we must distinguish between 
self-sacrifice and what Overvold (1980: 109) calls “cutting one’s losses,” which 
involves cases in which the agent “is forced to choose among his desires for 
incompatible things,” yet the chosen act is not actually worse for the agent 
(Overvold 1980: 109).  For example, one might elect to have surgery, and thus 
sacrifice some degree of short-term comfort, for the sake of one’s long-term 
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health.  While this does involve a sacrifice, it is not a case of self-sacrifice 
because the surgery is in the agent’s best interests considered as a whole.  Acts 
of self-sacrifice must actually involve embarking upon a path that is not in the 
agent’s best interests considered as a whole. 
 To see how CS deals with these cases, an example from Overvold (1980: 
115) will prove illuminating: 
 Consider the following which we would normally regard as a 
central case of self-sacrifice: During a war, a man is ordered to 
carry out an operation which he knows will cause the death of 
many innocent victims.  He correctly believes that he has only two 
viable alternatives: carry out the order and be rewarded for his 
efforts with fame and promotion, or refuse, and as a result lose his 
own life.  Given a week to decide, he carefully considers these 
options, and finally refuses and as a result is executed.  Since he 
knew he would lose his life, but still chose to perform the act, he 
meets the first two conditions of self-sacrifice.  But did he actually 
suffer a loss of welfare?  Ordinarily, we would treat his loss of life 
as sufficient for saying that there was a net loss of welfare, and 
hence that he had acted contrary to his self-interest.  We can 
strengthen the claim if we add that the man correctly believed that 
although he would be bothered by guilt for awhile if he carried out 
the orders he would eventually get over it and live a happy and 
rewarding life. 
 
The interesting thing about Overvold’s description of the soldier’s case is that 
he seems to anticipate the correct general form of desire theory that will avoid 
this objection without realizing it.  In the last sentence of the excerpt, Overvold 
(1980: 115) says that “we can strengthen the claim” basically by stipulating 
that, if the man carries out the order, his welfare will be high in the future.  
Overvold, unfortunately, stops his inquiry here.  The path for the desire 
theorist, however, should be clear.  One need only ask: What would make it the 
case that the soldier’s post-war welfare would be high?  The answer from desire 
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theory generally⎯and CS in particular⎯is that there are a great number of 
relevant desire (or caring) satisfactions in the future part of his life. 
 The key to the Caring Satisfactionism solution to the problem is 
summing up and comparing all of the caring satisfactions and frustrations in 
both life paths available to the soldier.  When the soldier is executed, there are 
no future caring satisfactions or frustrations⎯the story of how well his life 
went for him is over.  When the soldier lives, his life will include all of the 
caring satisfactions and frustrations contained in the life in which he is 
executed (at least up to the point he makes his decision) plus the net positive 
balance of caring satisfactions and frustrations he enjoys in his post-war life 
(i.e., his “happy and rewarding life”).  In this way, CS allows for cases of self-
sacrifice and correctly tells us that this is a genuine case. 
 Well that’s all well and good, or so you might say, but what was all the 
fuss about then?  The sheer number of philosophers throwing self-sacrifice 
rocks at desire theory’s windows does seem to cry out for an error theory.  
There is much that could be written here, but I shall attempt to be brief.  First, 
the version of desire theory at which Overvold’s influential formulation of the 
objection is aimed was a version formulated by Brandt (1972: 686-86).  
Brandt’s version is an informed desire account (which I argued against 
thoroughly in Chapter Four) and which is so imperfectly formulated that 
Brandt (1979: 247) has himself rejected it.  Second, proponents of this 
objection from self-sacrifice, for the most part, have their own theories of 
personal welfare and thus may not be trying to reformulate desire theory in 
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order to meet this objection.  Finally, there appears to be a very prevalent 
misconception about desire theory that is doing most of the work here.  This 
misconception is that desire theory must (often? usually?) claim that if I prefer 
one path to another, then the path I prefer, and thus choose, is the path that 
maximizes my welfare.  This is not a claim that desire theory needs to make, 
and it should not do so since the claim is quite clearly erroneous.  If self-
sacrifice is possible⎯and it is⎯then we do not always choose what is best for 
us, even assuming, as informed desire theories do, that we know everything 
that will occur as a result of any action under consideration.11  Even though 
desire theory might claim that the satisfaction of the initial desire to embark on 
the sub-optimal path is good for the agent, it need not claim that the rest of the 
path is best for the agent.  This is because the theory need not rely on the 
agent’s choice to determine the best path.  Rather, as suggested earlier, the 
                                       
11 For an interesting account of knowing what is best and not choosing it, see 
Dostoevsky’s (1989: 3) Underground Man in Notes from Underground: 
 I am a sick man. . . .  I am a spiteful man.  I am a most 
unpleasant man.  I think my liver is diseased.  Then again, I don’t 
know a thing about my illness; I’m not even sure what hurts.  I’m 
not being treated and never have been, though I respect both 
medicine and doctors.  Besides, I’m extremely superstitious⎯well 
at least enough to respect medicine.  (I’m sufficiently educated not 
to be superstitious; but I am, anyway.)  No, gentlemen, it’s out of 
spite that I don’t wish to be treated.  Now then, that’s something 
you probably won’t understand.  Well, I do.  Of course, I won’t 
really be able to explain to you precisely who will be hurt by my 
spite in this case; I know perfectly well that I can’t possibly “get 
even” with doctors by refusing their treatment; I know better than 
anyone that all this is going to hurt me alone, and no one else.  
Even so, if I refuse to be treated, it’s out of spite.  My liver hurts?  
Good, let it hurt even more! 
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theory can simply sum the relevant caring satisfactions and frustrations on 
each path in order to determine what is best. 
V. DESIRING THE BAD & DESIRING NOT TO BE WELL-OFF 
 The desire for the bad and the desire not to be well-off are sometimes 
grouped together and presented as one objection, but they actually pose 
different problems for desire theories. In this section I will examine these 
desires and their related problems to see if they prove problematic for Caring 
Satisfactionism. 
 One of the problems associated with the desire not to be well-off is in the 
form of a paradox.  For example, suppose I have just two desires: I want a lover 
who won’t drive me crazy with an intensity of 5, and I want not to be well-off 
with an intensity of 10.  Employing a very basic desire-satisfaction theory of 
welfare, when my lover drives me crazy (thus frustrating my desire), my welfare 
score is a -5.  So now I am not well-off.  However, my desire not to be well-off is 
now satisfied, which seems to give me a welfare score of +5.  But now I am no 
longer not well-off.  As Heathwood (2005: 502) says, “My desire that my welfare 
be negative is satisfied if and only if it is not satisfied.”  This paradox occurs 
only when welfare hovers around zero, but it is a paradox nonetheless. 
Feldman (2004: 17) and Bradley (2007: 46) both think this paradox 
makes desire theory at least less plausible and possibly false.  However, 
Heathwood (2005: 502-03) points out that even if the desire not to be well-off is 
possible, this paradox is simply inherited from paradoxes involving desires 
generally and that “however the more basic paradoxes are solved so will the 
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paradoxes for desire-satisfaction theories be solved.”  In other words, this 
paradox is everyone’s paradox, not just the desire theorist’s.12  Since this is 
quite clearly the case, this problem need not detain us any longer. 
The other problem often associated with the desire not to be well-off is, 
perhaps, more worthy of an in-depth analysis.  Desire theory claims, roughly, 
that things I want are good for me if and because I want them.  This version of 
the desire-not-to-be-well-off objection says that sometimes a person can want 
things because they are bad for him (Adams 1999: 89).  If that is true, then 
these bad things are not good for me by definition and, therefore, desire theory 
is false. 
 The first task presented by this objection is to attempt to understand 
what it means.  The most plausible versions of desire theory, including CS, 
claim that, roughly, having a desire satisfied is always good for you even 
though it may be all-things-considered bad for you because of what the 
satisfaction of your desire leads to.  For example, the satisfaction of my desire 
for a drink is good for me even though it causes a state of affairs that is all-
                                       
12 Moreover, Bradley (2007: 47) notes that there is a paradox of the type 
described lurking for every theory that claims “how well things go for a person 
is determined by (i) the person’s attitudes towards states of affairs or 
propositions (desiring them, believing them, taking pleasure in them), and (ii) 
whether those states of affairs are true.”  In other words, the only theories that 
can avoid this sort of paradox either completely ignore the person’s attitudes 
toward the things that are supposedly good for them (e.g., objective-list theory), 
or completely ignore whether the state of affairs the person has the relevant 
attitude toward actually obtains (e.g., hedonism of the experience-machine-
lives-are-great-for-welfare variety), or completely ignore both of these things 
(e.g., I have no idea what such a theory would look like).  Accordingly⎯if the 
analysis was correct up to the beginning of Chapter Five⎯then a paradox of 
this sort is going to arise for the right theory of welfare. 
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things-considered bad for me because the water was polluted and makes me 
sick.  This objection is aimed at eliminating the idea that the initial desire 
satisfaction is always good for a person.  And it does this by appealing to 
another theory of welfare without expressly doing so and without naming it.  
Remember the case: You want something because it is bad for you.  The only 
theory that can do the intuitive and theoretical work here is some version of an 
objective-list theory.13  In other words, the objection claims that there just are 
some sensations, or mental states, or something that is bad for a person to get, 
that it is possible to want these things for their bad qualities, and that 
therefore desire theory is false. 
 This version of the desire-not-to-be-well-off objection results in a solid 
strategy for the objective-list theorist because it is at precisely this point that 
objective-list theory in general, and hedonism in particular, is most plausible.  
For it does, at first blush, appear that certain things like pain, or boredom, or 
NASCAR just are not good for you whether you want them or not.  However, as 
we saw previously, objective-list theories are not plausible and, accordingly, 
should not be able to get the thin edge of their wedge in using this objection. 
 Although this objection is little more than an attempt to reopen the 
objective-list theory debate on terms favorable to that family of theories, let us 
suppose that I am wrong here.  What should desire theory generally, and CS in 
                                       
13 For purposes of simplicity here, I am grouping hedonism in with other 
objective-list theories since hedonism is just a (very short) objective-list theory.  
Of course, there could be a version of “hedonism” that claimed that pleasure 
and pain were a function of our desires, but this version of hedonism could not 
serve as the basis for this objection. 
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particular, have to say about the desire not to be well-off?  The first thing to 
note here is the difficulty in assessing this scenario due to the murkiness of the 
human psyche.  Nowhere is this fact more obvious than it is here, as what we 
are being asked to consider and evaluate is a condition in which, roughly, a 
person wants something because he does not want it.14 
 Described in this way, this objection should immediately raise doubts as 
to the possibility of this desire.  Perhaps this doubt is the reason this objection 
has not been pursued more frequently in the literature.  In fact, there is only 
one supposed case in any of the literature (to which everyone else cites), and it 
is not clear that this one case demonstrates what it purports to.  The belle of 
the desire-not-to-be-well-off ball is Richard Kraut’s  (1994: 40-41) self-
punisher: 
It is conceptually and psychologically possible for people to decide, 
voluntarily and with due deliberation, to renounce their good in 
favor of an alternative goal.  They can clearheadedly design a long-
range plan and fulfill it, thereby satisfying their deepest desires, in 
spite of the fact that they realize all the while that what they are 
doing is bad for them.  In fact, they can carry out certain plans 
precisely because they think that it is bad for them to do so.  For 
example, suppose a man has committed a serious crime at an 
earlier point in his life, and although he now regrets having done 
so, he realizes that no one will believe him if he confesses.  So he 
decides to inflict a punishment upon himself for a period of several 
years.  He abandons his current line of work, which he loves, and 
takes a job that he considers boring, arduous, and insignificant.  
He does not regard this as a way of serving others, because he 
realizes that what he will be doing is useless.  His aim is simply to 
balance the evil he has done to others with a comparable evil for 
himself.  Taking a pill to relieve his pangs of guilt would be of no 
use, since his aim is to do himself harm, not to make himself feel 
                                       
14 Assuming both that the Motivational Theory of Pleasure (which I argued for 
previously) is true and that this objection is not merely an objective-list theory 
in disguise. 
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good.  He punishes himself because he regards this as a moral 
necessity, and when he carries out his punishment, he does so 
from a sense of duty rather than a joyful love of justice and 
certainly with no relish for the particular job he is doing. 
 
Feldman (2004: 17) and Adams (1999: 89) cite Kraut approvingly, but do not 
elaborate or provide additional detail.  That is the entire list of those 
philosophers who seem to agree unequivocally with this particular objection 
and the subsequent conclusion. 
 Carson (2000: 88-92) and Heathwood (2005: 501-02) are the other two 
philosophers who discuss this version of the objection.  Although they each 
view the case differently, neither agrees with Kraut’s conclusion on the basis of 
the described case, and together they cover the most basic desire theory 
responses to this version of the desire-not-to be-well-off objection. 
 Heathwood (2005: 501-02) appears to take Kraut’s self-punisher⎯let us 
call him Special K⎯at face value.  Heathwood assumes that Special K has a 
desire not to be well-off and that taking the boring, arduous, insignificant job 
will most likely serve to make Special K’s life go badly for him.  This is of course 
contrary to Kraut’s conclusion about what a desire theory would have to 
conclude about Special K.  Heathwood (2005: 502) reaches his conclusion that 
Special K is probably not well-off by noting that his job is, by Kraut’s own 
description, full of frequent, daily desire frustrations (e.g., to be bored is to 
want to do something else) and that all these frustrations add up to a bad life 
for the one who lives it.  Granted, Special K does have one thing that is 
intrinsically good for him⎯the satisfaction of the desire not to be well-off⎯yet 
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this desire satisfaction probably does (and actually must)15 count for less in 
terms of welfare than the sum of all the desire frustrations from his bad job.  
Thus, Heathwood uses desire theory to arrive at the conclusion Kraut claims 
desire theory could not produce⎯namely, that Special K’s life is going badly for 
him. 
 Carson (2000: 89), on the other hand, says that “on the basis of Kraut’s 
description of the case, I’m not sure that we should say that self-punishment is 
contrary to the person’s long-term interests.”  Indeed, most instances of 
punishment, and perhaps all instances of morally justifiable punishment, are 
not aimed at making the punishee worse off long-term.  Parents punish 
children millions of times per day, and the goal is rarely, if ever, to make the 
child’s life go worse long-term.  And if we relocate the punisher and the 
punishee within one psyche, it becomes less clear that the punisher could 
intend to make the punishee worse off long-term.  As Carson (2000: 90) says, 
“In order to make this argument work, Kraut needs to describe the kind of case 
he has in mind very carefully.” 
 Accordingly, even though Kraut (1994: 40) claims that it is “conceptually 
and psychologically possible” to carry out a plan because it is bad for you, it is 
not clear that this is indeed true.  Moreover, Kraut’s Special K case does not 
establish this as a legitimate possibility.  Instead of describing Special K as 
                                       
15 The desire not to be well-off must count for less, in terms of welfare, than the 
total of all the frustrations; otherwise, the desire not to be well-off will no longer 
be satisfied.  This is the paradox involving the desire not to be well-off that is 
discussed at the beginning of this section. 
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having a desire not to be well-off, we could describe him as having a desire to 
have a life that includes certain frustrations.  However, this description is 
perfectly compatible with having a desire to be as well-off as he can given his 
past, and even with having a desire to be well-off, period.  This is because it is 
reasonable to assume that Special K’s feelings of guilt will ruin the first-order 
desire satisfaction he receives in the job he loves.  He does not think he 
deserves them, has a higher-order desire to no longer have these first-order 
desires satisfied, and thus finds his life going worse as a result.  Alternatively, 
if he takes the bad job, the feelings of guilt are easier to handle due to the 
frustration of many of his first-order desires for which he has a higher-order 
desire.  This view of Special K’s available options demonstrates (1) that the 
upper end of lives in terms of personal welfare is foreclosed to Special K due to 
his feelings of guilt, and (2) given that how well a life is going needs to be 
considered in relation to possible alternatives at the time, Special K’s life goes 
best for him when he takes the bad job.  He chose a course that is better all 
things considered, yet is worse from the standpoint of first-order desire 
satisfaction and frustration alone because he values the higher-order 
desire⎯one based on moral considerations with the object being certain first-
order desire frustrations⎯in a way that he does not value the first-order 
desires.  In this way, perhaps Special K’s life is going well for him despite the 
bad job.  And this might continue to be the case if and until his relevant mix of 
desires and their associated intensities change.16 
                                       
16 For much of this paragraph I am indebted to Michael Tooley’s comments on 
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 So Kraut’s case, the only one in the literature, is not clearly a case of 
desiring the bad because it is bad, and it is not clear that this is even 
conceptually or psychologically possible.  Moreover, depending on how one fills 
in the details, desire theory is quite capable of producing the answer that 
Special K’s life is either going poorly for him or going as well as possible given 
his particular history and psychological make-up.  The desire at issue is odd, 
at best, and it makes sorting out the relevant psychological features even 
harder than normal. 
 Caring Satisfactionism is also capable of producing a range of welfare 
scores depending on how we describe this type of case (assuming, again, that 
these desires are possible).  Following Heathwood’s reading of Kraut’s Special K 
case, CS would accurately produce a poor welfare score for Special K.  The 
basic idea is that Special K cares about not performing the “boring, arduous, 
and insignificant” tasks that fill his days.  When he does perform these tasks, 
the desires Special K cares about are frustrated, and CS claims that his life is 
going poorly. 
 Alternatively, CS can produce the outcome that Special K’s life is going 
as well for him as possible given the circumstances.  Following Carson (2000: 
90), let us assume that Special K “has an interest in his own moral purity.”  
Accordingly, what Special K does care about is that some of his first-order 
desires should be frustrated.  So when he takes the bad job and experiences 
these frustrations, he is as contented with this state of affairs as possible given 
                                                                                                                           
a prior presentation of these ideas. 
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his past history and subsequent regret because he takes these frustrations to 
be serving a moral function that he holds dear. 
 A few notes about this Carson-style reading of Kraut’s case are in order.  
First, there is nothing odd about caring about having certain first-order desires 
frustrated.  We often would like some of our first-order desires frustrated when 
they pertain to smoking, drinking, eating, etc.  If there is fault to be found with 
the frustrations Special K seeks, then it will have to be because of Special K’s 
underlying reason for caring about these frustrations.  Since the reason is a 
moral one, we would have to exclude moral reasons from our theory of welfare.  
However, as I argued previously, this is a non-starter.  Kraut (1994: 50 n.5) 
raises and rejects this very possibility: “Desires to be a good friend, a good 
father, or a good citizen all have moral content; and it is hard to see why we 
should rule out the possibility that satisfying these desires can be good.”  
Second, it is probably correct to point out that Special K’s life could be going 
much better for him if only he cared about other things.  However, the problem 
here is Special K and his particular psychological make-up, not the theory.  
And if it were a problem with the theory, then it is a problem for every theory 
that gives any weight to the particular make-up of the person at issue (which, 
of course, any plausible theory does).  Third, it is useful to remember that what 
Special K cares about could change at any time.  So if he wakes up one day 
and thinks he has paid his dues and now cares about performing his old, good 
job instead, then CS will say that his life is now going poorly if he stays in the 
bad job and would go well if he were to get his old job back. 
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 The bottom line for determining how Kraut’s case should come out is 
getting to the bottom of what Special K really cares about.  This is often 
difficult to determine, even for the person involved.  The task is further 
complicated in this case because we are on the outside looking in at a fictional 
case with limited details, and we are supposed to try to understand a person’s 
wanting what he does not want.  However, as we have seen, CS is flexible 
enough to produce the correct outcome in this case, whichever description 
turns out to be accurate. 
VI. THE PARADOX OF WELFARE 
 Personal welfare, in terms of topics that have received serious, sustained 
philosophical treatment, is relatively young.  Prior to 1980 or so, there is little 
more than a smattering of terse pronouncements from most of the leading 
figures in the history of philosophy, from Plato all the way up to Rawls.  Given 
this somewhat surprising fact, it is little wonder, then, that some of the debate 
is still confused.  Unfortunately, the debate is still deeply confused on at least 
two topics in particular.  The first we have visited many times and in many 
ways over the course of this project.  The issue involves the concept of personal 
welfare itself.  The easiest, albeit rough, way to characterize this confusion is to 
describe it as a debate between those theorists who are attempting to define 
what constitutes a good life and those theorists who are attempting to define 
what constitutes a good life for the person who lives it.  It is the latter category 
that is (hopefully) the topic of this project and what is meant by the terms and 
phrases well-being, personal welfare, a life that is intrinsically valuable for a 
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subject, what makes a life go best for the person who lives it, etc.  However, it 
is the issue of what constitutes a good life, full stop (i.e., not for a subject but, 
perhaps, for the world) that many who are purportedly engaged in this debate 
are concerned with, whether or not they realize it.  Objective-list theorists, 
perfectionism theorists, and those who argue for the plausibility of posthumous 
benefits and harms are just a few examples.  For the most part, the theorists 
who think they are making a case for these things in the personal welfare 
debate either are confused about the topic under discussion or refuse to 
acknowledge that a good life for the person who lives it need not be pretty, 
interesting, or moral. 
 The second serious confusion is located entirely within the topic of 
personal welfare and, perhaps for this reason, is harder to spot.  And I think it 
has done more to hamper progress than any other single issue in the debate.  
But before attempting to properly formulate the issue, I would like to put it in 
context in order to see where the difficulty arose. 
 Chapter Three of this project is a rather extensive treatment of, among 
other things, the origins of our desires and the role they play in the 
complexities of the human psyche.  Perhaps this discussion seemed out of 
place in a project on well-being, yet its function was to combat a specific family 
of problems in the debate.  This family of problems stems from the fact that 
within the personal welfare debate, rarely, if ever, is one presented with a 
nuanced and detailed description of the relevant parts of the human psyche in 
general and desires in particular.  Reading the literature gives one the 
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impression that desires are the sort of thing you might find under your couch 
cushions or in the bulk section at Whole Foods.  Of course it is not quite that 
bad, but desires are often presented as just these free-floating things inside 
your head. 
 This impoverished presentation of the mind and the desires within it has 
led to a series of problems for friends and foes alike in the debate over desire 
theory.  Although Derek Parfit is undoubtedly a genius, and his Reasons and 
Persons (1984) is certainly brilliant and arguably the most influential single 
work in ethics of the twentieth century, the problem seems to have taken root 
there.  Tucked away in Appendix I (yes, the ninth of ten appendices) of Parfit’s 
tome is this (now extensively cited) story that we encountered previously:17 
 Consider next Desire-Fulfilment Theories.  The simplest is 
the Unrestricted Theory.  This claims that what is best for someone 
is what would best fulfil all of his desires, throughout his life.  
Suppose that I meet a stranger who has what is believed to be a 
fatal disease.  My sympathy is aroused, and I strongly want this 
stranger to be cured.  We never meet again.  Later, unknown to 
me, this stranger is cured.  On the Unrestricted Desire-Fulfiment 
[sic] theory, this event is good for me, and makes my life go better.  
This is not plausible.  We should reject this theory.  (Parfit 1984: 
494) 
 
 Parfit’s point is well taken.  However, whereas I claim that the problem 
here is either that Parfit does not really care about the stranger or that Parfit 
never knows the stranger has been cured (or both), Parfit sends the debate in a 
different direction.  “Another theory,” Parfit (1984: 494) says in the next 
sentence after the quoted extract above, “appeals only to our desires about our 
                                       
17 Parfit was not the first to tackle this idea; that seems to have been Overvold 
in 1982.  Yet the popularity of Reasons and Persons seems to have made 
Parfit’s Stranger the common point of departure for discussions of this issue. 
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own lives.”  Parfit (1984: 494) clearly prefers this option, what he calls “Success 
Theory,” to unrestricted desire-fulfillment theory, and he never explicitly rejects 
it.  However, Parfit (1984: 494) does note that “when [success theory] appeals 
only to desires that are about our own lives, it may be unclear what this 
excludes.”  Parfit never formulates a clear answer to this.  Instead, he considers 
(and rejects) the possibility that the desire that all of my desires be satisfied is 
about my own life, gives one example of a desire that is about my own life, one 
example of a desire that is not, and moves on. 
 Parfit’s Stranger objection has moved the debate, I think, in one general 
direction that has manifested itself in at least three distinct objections.  The 
first, and most general, way to formulate the objection is that desire theory is 
too broad.  Griffin (1986: 16-17), citing Parfit’s Stranger, phrases it just this 
way: 
The breadth of the [desire theory] account, which is its attraction, 
is also its great flaw. . . .  The trouble is that one’s desires spread 
themselves so widely over the world that their objects extend far 
outside the bound of what, with any plausibility, one could take as 
touching one’s own well-being. 
 
Kagan appears to be making a similar argument for the same idea with his 
Prime Number Fan.  He asks us to imagine that he is a huge fan of prime 
numbers who desires that the total number of atoms in the universe is prime 
(Kagan 1998: 37).  When this turns out to be the case, the version of desire 
theory he presents will claim that his life is going better as a result: “But this is 
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absurd.  The number of atoms in the universe has nothing at all to do with the 
quality of my life” (Kagan 1998: 37).18 
 The second way of framing the objection is to offer it up as a necessary 
restriction designed to make desire theory more plausible by limiting the 
breadth of the account to desires that are about one’s own life.  As we have 
seen, this is what Parfit (1984: 494) proposes.  Overvold, (1982: 188) writing 
before Parfit, suggested a similar restriction: “only desires and aversions that 
are relevant to the determination of an individual’s, S’s, self-interest are S’s 
desires and aversions for states of affairs in which S is an essential 
constituent.”  Carson (2000: 76) has some reservations about Overvold’s 
theory, but says that “nevertheless, to date, it is the best and most fully 
developed attempt to restrict the desire-satisfaction theory, and it is a theory 
that lends itself to further refinement and improvement.”  Portmore (2007: 27), 
citing both Parfit’s Stranger and Kagan’s Prime Number Fan, also thinks desire 
theory needs this restriction if it is to be plausible (which, apparently, he 
ultimately does not think it is) and claims the following: 
First, as most desire theorists acknowledge, the theory must be 
restricted in such a way that only those desires that pertain to 
one’s own life count in determining one’s welfare.  The problem is 
that no one has yet provided a plausible account of which desires 
these are . . . . 
 
                                       
18 Again here, as with Parfit’s Stranger, what is doing the intuitive work is the 
fact that Kagan could never know the number of atoms in the universe is 
prime, and it is hard to imagine anyone actually caring about this at all 
(although, as mentioned previously, it is obviously possible for a person to care 
about this). 
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 Ultimately, this line of thought paints itself into a corner from which 
there is no escape.  This can be seen in the third and final way this Parfit’s-
Stranger-style objection manifests itself.  What began as an objection to the 
breadth of desire theory, and then focused on requiring desire theory to count 
only those desires that are about one’s own life, now focuses even more tightly 
on needing to be selfish.  As with many topics, Sidgwick (1907: 109) anticipates 
this move when he proposes to “consider only what a man desires for 
itself⎯not as a means to an ulterior result,⎯and for himself⎯not benevolently 
for others: his own Good and ultimate Good.”  Schwartz (1982: 199), also 
writing before Parfit’s Stranger, takes the same line: “Roughly speaking, self-
regarding preferences are ones not based on any ultimate objective of 
promoting the welfare, the goals, or the happiness of anyone but their subject.  
Only such preferences (and perhaps not even they) constitute strong evidence 
of what is good for this subject.”  Sen (1985: 190) pursues a similar line of 
thought when he claims “that connection [between what a person regards as 
valuable and the value of the person’s well-being] will be weakened precisely by 
the fact that a person may well value things other than personal well-being.”  
Sumner (1996: 120) seems to be getting at this same idea: “The fact that I 
choose x rather than y (or would choose it if I could) does not show that I 
expect a higher personal payoff from it, since my choice may be motivated by 
other considerations, such as altruism or a sense of obligation.”  Adams (1999: 
87-88) continues this trend by claiming that both altruistic and idealistic 
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desires (involving virtues and other ideals) can lead you to do what is not best 
for you. 
 Thus we have the predictable end to this line of reasoning.  Employing 
some misleading hypotheticals, desire theory is thought to be too broad.  Given 
the nature of the misleading hypotheticals, the consensus becomes that desires 
relevant to welfare must be limited to those desires that are about your own 
life.  But what does that mean?  Can’t it just be that I want whatever it is that I 
want?  No, because then we are right back where we started⎯an account of 
welfare that is too broad because we can want anything.  Well, what then?  The 
desires that are relevant to welfare must be about your own life in that they 
must be selfish desires dealing directly with your own welfare. 
 The problem is that this road is a dead end.  Accordingly, it is not a 
surprise to find that no one has been able to formulate a decent account of 
what welfare-related desires are at the end of this path.  The reason for this is 
that the dead end actually takes the form of the paradox of welfare. Joel 
Feinberg’s (2006: 531-32) description, although discussing the paradox of 
hedonism, illustrates the problem nicely: 
Imagine a person (let’s call him “Jones”) who is, first of all, devoid 
of intellectual curiosity.  He has no desire to acquire any kind of 
knowledge for its own sake, and thus is utterly indifferent to 
questions of science, mathematics, and philosophy.  Imagine 
further that the beauties of nature leave Jones cold: he is 
unimpressed by the autumn foliage, the snowcapped mountains, 
and the rolling oceans.  Long walks in the country on spring 
mornings and skiing forays in the winter are to him equally a bore.  
Moreover, let us suppose that Jones can find no appeal in art.  
Novels are dull, poetry a pain, paintings nonsense and music just 
noise.  Suppose further that Jones has neither the participant’s 
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nor the spectator’s passion for baseball, football, tennis, or any 
other sport.  Swimming to him is a cruel aquatic form of 
calisthenics, the sun only a cause of sunburn.  Dancing is 
coeducational idiocy, conversation a waste of time, the other sex 
an unappealing mystery.  Politics is a fraud, religion mere 
superstition; and the misery of millions of underprivileged human 
beings is nothing to be concerned with or excited about.  Suppose 
finally that Jones has no talent for any kind of handicraft, 
industry, or commerce, and that he does not regret that fact. 
 What then is Jones interested in?  He must desire 
something.  To be sure, he does.  Jones has an overwhelming 
passion for, a complete preoccupation with, his own [welfare].  The 
one exclusive desire of his life is to [increase his own personal 
welfare].  It takes little imagination at this point to see that Jones’s 
one desire is bound to be frustrated.  People who⎯like 
Jones⎯most hotly pursue their own [welfare] are the least likely to 
find it.  [People leading lives high in welfare] are those who 
successfully pursue such things as aesthetic or religious 
experience, self-expression, service to others, victory in 
competitions, knowledge, power, and so on.  If none of these things 
in themselves and for their own sakes mean anything to a person, 
if they are valued at all then only as a means to one’s own 
[personal welfare]⎯then that [welfare] can never come.  The way to 
achieve [a good life for you] is to pursue something else. 
 
The bracketed changes in the second paragraph of the excerpt were made to 
adapt Jones’s case from illustrating the paradox of hedonism to illustrating the 
paradox of welfare.  So instead of pleasure and happiness in the hedonism 
case, we now have welfare and good lives in the welfare case.  However, once 
this change is made, the problem becomes obvious.  If desire theory is limited 
to desires (which actually must reduce to the one desire) about your own 
welfare, then there is nothing left to produce the desired welfare.  Thus the 
paradox of welfare: To increase your welfare, you must desire something 
besides your own welfare.  So the “about you” aspect of desires need be nothing 
more than that you truly care about something as an end in itself. 
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 The two best desire theorists of all time, Mark Carl Overvold and Chris 
Heathwood, seem to have come very close to pointing out this paradox.  
Although neither of them did, I think the tension between various positions 
they have taken would have eventually led them here.  Notice the tension 
between the following two excerpts from Overvold.  First, Overvold (1982: 186-
87) states: 
 Despite its popularity, there are difficulties with the 
prevailing account.  The problems emerge when we reflect on the 
place of the concept of self-interest in a wider range of concepts 
including the concepts of self-sacrifice and selfishness.  Consider 
an apparent case of self-sacrifice: An individual dies in an effort to 
save another.  Now it seems to me that it would be not only 
incorrect, but unintelligible, to describe such a case as both a 
genuine instance of self-sacrifice and an act that enhances the 
individual’s welfare.  Let this be our first constraint on the concept 
of self-interest: The account of self-interest must not be so broad 
as to allow us to describe the same act as a self-sacrifice and as an 
act that promotes the agent’s self-interest. 
 
One paragraph later, Overvold (1982: 187) writes: 
 But we must be careful not to restrict the concept of self-
interest too narrowly.  In this respect, the concept of selfishness is 
instructive.  It provides our second constraint: For an account of 
self-interest to be adequate, the following proposition must be 
intelligible: Action A is unselfish, and action A maximizes my self-
interest.  This stipulation resists any attempt to restrict a person’s 
self-interest to the class of actions that are performed for selfish 
motives.  It has often been argued, most forcefully by Bishop 
Butler, that a life of caring for others, i.e., acting at least 
sometimes from unselfish motives, can in the long run maximize 
an individual’s welfare.  Although this need not be true, it does 
pose an intelligible possibility.  An adequate analysis of the concept 
of self-interest must not make such an alternative conceptually 
impossible. 
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While most philosophers seem impressed with Overvold’s attempt19 to navigate 
the waters between self-sacrifice and unselfishness, I am not aware of any who 
accept it.  Given the task Overvold set for himself, this is not surprising. 
 Heathwood has a similar tension in his writing on this topic.  Heathwood 
(26) recites the following case from Gibbard (1987: 137):  
Consider a piece of cake to be divided between Desdemona and 
Iago.  Desdemona is altruistic: given the choice, she would divide 
the cake equally.  Iago is selfish, and given the choice he would 
take the entire cake for himself.  They are of similar size and 
appetite, they eat cake with equal signs of gusto, and they will 
each undergo similar kinds of inconvenience in order to eat a cake 
that would otherwise go to waste. 
 
Heathwood (26) then says: 
The problem for rationalistically-oriented desire theories of welfare 
is that they will imply that it would be best for Desdemona to get 
only half the cake, for this is the outcome she prefers considering 
the matter rationalistically.  But intuitively what would be best for 
her would be to get all of it. 
 
However, writing about the problem of self-sacrifice, Heathwood (2011a: 32) 
provides the following case: 
Alice’s Friday Night.  Alice is deliberating over how to spend her 
Friday night.  She can go to the disco with her friends, or she can 
volunteer at the soup kitchen.  Alice considers the options and, 
despite how badly she wants to go dancing with her friends, she 
decides, voluntarily and with full and vivid knowledge, to spend 
her Friday night helping the needy at the soup kitchen.  She feels 
it would be the right thing to do, and so she does it. 
 
Heathwood (2011a: 35) then has this to say about the case: 
[I]t is no longer very intuitive that Alice is doing what is worse for 
her on this Friday night.  Indeed, the claim appears rather 
question-begging.  Just because Alice isn’t acting with herself in 
                                       
19 This attempt is described above as his attempt to formulate an analysis of 
desires that are about our own lives. 
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mind, or with her own best interests in mind, and is instead acting 
benevolently for others, we cannot conclude that she must 
therefore fail to be doing what is in her best interests. 
 
Just as Overvold had difficulty drawing a bright line between self-sacrifice and 
unselfish acts in the abstract, so too, I think, will Heathwood have difficulty 
distinguishing between Desdemona’s self-sacrificial act and Alice’s unselfish 
one. 
 Frankfurt, once again, brings the solution here into sharp focus.  
Although he is discussing “love” in this excerpt, the same could be said for the 
“caring” that I have been discussing throughout this project. 
The appearance of conflict between pursuing one’s own 
interests and being selflessly devoted to the interests of another is 
dispelled once we appreciate that what serves the self-interest of 
the lover is nothing other than his selflessness.  It is only if his love 
is genuine, needless to say, that it can have the importance for him 
that loving entails.  Therefore, insofar as loving is important to 
him, maintaining the volitional attitudes that constitute loving 
must be important to him.  Now those attitudes consist essentially 
in caring selflessly about the well-being of a beloved.  There is no 
loving without that.  Accordingly, the benefit of loving accrues to a 
person only to the extent that he cares about his beloved 
disinterestedly, and not for the sake of any benefit that he may 
derive either from the beloved or from loving it.  He cannot hope to 
fulfill his own interest in loving unless he puts aside his personal 
needs and ambitions and dedicates himself to the interests of 
another. 
 Any suspicion that this would require an implausibly high-
minded readiness for self-sacrifice can be allayed by the 
recognition that, in the very nature of the case, a lover identifies 
himself with what he loves.  In virtue of this identification, 
protecting the interests of his beloved is necessarily among the 
lover’s own interests.  The interests of his beloved are not actually 
other than his at all.  They are his interests too.  Far from being 
austerely detached from the fortunes of what he loves, he is 
personally affected by them.  The fact that he cares about his 
beloved as he does means that his life is enhanced when its 
interests prevail and that he is harmed when those interests are 
defeated.  The lover is invested in his beloved: he profits by its 
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successes, and its failures cause him to suffer.  To the extent that 
he invests himself in what he loves, and in that way identifies with 
it, its interests are identical with his own.  It is hardly surprising, 
then, that for the lover selflessness and self-interest coincide.  
(Frankfurt 2004: 61-62) 
 
 While there are excellent attempts at solving the problem that began in 
earnest with Parfit’s Stranger, there is no successful end game for the desire 
theorist on this path.  The only way out⎯and the right answer⎯is the claim 
that all of these desires, and more, are the very stuff of welfare.  As Frankfurt 
helps to illustrate, provided that I really care about serving the ends I have 
chosen, then satisfying these desires does make my life go better for me.  After 
acknowledging that a path other than the one I have chosen may make my life 
go better for me, there is nothing else for the desire theorist to do. 
 Accordingly, there is not much left for me to do.  Perhaps it is an odd 
feature of reality that in order to have a good life, we must care about 
something other than having a good life.  Perhaps it is even odder still that in 
order to have a good life, we must open ourselves up to the possibility of having 
a bad life or, worse still, the possibility of having a life that is worse than never 
having lived at all.  As Frankfurt (1999: 111) says, “A person who cares about 
something is, as it were, invested in it.  By caring about it, he makes himself 
susceptible to benefits and vulnerable to losses depending upon whether what 
he cares about flourishes or is diminished.”  This is precisely why the attempts 
by some theories of welfare to claim the “flourishing” and disown the 
“diminishing”⎯as illustrated in the excerpts from Overvold and 
Heathwood⎯are doomed.  Actual caring does not work this way, and caring is 
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the stuff of welfare.  Frankfurt (2004: 23), entirely deserving of the last word, 
sums this up perfectly: 
 It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with 
importance.  This provides us with stable ambitions and concerns; 
it marks our interests and our goals.  The importance that our 
caring creates for us defines the framework of standards and aims 
in terms of which we endeavor to conduct our lives.  A person who 
cares about something is guided, as his attitudes and his actions 
are shaped, by his continuing interest in it.  Insofar as he does 
care about certain things, this determines how he thinks it 
important for him to conduct his life.  The totality of the various 
things that a person cares about⎯together with his ordering of 
how important to him they are⎯effectively specifies his answer to 
the question of how to live. 
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EPILOGUE: THE MEANING OF LIFE 
 Imagine a world exactly like the one in which we find ourselves, albeit 
with one difference.  This new world comes complete with meaning labels.  
Everything has one.  Parents, siblings, strangers, cars, buildings, plants, 
animals, places, events, ideas, art⎯they all have a meaning label.  In addition, 
every person has a copy of the Holy Metameaning Label that specifies the 
meaning that Everything Has Taken As A Whole. 
 Although the question of whether you would like to live in such a world 
is an intelligible one, I think it misses the point entirely.  For although some of 
us like to act as though some of the things we either love or hate have a 
meaning that is both unassailable and independent of us, this idea cannot 
withstand scrutiny.  My meaning label world is meant to demonstrate this 
failure by bringing this notion front and center.  Hopefully, the problem came 
screaming off the page as you read the previous paragraph in the form of the 
following question: But what if one of the labels I find does not reflect what this 
person, place, or thing means to me?  Choosing what something means to us 
must certainly be at or very near the top of the list of things we are free to do if 
we are free in even the most minimal sense. 
 As it turns out, this fact is directly in line with the conclusion of my main 
project.  Frankfurt (2004: 23) returns to this theme time and again in claims 
like, “It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance.”  
This idea is very closely related to a central theme of existentialism.  As Jean-
  
277 
Paul Sartre (1969: 566) says, “life has no meaning a priori. . . . It is up to you to 
give it a meaning, and value is nothing but the meaning you choose.”  There 
are no exceptions to this rule for Sartre (and probably not for Frankfurt either), 
“not even a valid proof of the existence of God” (Sartre 2005: 214).  This is 
because, as the meaning label case was meant to show, you would still have to 
decide what this meant, if anything, to you. 
 I could elaborate on these points further, but one of the most 
enjoyable⎯and refreshingly brief⎯works of philosophy I have encountered is 
on this very subject.  When I realized that my project squared nicely with 
Thomas Nagel’s (1987: 95-101) essay called The Meaning of Life, I knew I had to 
include it rather than attempt a feeble summary: 
 Perhaps you have had the thought that nothing really 
matters, because in two hundred years we’ll all be dead.  This is a 
peculiar thought, because it’s not clear why the fact that we’ll be 
dead in two hundred years should imply that nothing we do now 
really matters. 
 The idea seems to be that we are in some kind of rat race, 
struggling to achieve our goals and make something of our lives, 
but that this makes sense only if those achievements will be 
permanent.  But they won’t be.  Even if you produce a great work 
of literature which continues to be read thousands of years from 
now, eventually the solar system will cool or the universe will wind 
down or collapse, and all trace of your efforts will vanish.  In any 
case, we can’t hope for even a fraction of this sort of immortality.  If 
there’s any point at all to what we do, we have to find it within our 
own lives. 
 Why is there any difficulty in that?  You can explain the 
point of most of the things you do.  You work to earn money to 
support yourself and perhaps your family.  You eat because you’re 
hungry, sleep because you’re tired, go for a walk or call up a friend 
because you feel like it, read the newspaper to find out what’s 
going on in the world.  If you didn’t do any of those things you’d be 
miserable; so what’s the big problem? 
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 The problem is that although there are justifications and 
explanations for most of the things, big and small, that we do 
within life, none of these explanations explain the point of your life 
as a whole⎯the whole of which all these activities, successes and 
failures, strivings and disappointments are parts.  If you think 
about the whole thing, there seems to be no point to it at all.  
Looking at it from the outside, it wouldn’t matter if you had never 
existed.  And after you have gone out of existence, it won’t matter 
that you did exist. 
 Of course your existence matters to other people⎯your 
parents and others who care about you⎯but taken as a whole, 
their lives have no point either, so it ultimately doesn’t matter that 
you matter to them.  You matter to them and they matter to you, 
and that may give your life a feeling of significance, but you’re just 
taking in each other’s washing, so to speak.  Given that any person 
exists, he has needs and concerns which make particular things 
and people within his life matter to him.  But the whole thing 
doesn’t matter. 
 But does it matter that it doesn’t matter?  “So what?” you 
might say.  “It’s enough that it matters whether I get to the station 
before my train leaves, or whether I’ve remembered to feed the cat.  
I don’t need more than that to keep going.”  This is a perfectly good 
reply.  But it only works if you really can avoid setting your sights 
higher, and asking what the point of the whole thing is.  For once 
you do that, you open yourself to the possibility that your life is 
meaningless. 
 The thought that you’ll be dead in two hundred years is just 
a way of seeing your life embedded in a larger context, so that the 
point of smaller things inside it seems not to be enough⎯seems to 
leave a larger question unanswered.  But what if your life as a 
whole did have a point in relation to something larger?  Would that 
mean that it wasn’t meaningless after all? 
 There are various ways your life could have a larger 
meaning.  You might be part of a political or social movement 
which changed the world for the better, to the benefit of future 
generations.  Or you might just help provide a good life for your 
own children and their descendants.  Or your life might be thought 
to have meaning in a religious context, so that your time on Earth 
was just a preparation for an eternity in direct contact with God. 
 About the types of meaning that depend on relations to other 
people, even people in the distant future, I’ve already indicated 
what the problem is.  If one’s life has a point as a part of something 
larger, it is still possible to ask about that larger thing, what is the 
point of it?  Either there’s an answer in terms of something still 
larger or there isn’t.  If there is, we simply repeat the question.  If 
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there isn’t, then our search for a point has come to an end with 
something which has no point.  But if that pointlessness is 
acceptable for the larger thing of which our life is a part, why 
shouldn’t it be acceptable already for our life taken as a whole?  
Why isn’t it all right for your life to be pointless?  And if it isn’t 
acceptable there, why should it be acceptable when we get to the 
larger context?  Why don’t we have to go on to ask, “But what is 
the point of all that?” (human history, the succession of the 
generations, or whatever). 
 The appeal to a religious meaning to life is a bit different.  If 
you believe that the meaning of your life comes from fulfilling the 
purpose of God, who loves you, and seeing Him in eternity, then it 
doesn’t seem appropriate to ask, “And what is the point of that?”  
It’s supposed to be something which is its own point, and can’t 
have a purpose outside itself.  But for this very reason it has its 
own problems. 
 The idea of God seems to be the idea of something that can 
explain everything else, without having to be explained itself.  But 
it’s very hard to understand how there could be such a thing.  If we 
ask the question, “Why is the world like this?” and are offered a 
religious answer, how can we be prevented from asking again, “And 
why is that true?”  What kind of answer would bring all of our 
“Why?” questions to a stop, once and for all?  And if they can stop 
there, why couldn’t they have stopped earlier? 
 The same problem seems to arise if God and His purposes 
are offered as the ultimate explanation of the value and meaning of 
our lives.  The idea that our lives fulfil God’s purpose is supposed 
to give them their point, in a way that doesn’t require or admit of 
any further point.  One isn’t supposed to ask “What is the point of 
God?” any more than one is supposed to ask, “What is the 
explanation of God?” 
 But my problem here, as with the role of God as ultimate 
explanation, is that I’m not sure I understand the idea.  Can there 
really be something which gives point to everything else by 
encompassing it, but which couldn’t have, or need, any point 
itself?  Something whose point can’t be questioned from outside 
because there is no outside? 
 If God is supposed to give our lives a meaning that we can’t 
understand, it’s not much of a consolation.  God as ultimate 
justification, like God as ultimate explanation, may be an 
incomprehensible answer to a question that we can’t get rid of.  On 
the other hand, maybe that’s the whole point, and I am just failing 
to understand religious ideas.  Perhaps the belief in God is the 
belief that the universe is intelligible, but not to us. 
 Leaving that issue aside, let me return to the smaller-scale 
dimensions of human life.  Even if life as a whole is meaningless, 
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perhaps that’s nothing to worry about.  Perhaps we can recognize 
it and just go on as before.  The trick is to keep your eyes on 
what’s in front of you, and allow justifications to come to an end 
inside your life, and inside the lives of others to whom you are 
connected.  If you ever ask yourself the question, “But what’s the 
point of being alive at all?”⎯leading the particular life of a student 
or bartender or whatever you happen to be⎯you’ll answer “There’s 
no point.  It wouldn’t matter if I didn’t exist at all, or if I didn’t care 
about anything.  But I do.  That’s all there is to it.” 
 Some people find this attitude perfectly satisfying.  Others 
find it depressing, though unavoidable.  Part of the problem is that 
some of us have an incurable tendency to take ourselves seriously.  
We want to matter to ourselves “from the outside.”  If our lives as a 
whole seem pointless, then a part of us is dissatisfied⎯the part 
that is always looking over our shoulders at what we are doing.  
Many human efforts, particularly those in the service of serious 
ambitions rather than just comfort and survival, get some of their 
energy from a sense of importance⎯a sense that what you are 
doing is not just important to you, but important in some larger 
sense: important, period.  If we have to give this up, it may 
threaten to take the wind out of our sails.  If life is not real, life is 
not earnest, and the grave is its goal, perhaps it’s ridiculous to 
take ourselves so seriously.  On the other hand, if we can’t help 
taking ourselves so seriously, perhaps we just have to put up with 
being ridiculous.  Life may be not only meaningless but absurd. 
 
 Count me as one who finds this answer perfectly satisfying.  After all, if 
there is no other plausible1 answer, then what is the point of fretting about it? 
 Leaving that to one side, I have a final point to make about Nagel’s piece 
as it relates to my project.  In the search for meaning within your own life, the 
external search should be paired with a matching internal search. The internal 
search is necessary because, given our particular predilections and proclivities, 
there will be some things that we are able to care about and other things that 
                                       
1 I do not think this word is strong enough to describe the situation.  As Nagel 
says, even though some may find it depressing, they still find it unavoidable.  
So it may not be that other options are implausible, as much as it is that they 
may be difficult or impossible to describe coherently. 
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we are incapable of caring about (Frankfurt 1999: 178-79).2  It is also worth 
noting that the facts concerning what we are able to care about may not line up 
with our preferred conception of ourselves.  And there is more likely to be a 
discrepancy here when it comes to the people we care about.  Our preferred 
conception of them may have no overlap at all with what they are in fact 
capable of caring about.  The most benign manifestation of forgetting this fact 
is an argument among adults.  The most tragic is the parents who attempt to 
force the things they care about on their children. 
 Of course, the scarring from this practice can range from mildly amusing 
(as portrayed nicely in the film The Breakfast Club) all the way down to utterly 
horrific (as with the “honor” killings of homosexual or otherwise sexually active 
children).  So parents, before indiscriminately inflicting your values on your 
children, remember that you are potentially costing the people you care about a 
chance of leading a life filled with things they can and do care about.  Imagine 
a world where well-meaning parents ensured the existence of Aristotle the 
carpenter, Mozart the doctor, and Van Gogh the lawyer.  Or just totally ignore 
this point.  You know what is best for your kid, right?  And if you mess it up, 
you can always take comfort in the fact that the sun will eventually swallow the 
earth⎯erasing all evidence of you and your mistake⎯before the universe either 
goes cold or collapses. 
Have a nice day.  
                                       
2 Rosati (1995: 300 n.10) also discusses the claim that “it is a necessary 
condition on something being good for a person that she be capable of caring 
about it.” 
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